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Abstract 
Through a compilation of four research articles, this PhD thesis investigates 
‘hope’ as a biopolitical technology. It interrogates the use of hope by the 
United States security apparatus, on the one hand, to pre-empt processes of 
radicalisation and, on the other hand, to prepare the subject of security to 
cope with permanent insecurity. The dissertation analyses the security dis-
course of the Obama Administrations 2009 – 2016, paying particular atten-
tion to strategic narratives of hope across three principal domains of US secu-
rity: diplomacy, development and military. The thesis thereby renders visible 
a set of ambiguous relations between hope and insecurity in US foreign poli-
cy during the Obama period: between hate and hope in the domain of (public) 
diplomacy; between despair and hope in the domain of development; and 
between fear and hope in the military domain. To analyse the respective 
strategic narratives, the thesis employs a theoretical framework drawn from 
Giorgio Agamben’s theory of biopolitics, through which hope appears as a 
means of governing the future, a technology employed to regulate processes 
of subjectification. The dissertation’s theoretical ambition is to question a 
central assumption undergirding important critique of the post-9/11 biopoliti-
cal condition: namely that practices of security are inherently at odds with 
hope, operating through discourses and practices of fear and suffering to 
reduce the capacity to hope within the global populace. By analysing the 
appropriation of hope by US security discourse, the thesis explores how prac-
tices of security works through hope to achieve security. US security dis-
course achieves this by means of constituting a particular form of hopeful 
life: an individualised and resilient form of neoliberal life who is called to 
embody an indistinction between fear, despair, hate and hope.  
 
Keywords: hope, biopolitics, Agamben, Obama, security, development, pub-
lic diplomacy, resilience, radicalisation, counterterrorism, strategic narra-
tives, neoliberalism, discourse analysis.  
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Foreword 
All that Shepherd Fairey’s iconic Obama poster says is “Hope”. Aside from 
the face of Obama – “looking towards the future, his gaze serious yet confi-
dent” (White, 2010) – it details no hopeful subject, and no distinct future to 
hope for, only an imperative: Hope. In contrast to other seminal Presidential 
slogans, such as Donald Trump’s “Make America great again” and George 
W. Bush’s promise of “enduring freedom” to the Iraqi people, Fairey’s poster 
issued no distinct promise. It did not promise that the future will be free of 
struggle, nor that the future will be certain. Hope was its only promise, an 
assurance that despite the fear and division of our present day, hope was still 
possible.  
During the past years, I have studied the biopolitical appropriation of 
hope by the US security apparatus. During this time, I have come to be 
haunted by the imperative to hope and the desire for hope, which by no 
means is exclusive to Obama. On the contrary, the desire for hope undergirds 
much of contemporary critique directed at the post 9/11 state of security. In 
this critique, a radical potential has been invested in hope, finding in hope, on 
the one hand, an openness to an unknown future, to the stranger and to the 
different (Bloch, 1986; Rorty, 1999; Derrida, 2006: 212; Solnit, 2016), and, 
on the other hand, a radical capacity to imagine another future, and in this 
process a potential to transform the present (Hardt and Negri, quoted in 
Brown et. al., 2002; Ahmed, 2004: 185; Anderson, 2006a; 2006b; Burke, 
2011; Reid, 2012, Evans and Reid, 2014; Pedwell, 2012).  
The thesis that follows is my attempt to question this imperative and the 
political capacity that so often associated with it. Through a compilation of 
four research articles, the thesis examines hope as a biopolitical technology, 
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interrogating its use by the United States security apparatus to pre-empt pro-
cesses of radicalisation. The empirical material consists of the security dis-
course of the Obama administrations 2009 – 2016. Particular attention is paid 
to strategic narratives of hope across three principal domains of US security: 
diplomacy, development and military. Rendered visible by this analysis is a 
series of ambiguous relationships between hope and in/security in US foreign 
policy of the Obama period: between hate and hope in the domain of diplo-
macy; between despair and hope in the domain of development; and between 
fear and hope in the domain of military affairs. Through this reading, the 
thesis explores how the discourse of hope is used to constitute a particular 
form of life: a depoliticised and allegedly nonviolent neoliberal way of being.  
 
 
Outline of the kappa  
This introductory kappa attempts to synthesise and present the research con-
ducted in the four supporting articles, rendering explicit the methodological 
choices and analytical tools employed within the articles. It also brings the 
theoretical discussions and empirical analyses performed within the articles 
together, in order to allow a concluding discussion on how hope is used bio-
politically by US security discourse. It is my ambition that the kappa should 
be able to stand on its own, demanding no familiarity with the supporting 
articles.  
Chapter 1 presents the research problematic that informs the thesis, the 
study’s aims as well as the research questions employed. It briefly introduces 
how hope has been enlisted by politics of security as a tool to pre-empt pro-
cesses of radicalisation to what in US security discourse is referred to as 
‘violent extremism’. The chapter also presents the choice of empirical mate-
rial and some of the limitations involved with this choice, as well as with the 
choice of an Agambenian theoretical framework. 
Chapter 2 aims to establish a theoretical framework to study hope as a bi-
opolitical technology. It also reviews the relationship between hope and secu-
rity as it has been perceived by critical analyses of modern and postmodern 
forms of biopolitics of security. The chapter highlights the centrality afforded 
to hope within studies critical of the post 9/11 state of security. Drawn from 
this discussion is a conceptual toolkit that is heavily indebted to Agamben, 
focusing on the possible conceptual relation between hope and Agamben’s 
concepts of exclusion, suspension and potentiality – crucial as Agamben 
deems them to be for the workings of both sovereign power and biopolitics.  
Chapter 3 elaborates on the methodological rationale that informs the 
analysis of the Obama administration’s security discourse. The chapter quali-
Foreword 
 3 
fies the choice of discourse as the thesis’ level of analysis and the selection of 
grand narrative as its primary object of study. The chapter further details the 
methodological limitations and possibilities entailed in the concept of the 
example, discussing the relation between the case of official foreign policy 
discourse and its use of strategic narratives and the wider security dispositif 
this discourse is a part of. Also discussed are the analytical concepts em-
ployed to identify the conceptual network of relations and the narrative struc-
ture that give form and meaning to the use of hope in US security discourse.  
Chapter 4 synthesises the empirical investigations performed in the sepa-
rate articles. The aim of the chapter is to discuss and make visible the rela-
tionship between hope and security as it is articulated and actualised in the 
respective strategic narratives that comprise US security discourse. The anal-
yses are presented through a series of thresholds (a key analytical concept in 
the Agambenian lexicon): between hate and hope, despair and hope and lastly 
between fear and hope.  
Chapter 5 concludes this kappa. The aim of this chapter is to discuss how 
hope conditions political agency today. The chapter begins with a summary 
of the empirical analysis performed in chapter 4 in light of the study’s re-
search questions. These findings are then discussed in relation to key con-
cepts of Agambenian biopolitics, namely the state of exception and bare life, 
probing these concepts’ relation to hope. The chapter ends with a short after-
word that seeks to discuss the relationship between hope and biopolitics be-
yond US security discourse. Following this short excursion is a discussion of 
the contribution to research that this thesis offers as well as a short comment 
of future avenues of research provoked or made possible by the thesis. 
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Introduction  
According to Terry Eagleton, hope is a “key signifier” (2015: 54) of moder-
nity, a signal of “the transition from the tradition-bound to the future-
oriented, from timeless metaphysical truths to the historically open-ended” 
(2015: 54). As a key signifier of modern life, hope appears to be everywhere. 
If one begins to search for hope in one’s everyday surroundings, as I have 
done since 2011 when work on this thesis began, it can seem as if the world 
is obsessed by hope. From billboards to television commercials we are con-
stantly urged to commit to hope – to play ‘Football for Hope’ (FIFA, 2010), 
to do ‘Yoga for Hope’ (City of Hope, 2016) and to ‘Run for Hope’ (Hope 
Association, 2016). We are also asked to give money for hope. In the UK 
alone, 1050 listed charities include the word hope in their name (UK Charity 
Commission, 2018).  
In politics, hope seems to belong simultaneously to no one and to every-
one. From the political left to the political right, hope is embedded in lan-
guage as diverse as Marxist slogans of a coming revolution (Bloch, 1986; 
Harvey, 2000; Chomsky, 2010) to capitalist and liberal mottos of inevitable 
progress (Schlesinger, 2007; Ridley, 2011). According to Ben Anderson, “all 
political campaigns express and offer more or less specific hopes, albeit in a 
range of different tones” (2017). As argued by Anderson, this includes those 
discourses that often are claimed to be antithetical to the indeterminateness 
and inclusiveness that often is associated with hope, such as current US Pres-
ident Donald Trump’s campaign discourse of “hate” (Giroux, 2016; Shaull, 
2017), “fear” (Robin, 2016; Fallows, 2017) and “despair” (Aronson, 2017; 
Solnit, 2016). 
In contemporary politics of global security, hope holds an equally central 
place. In 2009, when announcing the nomination of US President Barack 
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Obama as laureate of the Nobel Peace Price, the Nobel Committee recog-
nised hope as a key concept of liberal peace (Nobel Media, 2009). Others 
hold hope to be central to the legitimation of humanitarian intervention (An-
derson, 2006a: 749). The US 1992-93 Operation Restore Hope in Somalia 
and the 1999 US Operation Shining Hope in Kosovo serve as clear examples 
of this practice.  
In the post 9/11 understanding of global insecurity, the proclaimed lack of 
hope within the global South has served – and continues to serve – as a con-
vincing explanation to the continual threat of terrorism. Exemplary of this 
logic is former US President George W. Bush’s identification of hopelessness 
as a root cause for terrorism: “the stability we thought we saw in the Middle 
East was a mirage. For decades, millions of men and women in the region 
have been trapped in oppression and hopelessness. And these conditions left 
a generation disillusioned, and made this region a breeding ground for ex-
tremism” (2006, emphasis added). As President, Barack Obama often repeat-
ed Bush’s logic, arguing that it is “when people – especially young people – 
feel entirely trapped in impoverished communities [that] those communities 
[become] ripe for extremist recruitment” (Obama, 2015a, emphasis added). 
According to Obama, the capacity to hope is defined as one of the principal 
targets of terrorist acts, the intention of which Obama describes as to “foment 
fear and division” (2016a). Trump has recently offered a similar perspective: 
“The true toll of ISIS, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and so many others, 
must be counted not only in the number of dead. It must also be counted in 
generations of vanished dreams” (2017). 
In contemporary US Presidential counterterrorism discourse, the produc-
tion of hope is often presented as a key strategy for the pacification of what is 
perceived to be potentially dangerous populations. In this discourse, hope 
appears as a use object, the deployment of which ostensibly furthers the aims 
of security. According to Bush, “hope is an answer to terror” (2002), for 
Obama, hope is “the most powerful weapon in our arsenal” (2009a). In the 
wake of the 2016 attacks in Brussels, Obama described the social character of 
this weapon, moving from one body to another: “It is not a static hope [but] a 
living and breathing hope. It’s not a gift we simply receive, but one we must 
give to others, a gift to carry forth” (2016a). In his celebrated Nobel lecture, 
Obama defined hope as holding the capacity to bridge seemingly fixed lines 
of division, to reject what may appear as static particular identities and thus 
to pave the way for a common humanity (2009b).  
Prompted by such narratives, this thesis interrogates the instrumentalisa-
tion of hope by the US security apparatus under the Obama administrations 
2009 – 2016. If hope is that which will combat and defeat terror, operating on 
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terror’s alleged conditions of possibilities, then this thesis analyses how this 
weapon is used. By observing hope’s social and political character – how 
hope is envisioned to move between bodies, to assemble bodies into for-
mation – the thesis analyses how discourses of hope are meant to regulate the 
capacity of certain risk populations to become violent. The thesis questions 
what hope is, how it is practiced and how it acts on the lives it targets. Pro-
voked by the empirical investigations that supports this thesis are questions 
of larger ethical and political weight that are addressed in the concluding 
chapter of this kappa: If hope is an embrace of insecurity (Rorty, 1999), what 
happens to hope when it is rendered into a technology of security? If hope 
expresses the promise of an open and unknown future (Derrida, 2006; Solnit, 
2016), then what remains of this promise, when it is used to govern the fu-
ture’s coming into presence? If hope is a capacity to envision another more 
just world (Bloch, 1986; Burke, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014; Aronson, 
2017), what happens to this capacity when it is used to secure this world, 
when hope becomes both a necessity and a use of force?1  
While hope currently appears to have a conventional meaning – defined 
according to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy as something like 
desire plus expectation (Bloeser and Stahl, 2017) – it is difficult from a phil-
osophical viewpoint to argue that hope has a fixed meaning. On the contrary, 
as made clear by Eagleton’s exposé of hope’s conceptual history (2015), 
hope is an essentially contested concept. Peter Burke maintains that there is 
no “Hope, with a capital H, in the singular”, but rather “varieties of hope, 
[…] hopes in the plural” (2012: 207). Susan McManus describes the meaning 
of hope as inherently “ambivalent” (2011). Throughout hope’s conceptual 
history, it has been referred to inter alia as a feeling or affect (Bloch, 1986; 
Massumi, 2002a; Anderson, 2006a), a disposition or ethos of life (Anderson, 
2006a; Eagleton, 2015: 57-59; Aristotle, 2016: 49), a falsifiable rational es-
timation of the future (Descartes, 2015: 221; Eagleton, 2015: 3), and curious-
ly both as pleasure (Bauman, 2008: 15; Ahmed, 2010: 181) and as pain (Nie-
tzsche, 1996: 45).  
In contemporary critiques of liberal forms of linear and modernist gov-
ernance, hope seems to hold a particular appeal. In this literature, hope is 
commonly referred to as a revolutionary experience of excess (Massumi, 
2002a; Spivak, 2002; Anderson, 2006a), as an embrace of contingency and of 
social diversity (Rorty, 1999; Derrida, 2006; Solnit, 2016; Robin, 2016; Ar-
                                                                  
1 As shown by Steven DeCaroli, the etymological roots of the concept of necessity stem from 
the Greek word ananke, which was perceived by the Greeks to be closely related to both vio-
lence and security: “the proximity of necessity and violence arises, of course, in the context of 
biological survival where, in accordance with natural law (ius naturale), the use of force to 
secure basic necessities is justified” (2016: 208, original emphasis). 
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onson, 2017) and/or as a transformative and subversive capacity that is intrin-
sic to, if not defining of, life (Negri, 1999; Zournazi, 2002; Burke, 2011; 
Evans and Reid, 2014). Susan McManus has dubbed this appeal the “hope 
project” (2011), calling attention to how hope has come to capture the imagi-
nary of the academic left in its attempt to articulate resistance towards the 
post 9/11 security apparatus.  
Given hope’s ambiguous and polysemic nature, this thesis does not seek 
to define hope. On the contrary, it analyses the instrumentalisation of hope 
within the Obama administration’s security discourse as performative of 
hope. Following Ghassan Hage, who has argued that “we need to look at 
what kind of hope a society encourages rather than simply whether it gives 
people hope or not” (2002: 152), the thesis sees hope as a concept whose 
meaning is established through practices that change over time and space. 
Following a long tradition within poststructural and/or discourse-analytical 
thought (Foucault, 1972; Hansen, 2006; Cholouriaki, 2008; Derrida, 2009: 
170; Agamben, 2009a; 2011), the thesis reads the use of hope within US 
security discourse as produced by, and as being productive of, social realities 
and the lives that inhabit them. As such, the thesis probes how the Obama 
administrations’ politics of security aimed to be formative both of a particular 
form of hope and of the life meant to experience and embody it. The primary 
objective of this thesis is not to analyse how the Obama administration’s 
security discourse played on people’s hopes – as if hope had a given mean-
ing, as if all humans by default shared a general predisposition to experience 
a particular kind of hope – but rather how it rendered the capacity to hope 
into a political problem, a deficiency that needed to be externally corrected.2 
In other words, the thesis treats the use of hope by and in US security dis-
course as what Giorgio Agamben refers to as a biopolitical technology or 
apparatus (2011). According to Agamben, the aim of biopolitics is, on the 
one hand, to form, model, valuate and define what is considered safe, non-
violent human life and, on the other hand, to identify, exclude and/or to regu-
late those lives that are considered dangerous and threatening (Agamben, 
1999a: 147, 1998: 137, see also Reid, 2011). This dual objective makes bio-
politics – the power to make life – inseparable from sovereign power – the 
power to let life die (Agamben, 1999a: 147; 1998:6).3 As Judith Butler re-
                                                                  
2 As noted for instance by Murray Li (2007: 7) and by De Larrinaga and Doucet, problematisa-
tion is a key facet of biopolitics. It is a “discursive strategy [that] de-legitimates local politics and 
gives the green light for the disciplinary and rationalising intervention of outside forces” (De 
Larrinaga and Doucet, 2014: 58).  
3 In contrast to Foucault, Agamben perceives no difference between biopolitics and sovereign 
power. According to Agamben “the production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of 
sovereign power” (1998: 6, original emphasis). For a discussion on the differences between 
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minds, the question of what life is, of life’s ontology, is never posed “outside 
of operations of power” (2009: 1). It is a question of exclusion, the result of 
historical and political struggles, of “social crafting and form” (Ibid.). As 
such, every definition of life – every claim to establish the fact of life, such as 
Obama’s recognition of hope as foundational for the establishment of a 
“common humanity” (2009b) – is part of what Agamben refers to as a “re-
lentless fight between living beings and apparatuses” (2011: 14),4 between 
the substance of life and the “historical element” (Ibid.: 6) through which 
living beings are captured: “the set of institutions, of processes of subjectifi-
cation and of rules in which power relations become concrete” (Ibid.). It is 
the result of this fight that Agamben calls the subject (Ibid.).  
To study hope’s role in this process, the thesis analyses security discourse 
– a key discourse in the biopolitical apparatus governing contemporary life. 
As mentioned above, this study is limited to the security discourse of the 
Obama administration. The reasons are twofold, and although they will be 
expanded upon in the methodological section of this kappa, they are worth 
introducing here. Firstly, few presidencies have been so intimately tied to 
hope as Obama’s (Nobel Media AB, 2009; Pedwell, 2012; CBS, 2017). 
Moreover, as argued for instance by Hirokazu Miyazaki (2008), the hope that 
Obama embodied was to a large extent self-referential. In contrast to tradi-
tional accounts of US exceptionalism articulated by his predecessors (Pat-
man, 2006; Burke, 2007; Rojecki, 2008), Obama promised not to realise a 
given future, but hope for the future. As such, the election of Obama was 
presented as a radical break from the past, one that seemingly freed hope 
from its attachment not only to US exceptionalism and manifest destiny, but 
also from the global power relations supported by such notions (Stephanson, 
2009; Pedwell, 2012; Golbush, 2016). In contrast to the discourse of the war 
on terror, Obama’s conceptualisation of hope was presented not as an imperi-
alistic assertion of an already defined vision of utopic perfection, but as an 
empathic recognition of the impossibility of such visions (Rossi Keen, 2008: 
5; Hirsh, 2011; Kloppenberg, 2011; Berlant, quoted in Pedwell, 2012). Ac-
cording to Scott Atran, this promise made Obama key to fighting radicalisa-
tion, a “ray of hope” that in 2008 “already [was] making it harder for Al 
                                                                                                                                               
Agamben and Foucault’s definition of biopolitics, see Ojakangas, 2005; Genel, 2006; Coleman 
and Grove, 2009; Snoek, 2010; Heron, 2011.  
4 Agamben defines an apparatus as “literally anything that has in some way the capacity to 
capture, orient, determine, intercept, model, control, or secure the gestures, behaviors, opinions, 
or discourses of living beings. Not only, therefore, prisons, madhouses, the panopticon, schools, 
confession, factories, disciplines, juridical measures and so forth (whose connection with power 
is in a certain sense evident), but also the pen, writing, literature, philosophy, agriculture, ciga-
rettes, navigation, computers, cellular telephones and – why not – language itself” (2011: 14). 
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Qaeda and associates to promote the demonization of America which drives 
their viral movement” (2008). 
Secondly, Obama’s particular version of hope remains relevant in global 
security discourse. Not only does it still reverberate in the US security appa-
ratus at large (Gerson, 2016), it also surfaces periodically in the Trump ad-
ministration’s security discourse – think for instance of Trump’s asserted 
commitment to tolerance, respect of cultural and ethnic difference as well as 
to the right of every human to hope issued in Saudia Arabia (2017). One may 
also consider whether not the seemingly grand contrast between Obama and 
Trump has not secured for Obama’s version of hope an even stronger grip on 
the political liberal imagination and beyond. Following Trump’s election, the 
political debate in the academic left was to a large extent centered on a desire 
for hope (Anderson 2017; Tängh Wrangel, 2017b).5 Polls taken shortly after 
Trumps’ election further suggested that Obama’s popularity increased during 
Trump’s presidency (Tesfamichael, 2017). 
To study the use of hope within the Obama administration’s security dis-
course, this thesis analyses three different, yet interrelated, strategic narra-
tives tasked to generate hope within what implicitly or explicitly is referred to 
in US security discourse as risk populations (Jackson, 2007; von Hippel, 
2008; Kundnani, 2012; Eroukmanhoff, 2015). These narratives are key with-
in the Obama administrations’ counter terrorism communications, engaging – 
by the means of (public) diplomacy, development and military –6 three dif-
ferent processes of purported radicalisation. By looking at how hope is articu-
lated in these respective narratives, the thesis analyses how hope is meant to 
regulate violence by tackling, firstly, the assumed relation between ideology, 
hate and violence (diplomacy), secondly, the relation between poverty, des-
pair and violence (development), and, thirdly, the relation between insecurity, 
fear and violence (military), as detailed in the US National Security Strategy 
(White House, 2010a; 2015).  
Following Agamben’s methodological conceptualisation of the example 
as a performative operator (2009a; 2009b), the primary empirical material 
that is taken to exemplify and make visible these narratives consists of politi-
cal speeches, described by Obama as a key tool to inspire the public, an op-
portunity to ‘send a message’, to ‘commit to hope’ (2015b). As exemplary 
moments of hope, speeches signify for Obama more than “just words” 
(2008a; 2015c), they represent the possibility to inspire and ignite political 
action and participation (2008a). Just like hope, Obama describes words as a 
                                                                  
5 For a critical reflection of this desire, see Tängh Wrangel, 2017b.  
6 In the US National Security Strategy of 2015 these ‘pillars’ of security are defined as the three 
“principal means of U.S. engagement abroad” (White House, 2015: 4). 
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“living” entity, as a “call to action, a roadmap” (2015c) that not only the 
public is urged to follow, but also the US security apparatus as a whole 
(Obama, 2014a). As such, while political speeches may not represent the 
standard use of hope within the US security apparatus, if such a standard 
exist at all, they nonetheless hold normative power over this use. As the most 
authoritative level of political communication, presidential speeches repre-
sent the words which the 2010 US National Framework of Strategic Commu-
nication urges the US security apparatus to be “synchronised” and “aligned” 
with (White House, 2010b: 1). Agamben calls such discourses exemplary or 
paradigmatic (2009a: 9-32).  
The analysis of these narratives is highly indebted to Agamben’s political 
philosophy, in particular to his conceptualisation of potentiality (1999b). If 
hope traditionally has been perceived as a radical capacity or potentiality to 
imagine another world or future, an embrace of contingency that by default 
would be opposite to or external to the reductive logics both of security and 
biopolitics, Agamben grants no such privilege to hope. For Agamben, there is 
no outside of power, no particular political agency invested in the experience 
that there is something beyond our present world. Potentiality functions for 
Agamben rather as “the ontological underpinning […] of sovereignty” (Atell, 
2011: 162). Agamben perceives power not as a containment or reduction of 
potentiality, but the “organization of potentiality” (1995: 71). As such, he 
defines potentiality as a “principle” (1998: 47) that runs through every at-
tempt to give form to life. Given the close proximity identified by Obama 
between hope and potentiality (2008b; 2009c; 2009d; 2015b; 2016a), it is the 
identification of this ‘principle’ within US security discourse that Agamben’s 
theoretical framework makes possible, and hence also its role in the constitu-
tion of what this thesis will refer to as hopeful life. In other words, by direct-
ing attention to the role of hope-as-potentiality in the maintenance of the 
biopolitical present, the framework offered by Agamben makes it possible to 
analyse hope as a principle of sovereign power, a technique of security. It 
places not only Obama’s discourse of hope under critical scrutiny, but in 
extension also the diagnoses and prescriptions offered by the contemporary 
desire for hope within the political and academic left (McManus, 2011; Dug-
gan and Muñoz, 2009: 275).  
 
 
Aims 
The primary aim of this thesis is to understand and make visible how hope is 
employed as a biopolitical technology within US security discourse under the 
Obama administration. It seeks to shine light on what the purposes of this use 
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are, how its ideal practice is envisioned and executed by US security dis-
course. It also aims to render visible how hope acts on the life it targets  and 
what relationship between hope and security the use of hope presupposes and 
(re)produces. As an effect of this investigation, this thesis aims to make pos-
sible a discussion on the relationship between hope and the present biopoliti-
cal condition.  
On a theoretical level, the thesis aims to contribute to a range of litera-
tures in which the concept of hope holds a central place. To studies of the 
politics of hope – and of the adjacent concepts of desire (e.g. Laclau and 
Mouffe, 1985; Stavrakakis, 1999)7 and optimism (e.g. Berlant, 2011) – this 
thesis adds a biopolitical dimension. Both Lauren Berlant and Sara Ahmed 
(2010: 181) treat the use of hope as a subdiscipline to the political manipula-
tion of desire, as an “attachment” (Berlant, 2011: 23), or a “wish orientation” 
(Ahmed, 2010: 181) towards a politically communicated vision of the future, 
a final end-state. In contrast to these studies, which have analysed the rela-
tionship between neoliberalism and hope, I am primarily interested in hope’s 
relationship to security.8 I am further more interested in how the subject is 
constituted as hopeful, rather than in studying which future that is projected 
towards the subject. To general studies of biopolitics, the thesis conceptualis-
es hope as a biopolitical technique, discussing how hope can be studied as 
form of governance. To studies of Agambenian biopolitics, the thesis seeks to 
discuss how hope regulates the relationship between politically qualified life, 
bios, and bare life, zoē, questioning a common description of bare life as a 
life without hope (Agamben, 1998: 7; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 
2011; Bourke, 2014). The thesis further seeks to contribute conceptually to 
critical literatures on development, radicalisation, resilience and affect theo-
ry, by systematically situating hope in these respective forms of governance. 
Empirically, the thesis aims to make three contributions. First, it seeks to 
remedy a bias in critical security studies towards studying the affect and logic 
of fear within critical studies of security (Hardt and Negri, quoted in Brown 
2002; Ahmed, 2004; Robin, 2004; 2016; Debrix, 2005; Massumi, 2005; 
2007; Bleiker and Hutchinson, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009; Loseke, 2009; 
Royal, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014). Secondly, the thesis also seeks to widen 
the range of empirical cases to which Agamben’s framework is traditionally 
applied, beyond its typical discursive case: explicitly excluding discourses, 
                                                                  
7 For a conceptual discussion on the difference between hope and desire, see Eagleton, 2015: 47-
54.  
8 Following Luis Lobo-Guerrero and Anna Stobbe, neoliberalism is for me a result, not a starting 
point. According to Lobo-Guerrero and Stobbe, different forms of governance should “not to be 
assumed as preconceived, for example, of a neoliberal sort. It must be taken instead as undeter-
mined until the power relations that give rise to it are explored” (2016: 431).  
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often exemplified by the rhetoric of Presidents Bush and Trump (Bly, 2016). 
Third, to studies on Obama’s grand strategy, the thesis questions common 
descriptions of Obama’s hope as “general” (Miyazaki, 2008: 8), “imagina-
tive” (Kloppenberg, 2011: 84), “empathic” (Berlant, quoted in Pedwell, 
2012) and “pragmatic” (Rossi-Keen, 2008) as well as readings of Obama’s 
security strategy as historically opposed to US imperialism (Stephanson, 
2009).   
Methodologically, the thesis aims to contribute to attempts to operational-
ise Agamben’s dense political philosophy, in terms of both methodology and 
method. As for methodology, the thesis discusses the use of discourse as a 
way of studying the employment of biopolitical technologies, such as hope. It 
also discusses the relationship between a single case study and the general 
dispsitif, or apparatus of power, of which the case is but a part. In terms of 
method, the thesis attempts to deduce from Agamben’s philosophy a set of 
principles, such as the example (1998: 21-22; 2009a; 2009b: 9-11) and the 
signature (2009a) through which to both delimit a given discourse and to 
select empirical material. Through a discussion on Agamben’s conceptualisa-
tion of the relationship between the example and the exception (1998: 21-22) 
as well as his concept’s of repetition and movement (2004a), the thesis also 
seeks to tease out an analytical practice through which to read the text and 
narrative structure of a given discourse.  
Politically, the thesis seeks to problematize the assumed progressiveness 
that various strands of the biopolitical theoretical canon afford to hope. By 
questioning the juxtaposition between hope and bare life that is often as-
sumed in this literature (McSorley, 2016; Burke, 2011; Agamben, 2000: 31; 
Bourke, 2014), the thesis aims not only to provide an alternative reading of 
the biopolitical present, but also to question the political potency of the con-
temporary desire for hope within the academic and political left.  
 
 
Research questions  
In order to study hope as a biopolitical technique, as a tool of discursive 
power that is appropriated by apparatuses of security, the thesis is guided by 
the following central research question: 
  
How is hope designed to be used biopolitically in US security discourse 
under the Obama administrations? 
 
To answer this question, the thesis pursues four subsidiary research ques-
tions, each targeting different aspects of biopolitical use, as defined by 
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Agamben: namely, instrumentality, ontology, temporality and subjectifica-
tion. The discussion below will discuss Agamben’s definition in relation to 
the four subsidiary research questions, listed below:  
 
In US security discourse under President Obama:   
 
1) how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the in-
strumental use of hope? 
2) how do particular conceptual relations give meaning to hope? 
3) how is the temporal experience of hope articulated and actual-
ised?  
4) how are different forms of life constituted in relation to hope 
and to one another? 
 
As stated above, the reasoning behind these research questions is based on 
Agamben’s definition of the concept of use (2015), the exploration of which 
concludes the Homo Sacer book series. Starting with instrumentality and 
ending with biopolitics, the ensuing discussion will review Agamben’s four-
fold conceptualisation.  
The formulation of research question 1 – how can we understand the nar-
rative means and ends of the instrumental use of hope? – is based on Agam-
ben’s etymological discussion on the concept of ‘use’, in particular its rela-
tion to technology. According to Agamben, in its most direct articulation, use 
refers to an instrumental activity, one whose genealogy Michel Foucault has 
traced to the Greek notion of techne as “a practical rationality governed by a 
conscious aim” (1984: 255-256). Agamben finds this definition resurfaced 
across the conceptual history of use, actualised for instance in Martin 
Heidegger’s description of technology as “nothing other than human action 
directed at a goal” (quoted in Agamben, 2015: 68). With that in mind, the 
first research question directs attention to the instrumentalisation of hope that 
is a central part of US security discourse in general and in its adoption of 
strategic narratives in particular (Obama, 2008a; 2009a). Through what nar-
rative means are hope explicitly meant to be produced by these different 
narratives, and to what ends? How do these narratives make use of hope to 
replace the hopelessness that is perceived to condition radicalisation? And 
what kind of ‘security’ does this use promise to achieve?  
The second research question – how do particular conceptual relations 
give meaning to hope? – directs attention to how the use of hope gives mean-
ing to hope. According to Agamben, to be used is not only a question of 
instrumentality, as if the object of use had a given and fixed meaning, an 
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original and static function, generative of only one possible effect. On the 
contrary, use refers to a performative process that is constitutive of the object 
in use, in this case hope. Historically, Agamben traces the performative di-
mension of use to the Greek category of work, ergon, meaning production. In 
ancient Greece, work designated a process of rendering actual, allowing a 
not-yet fully formed object to “come into presence” (2015: 48). For Agam-
ben, to bring something forth includes a linguistic process9 – a practice of 
naming and constituting the object of use by inscribing it “within a given 
sphere” (2007a: 85).10 To be used is to be placed in relation – to be inserted 
in a sphere consisting of other concepts, subjects and objects, and, crucially, 
to affect and be affected by these relations (Agamben, 2014: 69; 2015: 29). 
Based on this logic, the thesis analyses the conceptual relations through 
which hope is articulated in the Obama administrations’ security discourse: 
between hope and fear in the sphere of military; between hope and despair in 
the sphere of development; and between hope and hate in the sphere of (pub-
lic) diplomacy. Through these three analyses, the thesis interrogates the gen-
eral relationship between hope and security.  
The third empirically oriented research question – how is the temporal 
experience of hope articulated and actualised? – refers to the historical and 
contingent dimension that Agamben claims to belong to the practice of use, 
described by Agamben, on the one hand, in terms of movement, and, on the 
other hand, in terms of becoming. Firstly, as per the above, Agamben refers 
to the practice of use as a process, an activity that moves the object of use, 
“inscrib[ing]” (2007: 85) it in a given sphere, thereby changing its meaning. 
So described, the activity of use is inherently temporal, a sense of movement 
that dislodges a signifier from past usages and makes it available for use in 
new ways. Secondly, Agamben describes use as an activity that brings pres-
ence to that which is not-yet fully actualised (2015: 48). It is in this sense that 
one can say that usage organises processes of becoming. According to 
Agamben, this is a central aim of every biopolitical technology (2011: 11), 
one that is performed inter alia through the organisation of time. In Infancy 
and History, Agamben argues that “every culture is first and foremost a par-
                                                                  
9 For Agamben, what is fundamental to life is the constitutive function of relation: “relation 
ceases to be one category among others and acquires a special ontological rank” (2015: 270). 
Nothing can escape being-in-relation, not even language. Indeed, according to Agamben, “the 
fundamental relation – the onto-logical relation – runs between beings and language, Being and 
its being said or named. Logos is this relation, in which beings and their being said are both 
identified and differentiated, distant and indistinguishable” (Ibid.: 271).  
10 Agamben thus follows a long tradition within post-structural thought to substitute meaning for 
use, or rather, to attribute meaning to use. As argued by Derrida: “the idealization of an objective 
and theoretical ideality of meaning, or a ’free’ ideality, as Husserl would say […], cannot be 
what gives the rule for the use” (2009: 170).  
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ticular experience of time and that no new culture is possible without an 
alteration in this experience” (2007b: 99). Based on this logic, the thesis 
investigates the experience of time that is articulated and actualised in and by 
US security discourse’ use of hope. If hope is issued through ‘a new begin-
ning’ – the key theme of the strategic narrative on diplomacy, or in a ‘new 
moment of promise’ – the leitmotif of the strategic narrative on development 
– then how are these moments meant to be experienced temporally? What 
past do they promise to displace, what present do they actualise, and what 
future do they visualise?    
The fourth empirically oriented research question – how are different 
forms of life constituted in relation to hope and to one another? – attends to 
the explicit biopolitical dimension that Agamben identifies as inherent in the 
activity of use. According to Agamben, a biopolitical technology, or appa-
ratus, takes as its object the constitution of life. As discussed above, apparat-
uses aims to “capture” (2011: 14) what Agamben refers to as a non-fixed 
“substance of life”, to mould it into a given subject. As Agamben’s discus-
sion of the concept of use indicates, the activity of biopolitical use presup-
poses a series of relations: between the using subject and the object of use, 
between the object of use and the subject that is the projected outcome of that 
use, and finally between the using subject and the produced subject. Accord-
ing to Agamben, these relations are performative of each position, including, 
the using subject. Agamben explains: "Every use is first of all use of the self: 
to enter into a relation of use with something, I must be affected by it, consti-
tute myself as one who makes use of it […] in the using of something, it is 
the very being of the one using that is first of all at stake” (2015: 30). What 
Agamben terms “subjectification” (2011: 6) is thus intrinsic in the concept of 
use., which is fundamentally distinguished from both utility and instrumen-
tality, seeing as the latter two presuppose an independent and autonomous 
agent.11 With the ambition to analyse how the use of hope governs processes 
of subjectification – what subjects the use of hope is productive of, the thesis 
investigates how the activity of use both separates and places in relation 
different forms of life on the basis of hope. Analysed through this question 
are multiple topics of concern: Which forms of life are deemed in need of 
                                                                  
11 Historically, Agamben finds this ontological formulation expressed in the Stoic tradition, in 
which use of the self was opposed to the notion of essence and substance. For the Stoics, use was 
taken to “precede being […referring to] a primary energeia without being’” (2015: 56, original 
emphasis). While the Self was seen as a contingent entity, amenable to change, the capacity to 
use was not. As Agamben writes: “it is necessary that the self first be constituted in use outside 
any substantiality in order that something like a subject – a hypostasis – can say: I am, I can, I 
cannot, I must…” (Ibid.: 55). 
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hope? Which forms of life are perceived to be capable of using hope? What 
relationship between these forms of life does the use of hope establish? And, 
lastly, what subject does the use of hope by US security discourse aim to 
produce, what form of hopeful life does it deem deem safe, without risk of 
becoming violent?  
To summarise this discussion, my empirical exploration of the discursive 
use of hope analyses the instrumentalisation of hope by the Obama admin-
istrations’ security discourse. It questions what this instrumentalisation does 
to hope, to time and to life respectively. As such, the thesis focuses on the 
four elements identified by Agamben as belonging to every technology: in-
strumentality, ontology, temporality and subjectification. In the next section, 
I will probe a series of limitations actualised by these research questions and 
by the discourse-oriented framework employed.  
 
 
Delimitations 
The choice to focus on discourse comes with a series of limitations that ren-
der the thesis unable to speak on a range of issues of urgent political and 
academic importance.  
First of all, despite the explicit attention to use, the focus on discourse en-
tails a blind spot to aspects of implementation that fall outside the use of 
strategic communication, in particular to how the use of hope is operational-
ised across the departments, sectors and shifting levels of the US security 
apparatus.12 As is well known, the focus on discourse associated with the 
‘linguistic turn’ within critical studies of security has been widely critiqued in 
recent years precisely for its inattention to this level of implementation. Didi-
er Bigo, for one, has questioned whether discourse hold any explanatory 
value at all, directing attention rather to the embodiment of mundane, bu-
reaucratised practices among the professional security work force (2014). 
Similarly, Jef Huysmans has called for the study not of the traditional excep-
tional speech act, but of everyday practices that in contrast appear as “little 
security nothings” (2011). The thesis’ attention to discourse further renders it 
blind to hope’s material implementation – not only how it is effectuated by 
actual policies, such as the 2010 US Global Development Policy but also how 
these policies are expressed for instance in the built environment, through 
infrastructure initiatives such as Power Africa and Feed the Future. The 
aesthetic dimension of strategic communication – its dissemination through 
                                                                  
12 For a discussion on how exceptional claims to sovereignty are related to and dispersed across 
a “complex and forcible domain of power”, see Butler and Spivak, 2007: 10-11.  
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“images, slogans, memes, and stereotypes”, as testified by former coordinator 
of the Center for Strategic Counterterrorism Communications Albert Fer-
nandez (2013), also falls outside the purview of this thesis.  
The reason for these limitations is that my primary interest is to make vis-
ible the exclusions and power actualised by hope on the most authoritative 
level within the US security apparatus. Because it is at this level that the use 
of hope most effectively affects our political imagination. I do not claim that 
this is the only way hope is used in the US security apparatus. Quite the con-
trary, as I argue in the methodological chapter of this kappa, I see the respec-
tive strategic narratives neither as dictating the actions of the US security 
apparatus, nor necessarily as representative of its use of hope, but as an ex-
emplary use – a code of conduct, a point of reference that cannot be avoided.  
Importantly, the question of how the irreducible multiplicity of contempo-
rary global life has come to embody, respond, contest, appropriate and resist 
the respective strategic narratives’ attempts of subjectification also falls out-
side the scope of inquiry. Following Mitchell Dean, I wish to conclude this 
section by emphasising that “regimes of government do not determine forms 
of subjectivity” (2010: 43). Needless to say, the use of hope analysed in this 
thesis does not affect every hope, every experience of time, and every life, 
only the particular hope, time and life actualised in and by the Obama admin-
istrations’ security discourse. The hopeful life that is addressed in this thesis 
should therefore “not be confused with a real subject, subjectivity or subject 
position, i.e. with a subject that is the endpoint or terminal of these practices 
and constituted through them” (Ibid.).  
 
 
Supporting Articles 
Supporting the analysis summarised in this kappa are four separate research 
articles. Article 1 situates the thesis in the current academic debate. It reads 
the meaning afforded to hope politically and analytically in critical studies of 
the post 9/11 US security apparatus. The article ends with a call to treat hope 
not as an analytical concept, but as a biopolitical technology, one which is 
central to practices and discourses of security. Articles 2-4 attempt to answer 
this call, offering a biopolitical analysis of the use of hope in US security 
discourse of the Obama administration. The analyses performed in the re-
spective articles, have enabled this kappa to discuss this use in relation to 
three central facets of Agambenian biopolitics: the suspension of language 
and political voice (article 2), the suspension of time and of political agency 
(article 3) and the suspension of political belonging and permanent exposure 
to death (article 4).  
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Article 1, “Reading the War on Terror Through Fear and Hope? Affective 
Warfare and the Question of the Future”,13 analyses how hope and fear has 
been employed in critical analyses of contemporary practices of security, 
represented in the article by critical strands of affect theory as well as of 
Derridean deconstruction. It concludes that the analytical distinction between 
hope and fear that these accounts offer reproduces both the temporal structure 
of promise enacted by authoritative discourses of the War on Terror as well 
as the political terminology and distinctions informing such discourses.  
Article 2, “The Unknowing Subject of Radicalisation: US Counterterr-
orism Communications and the Biopolitics of Hope”,14 analyses the biopolit-
ical use of hope by US counterterrorism communications to combat the ‘hate’ 
that US security discourse claims to be disseminated by the ‘ideology of 
violent extremism’. Tracing the definition of hope that informs these practic-
es, the article makes visible a paradoxical form of hope that while held as 
open to an unknown future, functions to govern the future’s coming into 
presence. The article argues that the use of hope by US counterterrorism 
communications is constitutive of a postmodern subject, whose ability to 
articulate concrete utopian visions of the future is actively and continuously 
disrupted. Such visions are associated by US counterterrorism communica-
tions only with violence and exclusion. It is further argued that while the use 
of hope aims to create an unknowing and hopeful subject open to the future, 
the form of governance that informs these practices is more akin to Agam-
ben’s theory of the state of exception. What characterises this form of politics 
is not hope, as it is commonly conceived, but an indistinction between hope, 
fear and hate. The article engages literature of radicalisation, strategic com-
munication as well as poststructural theories of hope. 
Article 3, “Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the 
Promise of Despair”,15 traces the distinction between hope and despair that is 
central in the Obama administration’s development discourse. It analyses 
hope’s proclaimed ability to render despair – and poverty – a condition less 
threatening to neoliberal life. Emerging from this reading is the identification 
of hope’s temporal structure as it is actualised in this discourse: an amnesiac 
hope that works to revise the past rather than to build the future. This tem-
poral structure is explicitly discussed in relation to Agamben’s definition of 
both the state of exception and of potentiality. The form of life that the use of 
                                                                  
13 Published 2013 in Political Perspectives 7(2): 85-105. Special issue: Unfolding the Political: 
Voices of aesthetics and emotions, guest edited by Emmy Eklundh and Rachel Massey.   
14 This article has been invited to be part of a special issue on “Hope as a Technology of Devel-
opment”, guest edited by Marjo Lindroth and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. Tentative journal: 
International Political Sociology.  
15 Published 2017 in Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 35(5): 875-892.  
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hope aims to produce is identified as similar to the idealised figure of the 
neoliberal subject, whom is encouraged to not perceive despair as the oppo-
site of hope, but as its condition of possibility. The article engages literature 
within the fields of critical development studies and post-development.  
Article 4, “Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future in 
Bare Life”,16 takes a broader look, focusing not only on the distinction  be-
tween fear and hope in US security discourse, but also on the overarching 
relation between security and hope that this discourse is productive of. By 
analysing Obama’s Nobel lecture, it argues that through hope, life becomes 
both permanently vulnerable and dangerous. The distinction between fear and 
hope, as well as that between war and peace that initially appears to support 
the use of hope within US security discourse is thus dissolved. The article 
analyses the production of hopeful life through Agamben’s notion of the 
sovereign ban, explicitly probing the relation between hopeful life and the 
figure of the homo sacer, a bare life able to be killed, yet not sacrificed 
(1998: 85). The article interrogates critical literature on resilience.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                  
16 Published 2014 in Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 2(3): 183-184.  
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Theorising the use of hope  
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework from 
which we can study and understand the use of hope not only as an instrumen-
tal conscious activity performed by a pre-defined agent, but as a biopolitical 
practice, a “weapon used in the biopolitical struggle for Being, in which a 
decision is made each time on the human and the inhuman on ’making live’ 
or ’letting die’” (1999a: 147). This framework is based on Agamben’s con-
ceptualisation of potentiality not as a “logical or epistemological categor[y]”, 
but as an “ontological operator” (Ibid.) employed to form the human subject. 
According to Agamben, it is precisely through potentiality that the subject is 
produced: “’the subject […] is a field of forces always already traversed by 
the incandescent and historically determined currents of potentiality and 
impotentiality” (Ibid.: 147-48, emphasis added). The framework is chosen for 
multiple reasons, one of which is because it engenders critical examination of 
the relationship between hope and potentiality that Obama repeatedly articu-
lates (2006; 2008b; 2009b; 2009c; 2009d; 2010a; 2013; 2015b; 2015d; 
2016a). By defining hope as a use object, the framework also directs attention 
to the biopolitical ramifications entailed in the concept of use – an activity 
that is operative on the levels of ontology, temporality and subjectification. 
As such, the framework garners attention, firstly, to hope as constituted 
through discursive practices. Secondly, to hope as a temporal experience of 
movement that governs the future’s coming into presence, and thirdly, to how 
the subject of hope is formed through exclusion.  
While this framework borrows heavily from general post-structural in-
sights, such as the attention to discourse and to relations of power and exclu-
sions, it nonetheless problematizes a certain way that post-structuralist cri-
tique of the post 9/11 state of security speaks about hope. Within this cri-
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tique, hope is often referred to as a capacity or an experience of excess which 
cannot be contained (Rorty, 1999; Negri, 1999; Massumi, 2002a; Derrida, 
2006; Anderson, 2006a; Skrimshere, 2008; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014). 
Hope is also commonly taken to signify an embrace of contingency and radi-
cal potentiality, a practice that opens the present towards the possibility of a 
radically different future (Ahmed, 2004; Evans and Reid, 2014; Eagleton, 
2015; Solnit, 2016;). In respect to politics of security, hope is often held as an 
act of resistance, a refusal to accept fear and division as a fixed reality (Hardt 
and Negri, quoted in Brown et. al., 2002; Atran, 2008; Skrimshire, 2008; 
Bourke, 2014; McSorley, 2016; Robin, 2017).  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Susan McManus has referred to 
this manner of speaking as the “hope project” (2011).17 While McManus 
speaks of a ’project’, the way of speaking that I will address in this chapter is 
not as coherent, as instrumental nor as well-defined as the notion of a project 
implies. The ’hope project’ is not a unified or pre-defined research agenda. 
Although working in a post-structural spirit, those included in the ‘hope pro-
ject’ do not fully share epistemological and ontological foundations. Some 
advocates for hope, such as Brian Massumi (2002a), Anderson (2006a; 
2006b) and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (quoted in Brown et. al, 2002), 
base their research on the philosophy of Baruch Spinoza, others employ a 
Derridean perspective (Skrimshere, 2008). Others still depart from Foucauld-
ian biopolitics (Duffield, 2007; Chandler, 2013; Evans and Reid, 2014) or 
from Levinasian ethics (Burke, 2011). Despite these differences, however, 
they all contribute to an idea of and a desire for radical hope, one that, I 
would argue, is not all that different from the narrative of hope offered by 
Obama.18  
The chapter departs with a literature review that focuses on the relation-
ship between hope and global biopolitics of security. This review details the 
use of hope by both modernist frameworks of liberal progress and by what 
David Chandler has referred to as “postmodern” (2014: 62) forms of human-
centred approaches to global security. Following this exposé, I review how 
these forms of governance have been critiqued from the vantage point of 
critical theory, in particular critical studies of security broadly defined (c.a.s.e 
collective, 2006; DeLarrinaga and Salter, 2014). The reason that this critique 
is presented is twofold. On the one hand, the review aims to tease out the 
                                                                  
17 Duggan & Muñoz (2009: 275) has similarly observed the privilege afforded to hope in con-
temporary critique.    
18 Of course, not all post-strutural theory shares the desire for hope, yet it is common. Rorty 
includes in his vision of hope, “anti-platoni[c]” theorists as disperse as Heidegger, Sartre, Gada-
mer, Derrida and Foucault, but also James, Dewey, Kuhn, Quine, Putnam and Davidson (Rorty, 
1999: xix). 
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ideas of radical hope that this literature is productive of, and, on the other 
hand, to problematise how this narrative has rendered invisible the identifica-
tion of hope as a biopolitical technology. Throughout this review, the discus-
sions will focus on how hope’s instrumentality, ontology, temporality and 
subjectification has been conceived or assumed in and by biopolitics of secu-
rity as well as by its critiques. 
In order to move beyond the exteriority between hope and security that is 
often articulated within critical studies of security, the chapter ends with a 
discussion on the relationship between potentiality and biopolitics as concep-
tualised by Agamben. To be sure, Agamben grants no privilege to hope, nor 
to potentiality, in the attempt to overcome biopolitics of security. According 
to Agamben, devotion to the future “is not a question of thinking a better or 
more authentic form of life, a superior principle or an elsewhere” (2014: 74). 
For Agamben, the experience of a radical excessive potentiality that often is 
emphasised by critical studies of security is not outside of biopolitics, but 
complexly imbricated with the workings of both biopolitics and sovereign 
power. Indeed, Agamben has argued that “a principle of potentiality is inher-
ent in every definition of sovereignty” and that “the sovereign state is found-
ed on an ’ideology of potentiality’” (1998: 47). Emerging from this discus-
sion is a theoretical framework to study how the use of hope attempts to 
organise potentiality. Like post-structural theory at large, it does this by fo-
cusing on the performative use of language, on the constitutive role of exclu-
sions and on the regulation of time – but without privileging hope as an un-
containable affect or capacity.  
 
 
The use of hope in biopolitics of security 
As stated above, this section offers a literature review over the use of hope in 
modern and postmodern forms of biopolitics of security. It begins with a 
discussion on the liberal subject of modernity, and the linear hope attached to 
the attempt to universalise this subject’s moral progression. Following this 
discussion is an exploration of the attempts by postmodern forms of security 
governance to produce a non-linear and localised hope. Throughout this re-
view, the biopolitical ambitions and ramifications of these projects will be 
highlighted, with a particular focus on the instrumentality, ontology, tempo-
rality and processes of subjectification that these forms of governance relate 
to hope.  
As is well known, the liberal viewpoint holds the individual to be the 
primary actor of politics (Hegre, 2004: 31; Vernon, 2011). In its ideal form, 
liberal representative democracy presents itself as a reflection of the individ-
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ual citizens that make up a given state. While hope is central to this subject, 
liberal theory subsumes hope’s ontology to the general notion of interests. As 
such, hope is described in non-emotive terms, embodied in a bounded and 
rational individual who pursuits its hopes instrumentally and calculable, with 
no explicit regard for the common good. Ronald Aronson has referred to this 
subject as formed through a “privatisation of hope” (2016). According to 
James Vernon, what defines the liberal individual is not the contents of his or 
her interests – but the way in which these interests are pursued. What charac-
terises the liberal subject is “a way of being in the world. The subjects of 
liberal politics [are] expected to think for themselves and act as individuals, 
not as representatives or members of a wider collectivity or community” 
(2011: 304).  
In order to ensure that this individual does not express its hopes through 
violent means, modernist forms of liberal theory encourage the careful regu-
lation of the economic incentives and institutional settings surrounding the 
individual. To that end, liberal democracy combines promises of meritocracy 
(Wallerstein), with the establishments of legal rights and structures to handle 
discontent (Hegre, 2004: 34). Proponents of the democratic peace theory hold 
that such institutional forms make liberal democracies averse to war, both 
between and within states. Immanuel Kant, chief ideological architect of the 
democratic peace paradigm, has famously argued that liberalism makes war 
non-profitable (1795/1991). It is further commonly assumed within liberal 
theory that the everyday practices of democracy foster moral norms of toler-
ance, pluralism and compromise, norms that according to Håvard Hegre 
“strictly inhibit the complete removal from political life of the loser in politi-
cal contest — defeat does not mean elimination of a chance to try again” 
(2004: 42).  
Through the latter explanation’s emphasis on norms in the cultivation of 
democratic ideals, the liberal subject appears less as a universal and ahistoric 
description of human nature, but as a politically formed entity, the moral 
progression of whom was the object of Kant’s philosophical project (Behnke, 
2012; Jabri, 2010). For this subject, conflictual self-interest had been trans-
formed into enlightened self-interest, rendering the difference between the 
individual and the common good obsolete (Behnke, 2012: 254). According to 
Vernon, however, the liberal project was never complete, because the ideal-
ised liberal subject did not exist. Human life “was not always an individual” 
(2011: 306). On the contrary, the liberal project demaned that the individual 
was continuously produced, “for liberalism was never able to entirely extri-
cate its subjects from the social” (Ibid.). So defined, liberalism concerns a 
radical and continuous transformation of the subject that it claims to be pre-
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existent and natural, a paradox that historically has generated immeasurable 
violence (Jabri, 2006; Reid-Henry, 2015; Evans, 2016). According to Agam-
ben, who calls the result of this paradox “an incessant civil war” (2000: 32), 
the liberal subject “is what already is, as well as what has yet to be realized” 
(Ibid.: 31). 
As we shall see, the use of hope has been central to liberalism’s trans-
formative promise. From above reading, we can contend that a linear tempo-
rality is embedded in the liberal canon, a promise of the imminent arrival of 
what has been likened to the “end of history” (Fukuyama, 2006), i.e. the 
establishment of perpetual peace through the universalisation of the liberal 
subject. According to Agamben, this linear hope is exemplary of modernist 
forms of biopolitics, defined by a wish to purify itself, to become whole. 
“Our age”, he writes, “is nothing but the implacable and methodical attempt 
to overcome the division dividing the people, to eliminate radically the peo-
ple that is excluded” (1998: 179). As have been observed repeatedly, the 
liberal promise includes a perception that “illiberal life” embodies a series of 
character defining lacks (de Larrinaga and Doucet, 2014: 58; Murray Li, 
2007: 7), one of which is its perceived inability to practice a politically ori-
ented hope. Hegre’s claim that poor people lack the economic and cultural 
capacity to “be politically active” (2004: 57) and to “use democratic institu-
tions” (Ibid.: 63) is illustrative of this position. According to Maja Zehfuss, 
such claims deny illiberal life the capacity for voice, perceiving them as “un-
able to make a contribution to visions of the future” (2012: 869).  
Central to the liberal promise is thus a geography and economy of hope; 
“a division between the hopeful and the hopeless that ties the hopeless into a 
network of obligation” (Anderson, 2006a: 749).19 Through the lens of the 
liberal promise, hope appears as a gift to those that are perceived to be “ab-
sen[t] of aspiration” (Galbraith, 1979: 61–62, quoted in Pupavac, 2005: 165), 
a promise to realise life’s full potential (Alt, 2016: 119). Installed by such 
practices is a “trusteeship” (Murray Li, 2007: 5) or a “contractual relation-
ship” (Duffield, 2005: 154) towards illiberal life. Hope is instrumental for 
this relationship, seeing as it allows liberal geopolitical practices to be per-
ceived as humanitarian or developmental (Anderson, 2006a: 749). Jennifer 
Fluri has observed that the precondition of this project is a reduction of illib-
eral life to a “site of potentiality” (2011: 12) – a blank slate onto whom the 
liberal project can sovereignly act. It thus seems that the liberal project con-
stantly reproduces that which it claims to erase, sedimenting an image of 
                                                                  
19 See also Richey (2015) for a discussion on how celebratory humanitarianism is productive of 
a “geopolitics of hope that foreground[s] sentimental rather than political concern” (2015: 14). 
See also Goodman (2013) for a similar discussion.  
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global poor as “the object of aid and protection” (Agamben, 1998: 133). The 
objectification of life that Agamben here addresses is of course addressed in 
the concept of bare life (1998) that he so often is associated with – described 
repeatedly as a life without future and hope (Agamben, 1998: 177; Negri, 
quoted in Nielsson, 2004: 68; Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 2011; 
Bourke, 2014).  
Through this reading, we can perceive the liberal project of modernisation 
as a biopolitical project to produce hopeful life: to instrumentally produce a 
subject for whom there is no difference between self-interest and the general 
interest. It is precisely this universal project that Obama claims to deny, issu-
ing a promise to recognise the global poor as inherently hopeful and potential 
(2009c). Indeed, the strategic narrative on development explicitly promises to 
do away with the linear promise of modernity, recognising that no nation can 
ever be perfect (2015b).  
In that sense, the Obama administrations’ security discourse echoes what 
has been observed as increasing tendency in and by contemporary govern-
ance to reject the modernist framework. According to David Chandler, what 
characterises this form of governance, which he refers to as “an adaptation of 
a postmodern ontology” (2014: 62), is an abandonment of modernity’s linear 
hope, a recognition “that linear or teleological understandings of human pro-
gress are no longer deemed possible” (Chandler, 2013: 3, see also Duffield, 
2005: 132; Reid, 2010: 392).  
Following developments in the life sciences that question the “’natural-
ness’ of the universal rational subject” (Chandler, 2013: 5, see also Dillon 
and Lobo-Guerrero, 2008; Dillon and Reid, 2009), the subject centring this 
emerging form of governance is perceived to be social, relational and affec-
tive, engaged in continuous non-linear processes of adaptation and emer-
gence. Michael Dillon has referred to the figure of life that such practices 
seek to produce as “Being as Becoming”, defined as a potential life that is 
“radically contingent because it is ontologically emergent” (2007b: 14). If the 
modernist promise sought to foreclose contingency, postmodern forms of 
security governance have been claimed to govern through contingency (Dil-
lon, 2007b), attempting to regulate the continual processes of becoming that 
is central to their definition of life (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 44). Based on this 
definition of life, the modernist desire for a stable identity is held to no longer 
be presented as an object of aspiration for the Western subject of security 
(Dillon, 2007a: 17; O’Malley, 2010; Chandler, 2012: 217).  
One of the ways through which the postmodern life of potentiality is 
claimed to be governed is through emotions, including hope (Grove, 2014: 
248; Kaufmann, 2016: 105). In the literature on affect, hope’s ontology is 
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perceived to be based not in reason, but in emotions, in the body’s sensory 
and affective capacities (Connolly, 2002; Massumi, 2002b; Ahmed, 2004; 
2010; Anderson, 2006a; 2006b; Holmer Nadesan, 2008; Berlant, 2011). Ra-
ther than giving hope to the hopeless, Mark Duffield argues that postmodern 
practices of security and development now seek to “contain” (2005: 152) 
what is perceived as illiberal life’s inherent potentiality. In contrast to modern 
forms of security governance, Duffield argues that postmodern practices of 
security offer illiberal life a “portfolio of sustainable aspirations, feasible 
hopes and affordable dreams” (Duffield, 2005: 155, see also Pupavac, 2005: 
167) – seemingly a stark contrast to Obama’s promise to release their poten-
tiality from the constraints of modernist ideals, offering the global poor a 
“new moment of promise” (2009c).  
It has also been claimed that postmodern forms of governance have re-
formulated the liberal definition of the relationship between poverty and 
violence. In this framework, it is not poverty that is dangerous, but the idea 
that poverty can be eliminated: the inevitable risks associated with “rising 
expectations backfiring” (Pupavac, 2005: 167). Aspirations to eradicate pov-
erty have thus been replaced by attempts to govern the poor, to create a resil-
ient subject that is able to cope with the vulnerabilities associated with pov-
erty (Best, 2013: 123; Aradau, 2014: 81; Chandler, 2015: 13; Pupavac, 2005: 
173). If contained, hope’s non-linear and anticipatory character is deemed 
central to this capacity (Evans and Reid, 2014: 47; Grove, 2014; Kaufmann, 
2015), as is hope’s assumed relation to creativity and optimism, two central 
aspects of resilience (Bourbeau, 2013).  
In general, however, the resilient subject is often depicted as without 
hope. According to Jeremy Walker and Melinda Cooper, the framework of 
resilience is productive of a “culture of preparedness” (2011: 152), one which 
always is in anticipation of the crisis. Evans and Reid hold the resilient sub-
ject to be exhausted by a “biopolitical aesthetic” of human suffering, “pro-
jecting and anesthetizing a fear for the immanent and total destruction of 
human life” (2014: 178). Together with Dillon, Reid has argued that fear has 
become a “generative principle of formation” (Dillon and Reid, 2009: 86), a 
feeling Brian Massumi hold to have become ingrained into the very fabric of 
post 9/11 life (2005: 31). It has often been claimed that the representations of 
this feeling is now heard and seen everywhere, “in real time, all the time” 
(Der Derian, 2005: 23). The same goes for the representation of catastrophe, 
as argued by Henry A. Giroux: “Catastrophes have not only been normalized, 
they have been reduced to the spectacle of titillating TV” (2012).  
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In summation, we find within (post)modern forms of security governance, 
two versions of hope employed to govern and form life’s becoming. In mod-
ernist accounts, the instrumental use of hope appears to be the creation of the 
liberal subject. Ontologically, the liberal project assumes that hope belongs to 
reason, the natural prerogative of the liberal subject. The temporal structure 
that organises the modernist hope is a linear conception of history, promising 
the universalisation of the liberal subject. In postmodern forms of govern-
ance, we see an inverse method. Rather than giving hope, it is claimed that 
such practices actively contain hope. Central to this form of governance is a 
perception of the human subject as an inherently potential and affective be-
ing, formed through constant adaptation to its habitat. The ontology of hope 
that occupies these forms of governance is defined as an anticipatory and 
affective capacity, one that is in need of continuous containment and regula-
tion.   
The next section will rehearse important theoretical critiques against these 
two forms of security governance, highlighting the pivotal role afforded to 
hope in this body of literature. As stated in the introduction to this chapter, 
what this review makes visible is a desire to position hope as external to 
biopolitics. The section is structured as follows: I first discuss a common 
tendency to argue that what modern and postmodern forms of biopolitics use 
is not really hope at all, but a reduced or distorted form of hope that is 
claimed to be parasitic of the inherent radical nature of hope. I then proceed 
by presenting different descriptions of the presumed subversive and political 
role that defines this radical hope. The section ends with a discussion on the 
proximity between this critique and the use of hope in US security discourse 
under president Obama. The ambition of this discussion is to question the 
radicality of this way of speaking as well as its usefulness when studying 
hope as a biopolitical technology.   
 
 
The affirmative use of hope in critical theory 
Based on above discussions, it would be easy to assume that hope has a cen-
tral place within biopolitics of security, functioning either as a promise to 
realise liberalism’s linear hope or as an attempt to contain and regulate the 
non-linear hopes of illiberal life. However, critical literatures of these forms 
of governance often describes such practices as antagonistic to and reductive 
of hope. This section will present this critique in greater detail, teasing out 
the various ideas of hope and the general desire for hope that is embedded in 
it. Like the section above, the presentation will focus on the ontology of hope, 
the temporal experience of hope and the process of subjectification that hope 
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is taken to be formative of. It will also discuss the instrumental relation to 
hope that often is presented in this literature: the articulated need to describe 
hope as a deficiency in need of constant cultivation if a radical political sub-
ject is to emerge. The section ends with an attempt to problematize this de-
sire, questioning its portrayal of hope as a subversive act of resistance, rather 
than as a biopolitical technique. 
While a Marxist perspective would describe the liberal promise of moral 
progress as false hope,20 a common stance from a post-structural perspective 
is to describe the liberal hope as a drastic limit to our political imagination. 
According to Anthony Burke, the liberal promise of security has "written us – 
[it has] shaped and limited our possibility, the possibilities for ourselves, our 
relationships, and our available images of political, social and economic 
order" (2007: 31). The confidence with which the liberal promise has been 
pronounced – the promise of “enlightened knowledge” effectively being, as 
Claudia Aradau explains, a “voice of authority and certainty” (2014: 86) – 
has additionally been taken as an attempt to foreclose the contingency that is 
commonly claimed to be hope’s condition of possibility. According to Eagle-
ton, devotion to linearity is a “fatalist” position, one that radically reduces the 
“indeterminacy of the future” (2015: 26). Jacques Derrida has poetically 
described this fatalism as the death of hope: “if one could count on what is 
coming, hope would be but the calculation of a program. One would have the 
prospect but one would no longer wait for anything or anyone. […] To see 
coming. Some, and I do not exclude myself, will find this despairing ’messi-
anism’ has a curious taste, a taste of death” (2006: 212, emphasis added).  
While the rationale behind postmodern forms of security governance em-
phasise time to be non-linear and the future to be essentially unknown (Mas-
sumi, 2007; Anderson, 2010; Aradau and van Munster, 2010; Martin, 2014), 
the life produced by such practices has nonetheless been claimed to be an-
chored to the actuality of one time, to be obsessed by a future only compre-
hensible in catastrophic terms. Aradau speaks of these practices as enacted by 
a will to ‘tame’ the unknown (2017: 329). Dillon speaks of them as organised 
by a “katechontic” (2011: 784, original emphasis) temporal structure, centred 
on a catastrophic imaginary, obsessed by the desire to withhold the end of 
                                                                  
20 From a (post)Marxist perspective, it is not the poor that is dangerous, but inequality. Accord-
ing to Lauren Berlant, the promise of social mobility orients affection to that which causes the 
hurt, namely the structure of capitalism. True hope, from a Marxist perspective, is rather of the 
revolution, in the social collective form of political mobilisation (Bloch, 1986). Ronald Aronson 
has argued that it is precisely the lack of this social and political hope that creates conditions for 
violence in liberal democracies: The promise of individual betterment turns collective, social 
hopes into individual ones (2017). The lack of social hope has further been claimed to create 
loneliness, lack of trust and empathy (Harvey, 2000).   
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days.21 Embedded in this temporal order, he argues, is not true contingency, 
but the knowledge of contingency: “contingency is not arbitrary chance. It 
represents a complex discourse – set of truth-telling practices – about the 
knowledge of uncertainty” (2007b: 45).  
Despite their professed commitment to contingency, it has thus been ar-
gued that postmodern forms of governance seek to stabilise the present, urg-
ing life to cope with rather than to transform the conditions in which it lives 
(Reid, 2012; Evans and Reid, 2014). Evans and Reid hold the postmodern 
subject of resilience to be a nihilistic and reactive life without imaginative 
power, unable to conceive of a world beyond the demands of insecurity 
(2014: 125; 196; see also Chandler, 2013: 163). According to Aradau, such 
forms of governance issues a “non-promise” (2014), through which the polit-
ical subject is taught to be “agential, but within the coordinates of the sys-
tem” (2014: 74). The potentiality that this framework incessantly emphasises 
is thus not held to really be potentiality, but a particular potentiality “sub-
orned to the actual”, to the “insistence that this world, as it is supposedly 
known, is the only world that can be” (Evans and Reid, 2014: 195). Accord-
ing to Thomas Martin, such practices offer nothing but “a radical constriction 
of the possibilities of the present” (Martin, 2014: 63). 
Through above description, we can already begin to trace a way of speak-
ing about hope that I hold as central to contemporary critique. Characteristic 
of this way of speaking is a dual claim: that hope, on the one hand, is under 
threat, at risk of being foreclosed by practices and discourses of security, and, 
on the other hand, is ontologically uncontainable by biopolitics, a disruptive 
force that forever exceeds the actuality of the present. According to this way 
of speaking, the temporality and ontology of hope is non-reducible to one 
time and to one meaning. Hope is rather presented as that which upsets every 
attempt to fix or define the present. Below, I will present four common ways 
of speaking about hope that I seek to both problematize and avoid.  
Firstly, the temporality of hope is often with the future. Derrida, for in-
stance, locates what he terms “messianic hope” in an unpredictable future 
that is paradoxically both forever to-come, yet always already present. Ac-
cording to Derrida, the future is not a temporal stage succeeding the present, 
but an experience of contingency that takes place within the present, in the 
most immediate immediacy. Derrida describes this moment as a “singular 
event of engagement”, a messianic moment in the “here and now” (1996: 83) 
that is present “without presence” (Ibid.). Elsewhere, Derrida has referred to 
this future as an actualisation of an irreducible potentiality: “‘It can come’ 
                                                                  
21 See also Prozorov, 2012; Debrix, 2015; Heron, 2016 and Agamben, 2017 for a discussion on 
the relation between katechontic time and sovereignty. 
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(‘ça peut venir’). There is the future” (Ibid., emphasis added). In his response 
to the attacks on 9/11, it was this experience of hope and future that he feared 
was at stake, because, as he warned, the discourse of terror “open onto no 
future and, in my view, have no future […] there is nothing good to be hoped 
for from that quarter” (Derrida, 2003: 113, original emphasis)  
Others have equally found both hope and the future in the experience that 
there is something beyond our current world. For Eagleton, hope is “conceiv-
able” because of the “unfinished nature of the actual” (2015: 52), because 
there “strictly speaking is no present – because every present is radically in 
excess of itself” (Ibid.). According to Reid, who in many ways equate the 
imaginary with hope, the imaginary is “not only the promise of a world be-
yond […], but the actual existence of the beyond in the psychic life of the 
subject. It is the enactment of the beyond now” (2011: 161, emphasis added). 
In Massumi’s terminology, hope is equalled to an affective intensity (2002a: 
212),22 i.e. to an “expectant suspension” (2002b: 27), a “temporal sink, a hole 
in time, as we conceive it and narrativize it” (2002b: 26). For Massumi, this 
hole in time is not a pause, but a “superlinear” experience, in which the dis-
tinction between present and future becomes blurred. It is the “perception of 
one’s own vitality, one’s sense of aliveness, of changeability” (Massumi, 
2002b: 36, original emphasis).  
Secondly, the ontology of hope is often placed beyond language, defined 
in opposition to fear and despair. Massumi’s definition of hope as an affec-
tive intensity is a case in point. As an affective intensity, Massumi perceives 
hope to be an experience in excess of language, unable to be fully contained, 
without “particular content or end point” (2002a: 242). As the very definition 
of an affective intensity, hope refers to that which is present but not repre-
sented; it is located beyond the “sociolinguistic fixing of the quality of an 
experience” (2002b: 28). Derrida too perceives the ontology of messianic 
hope as located “beyond language” (2003: 87, original emphasis), condi-
tioned upon an openness for the “freedom of play, [an] opening of indetermi-
nation and indecidability” (2005: 25). For Derrida, hope is possible because 
of language’s failure to fully constitute the world, hope is rather that force 
which deconstructs every such discursive attempt.23  
                                                                  
22 In a more recent article, Massumi has questioned hope’s progressive role, describing hope 
rather as a politics of waiting (2015). 
23 For descirptions of Derridean deconstruction as a practice of hope, see Stavrakakis, 1999: 
110-12; Matustik, 2004; Horner, 2010. For a fuller discussion on Derrida and Massumi’s respec-
tive definitions of the relationship between hope, language and linear time, see article 1 (Wran-
gel, 2013: 89-95). In this article I also place Derrida’s dichotomy between hope and language in 
relation to liberal politics of security.
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Antonio Negri similarly describes “full hope” (1999: 108) not as a consti-
tuted power, but as a form of constituent power: “the punctual determination 
that opens a horizon, the radical enacting of something that did not exist 
before” (1992: 31, quoted in Agamben, 1998: 43). Negri speaks of constitu-
ent power as a “principle and hope” drawn “toward the production of a new 
wealth and a new humanity” (1999: 231). The experience of hope, defined as 
essentially “boundless” in its expressions (Ibid.: 3), is thus juxtaposed the 
stabilisation of language which Negri claims to belong to constituted power 
(Ibid.: 3; 51; 211).  
As a form of constituent power, Negri further holds hope to be the onto-
logical opposite of fear (Ibid.: 324), which, according to Negri, functions to 
repress hope. In Empire, Negri together with Michael Hardt describe hope as 
“an antidote to the fear that surrounds us” (quoted in Brown et. al., 2002). As 
I have argued in article 1 – “Reading the War on Terror through Fear and 
Hope: Affective Warfare and the Question of the Future” –  Negri’s distinc-
tion between hope and fear is commonplace within critical studies of securi-
ty. Ahmed’s distinction between fear and hope is another illustrative example 
of this tendency. In contrast to hope, which Ahmed describes inter alia as a 
sense of “opening up the world (2004: 184), fear is described as an experi-
ence that “shrink[s] the body” (2004: 69), that restricts “its mobility precisely 
insofar as it seems to prepare the body for fight” (Ibid.). As such, Ahmed 
defines fear as central to politics of security, a means “to secure the relation-
ships between [...] bodies” (2004: 63), an attempt to preserve the subject in 
its present identity. Massumi’s description of fear as a paralyzing sensation 
(2005: 36) modulated for the purposes of security also mimics this dichoto-
my.24  
Such definitions not only ontologises hope, they also give hope a norma-
tive character, which brings me to my third point: hope is often equalled to 
the creation of a radical and inclusive subject. For Aronson, hope is “an expe-
rience of coming together” (2017), one that unsettles lines of division once 
perceived to be fixed and antagonistic. For Ahmed, hope is an act of “gather-
ing together” (2004: 184). According to Negri and Hardt, hope is a force of 
resistance, one that “ultimately resides in comraderie, the possibility of the 
creation of a fraternal society of equals” (quoted in Brown et. al., 2002: 200). 
Burke’s vision of a “humanity after biopolitics” (2011) offers a similar narra-
tive. In this article, which arguably provides the theoretical and philosophical 
assumptions undergirding Burke’s recent attempts to establish a form of 
“security cosmopolitanism” (2013), Burke finds in what he perceives as a 
                                                                  
24 For a systematic analysis of fear’s relation to sovereign power and to US politics of security, 
see Robin, 2004.  
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“groundless” human nature an inextinguishable “hopeful creativity”, untame-
able by biopolitics. Like Hardt and Negri’s hopeful society, Burke argues that 
this groundlessness must be recognised and acted upon if it is to be realised. 
The hopeful life he envisions is both an “empirical fact and [a] moral impera-
tive” (2011: 109). It is both an effect of politics, addressing a “moral future 
that is yet to take wing” (Ibid.: 108) and perceived to be prior to politics, 
referred to by Burke as “a supremely valuable core of human being norma-
tively prior to the claims of politics, culture and subjectivity” (Ibid.: 109).   
 According to such definitions, hope is held to be both intrinsic to life – 
an inextinguishable and uncontainable human force of creativity that forever 
transcends totalitarian attempts of sovereign power (Burke, 2011: 108) – and 
to be formative of a particular transcendent form of life, as exemplified by 
Hardt and Negri’s claim above. This brings me to my fourth and final point: 
hope is often presented as an end in itself, the instrumental task of what 
Richard Rorty has called an affirmative form of “biopower” (1999: 64). For 
Rorty, to foster hope means to foster a subject capable of setting “aside reli-
gious and ethnic identities in favour of an image of themselves as part of a 
great human adventure” (Ibid.: 238-9). Rorty thus sees in hope not only an 
abandonment of “the desire for stability, security and order” (Ibid.: 88), but 
also a commitment to contingency, to the “romance of unpredictable change” 
(Ibid.).  
To be sure, Rorty is not alone to speak in this manner. In critical studies 
of security, we find numerous examples of this line of critique, calling for the 
cultivation of hope. For example, Evans and Reid argue, in the spirit of Der-
rida, that “one must love the future” (2014: 191). To implement this love, 
they advocate for practising a “critical pedagogy” (2014: 195) to the “global-
ly oppressed” (Ibid.: 192) that would “release a potential which was already 
there in the making” (2014: 192, emphasis added). Other examples of this 
line of reasoning include Bloch’s and Sarah Amsler’s respective insistence 
that political agency is a “question of learning hope” (1986: 3; 2015: 12), 
Giroux’s notion of a “critical pedagogy of educated hope” (2003), Ander-
son’s call to develop an affirmative “ethos of hope” (2006a: 740) and Eagle-
ton’s identification of hope as a “question of merit”, that can be “cultivated 
by practice and self-discipline” (2015: 58). Within this line of critique, we 
also find Chandler’s appeal to replace the postmodern subject of governance 
with a “transformative subject” aspiring to “remake the world” (2013: 139) 
as well as Duffield’s promotion of an “international citizenship” representa-
tive of the “magic of life itself”, namely, the “possibilities for new encoun-
ters, mutual recognition, reciprocity and hope” (2007: 232).  
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Summarising this discussion, we hence see within critical studies of both 
modernist and postmodern forms of biopolitics of security a way of speaking 
about hope that collects diverse definitions and epistemologies of hope into a 
collective desire, one which presents hope as that which will counter and 
subvert the present state of security. Symptomatic of this desire is a descrip-
tion of hope as a temporal experience of radical contingency, one that is both 
co-disruptive of the present and formative of a new future and of a new inclu-
sive subject. Hope is further presented as simultaneously present and absent, 
as both embodied in life and as fundamentally lacking contemporary life. 
Below, I will discuss the limits posed by this description for my study of 
hope as a biopolitical technology.  
Firstly, if hope is perceived as an ontological capacity or experience, a 
constituent force that upsets the actuality of language, then this means that 
articulations of hope within political discourse are perceived by default not as 
constitutive of hope, but as reductive of it. As such, the conceptual relations 
through which hope is most commonly discussed, such as those between fear 
and despair, are taken as ontological, rather than as constitutive. Hardt and 
Negri’s juxtaposition between fear and hope is particularly illustrative of this 
position. Secondly, the descriptions of hope as external to the demands of 
security, arguably contributes to why hope is understudied as a biopolitical 
technology in a systematic fashion.25 As presented for instance by Burke, 
hope is not a biopolitical technology, but a substance of life, whose excessive 
character biopolitics of security aim to contain. While this way of speaking 
articulates a radical critique of the liberal and neoliberal subject – shining 
light on the historical and political context upon which this form of life is 
conditioned as well as on the exclusions belonging to its constitution – it 
nonetheless remains blind to the use of hope within its constitution. One 
central component in the “drama” that is playing on “theatre of our humani-
ty” (Evans and Reid, 2014: 176) is thus left invisible – withheld as the pre-
rogative of an affirmative form of subversion.  
Because of this omission, this line of critique moreover leaves unscruti-
nised the historical and political conditions that undergird the contemporary 
critical desire for hope: its proximity with the narrative of hope offered by the 
Obama administrations’ security discourse. For instance, as I explore in the 
supporting articles of this thesis, the conceptualisation of hope that is articu-
                                                                  
25 See for example Anderson, 2006a; 749; 2010b; Berlant, 2011; Pedwell, 2012; Goodman, 
2013; Grove, 2014: 248; Richey, 2015: 14; Kaufmann, 2016: 105. Anderson’s discussion of 
morale in a total state of war (20101b) is arguably the most systematic of these studies.  
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lated by Obama is quite similar to the descriptions of hope presented above. 
Obama too positions hope to be an inclusive concept, defined in opposition to 
fear and division. Obama too describes hope as an embrace of contingency, a 
call to cherish the “ambiguities of history” (2009b), and a recognition that 
“history is on the move” (2009c). In varying circumstances, Obama has 
claimed that this contingency is actualised through a combination of some of 
the techniques recommended by critical literature: for instance through the 
rejection of the liberal promise of perfection (Obama, 2009c) and through 
recognising the capacity to remake the world from the “bottom-up” (2006; 
2009c; 2015b).  
Additionally, Obama too perceives hope to be both present and absent in 
contemporary life. Like the poststructural descriptions of hope discussed 
above, Obama depicts hope as both an inextinguishable force of human na-
ture (2008; 2009b) and a capability that demands continuous external activa-
tion. According to Obama, hope can be both “built” (2010a), “supported” 
(2014) or “given” (2016a). While Obama continuously recognises the capaci-
ty to hope as universal (2009b; 2009; 2009c; 2015b; 2016a), it is nonetheless 
treated as a biopolitical problem, a capability or experience that both the 
subject of security and that of radicalisation is presumed to be in constant 
need of (Ibid., 2016a).  
In order to move beyond the desire for hope, as well as the externality be-
tween hope and security, the next section will seek to establish a theoretical 
framework for studying hope as a biopolitical technology. To that end, it will 
discuss Agamben’s conceptualisation of potentiality in relation to his defini-
tion of biopolitical use, paying particular attention to processes of ontology, 
temporality and subjectification. The discussion will explicate the pivotal role 
afforded by Agamben to potentiality in biopolitics of security, which Agam-
ben defines not as an uncontainable excess of biopolitics, but as a state of 
suspension, the “ontological root of every political power” (1998: 48).  
 
 
Theorising the biopolitical use of hope  
In contrast to the literature discussed above, Agamben finds no political po-
tency in hope, nor in a radical imaginary. Recalling the quote offered in the 
introduction to this chapter, Agamben perceives resistance against the biopo-
litical present to not be “a question of thinking a better or more authentic 
form of life, a superior principle or an elsewhere” (2014: 74). For Agamben, 
resistance is rather a question of decreating the present, to render the world 
“inoperative” (Ibid.: 69). In explicit contrast to Negri’s constituent power 
(Agamben, 1998: 43; 2015: 266), as well as to Derrida’s dedication to the to-
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come (Ibid., 1999b: 172-74; Doussan, 2013; Atell, 2015), Agamben defines 
his political project as an attempt to make way for what he calls, following 
Walter Benjamin, a destituent power (2015: 266; 2014: 70). According to 
Agamben, to destitute sovereign power is not a matter of replacing it, or of 
exceeding it, but rather to render it inoperative: to expose the suspension of 
time, language and life that Agamben claims characterises our present biopo-
liticised state. To that end, the examples offered by Agamben of subversive 
forms of agency is characterised not by hope, but by what could be called a 
nihilistic acceptance of the biopolitical present beyond the limits of will and 
desire (1999b: 254). The most famous of the examples offered by Agamben 
is Herman Melville’s Bartleby, a laconic figure that according to Agamben 
embodies the potential to negate the potentiality manifested in sovereign 
power, to turn the suspended state of modern life against itself (1998: 48; 
1999b 243-71; 2009b: 35-8). The phrase that, for Agamben, encapsulates 
destituent power is “I prefer not to” (1998; 1999b) 
The reason for Agamben’s scepticism of hope is found in his radical re-
definition of the concept of potentiality and its relationship to biopolitics. If 
we recall the brief introduction offered to potentiality in the introduction to 
this chapter, Agamben assigns no particular ontology or epistemology to 
potentiality. Potentiality is rather described as an “ontological operator” 
(Ibid.), a “weapon used in the biopolitical struggle for Being” (1999a: 147). 
If biopolitics is the politics that takes as its object the governing of life pro-
cesses, of life’s becoming (Ibid., 2011: 6), then it does this, according to 
Agamben, by regulating and organising the relation between actuality and 
potentiality through which different forms of life is brought into presence. 
For Agamben, this process does not necessarily refer to a reduction of life’s 
potentiality to actuality, but to the “organization of potentiality” (1995: 71).  
As a biopolitical technology, a use object, Agamben holds potentiality to 
be historically determined (1999b: 148). He speaks interchangeably of a 
particular “ideology of potentiality” as foundational of the sovereign state 
(1998: 47) and of particular “principle[s] of potentiality [as] inherent in every 
definition of sovereignty” (Ibid.). The “paradigmatic ontology” (Agamben, 
2009: 5) that characterises Agamben’s theoretical framework is here extend-
ed to his notion of potentiality. As such, Agamben underlines that potentiality 
cannot be studied as an ahistoric ontology. Like other paradigmatic concepts 
in the Agambenian framework, such as the homo sacer (1998: 139), inopera-
tivity (2014: 72) and the state of exception (Lee, Najeeb and Wainwright, 
2014: 652). Agamben claims that potentiality is only accessible through “the 
form in which [it] is captured in power” (2014: 72).  
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Importantly however, to adopt an Agambenian perspective of potentiality 
is not to strip à priori from potentiality its political potency, finding in it only 
the violent exclusions and operations of sovereign power. On the contrary, 
Agamben treats the political function of potentiality, and in extension of 
hope, as open. As observed by Rad Borislalov, Agamben speaks interchange-
ably of potentiality in positive and in negative terms (2005: 181), finding in 
potentiality both the workings of sovereign power and the means for its sus-
pension.26 Whether or not potentiality is emancipatory and progressive is 
hence an empirical question, one which is always phrased in relation to the 
structure of potentiality that we are caught in today.  
The discussion below will rehearse Agamben’s conceptualisation of po-
tentiality in relation to the four aspects of biopolitical use: instrumentality, 
ontology, temporality and subjectification, with a particular focus devoted to 
the latter three.  
In implicit contrast to Derrida (Atell, 2011), who if we recall defines po-
tentiality as a pure presence beyond the actuality of language, Agamben 
conceives of the relationship between actuality and potentiality not as a mu-
tually exclusive dichotomy, the one being parasitic of the other, but as a 
complex, if not paradoxical, indistinction. According to Agamben, the ontol-
ogy of what he calls “pure potentiality” (1999b: 245) is absence, not pres-
ence. Based on Aristotle’s notion of im-potentiality, Agamben takes potenti-
ality to signify the presence of an absence, a presence that Agamben claims is 
able to “condition and render possible what is actual” (Heller Roazen, 1999: 
15) 
The philosophical question that ultimately concerns Agamben is how one 
is to understand the experience of potentiality as potentiality, i.e. how poten-
tiality can be realised in, not reduced by actuality. For Agamben, this process 
demands a negation of the traditional idea of potentiality as the “potential to 
do or be something” (1999b: 250), seeing as such a definition would subsume 
potentiality to actuality: “we would never experience [potentiality] as such; it 
would only exist in the actuality in which it is realised” (Ibid.). If taken as a 
separate ontology, Agamben maintains that potentiality would refer not only 
to the capability to be or to act, but more importantly to the capacity to not-
be. Following Aristotle’s notion of im-potentiality, Agamben argues that "all 
potentiality is, at the same time, potentiality for the opposite [...] He who 
walks has the potential not to walk, and he who does not walk has the poten-
                                                                  
26 In his many elaborations of the radical emancipatory potential of Bartleby, Agamben speaks 
of im-potentiality as a break from sovereign power (1998: 48; 1999b 243-71; 2009b: 35-8). In 
Homo Sacer (1998: 47-48) and in The Idea of Prose, he speaks of potentiality as the ontology of 
power (1975: 71). 
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tial to walk" (Ibid.: 262), otherwise the activity would not be referred to as a 
potentiality. If a potentiality is to be actualised as a potentiality, it thus de-
mands that the potential not-to, the im-potential, is “not effaced in the pas-
sage into actuality” (Heller Roazen, 1999: 17), but realised in it. According to 
Daniel Heller Roazen, Agamben thus manages to conceive of “the passage to 
actuality […] not as a destruction or elimination of potentiality but, rather, as 
the very conservation of potentiality as such” (Ibid.: 17).  
This matters to us because it means that we can conceptualise the use of 
hope and potentiality within US security discourse as a performative, rather 
than as a reductive exercise. It also means that hope is actualised, if not con-
stituted, through language, not beyond it. Hope thus appears as an effect of 
performative distinctions in language – between what is taken as potential 
and that which is taken actual, between what is not yet, and what is. This 
means that the distinctions that Burke, Hardt and Negri and others employ to 
describe hope, such as those between fear and hope, and those between des-
pair and hope, appear from an Agambenian perspective not as ontological, 
but as a performative discursive separation. From an Agambenian perspec-
tive, these distinctions do not mark the limit of language. Fear is not pre-
defined as a stabilisation of actual language, nor is hope perceived by default 
as the actual’s subversion. Such distinctions are rather perceived as taking 
place in language.  
Indeed, while the ontology of potentiality may be absent, this does not 
mean that Agamben positions potentiality outside of language. Quite the 
contrary, Daniel Paul McLoughlin has observed that Agamben takes “the 
limit of language [to] fall within language” (2009: 174). As such, Agamben 
has argued that “Everything that is presupposed for there to be language (in 
the forms of something non-linguistic, something ineffable etc.) is nothing 
other than a presupposition of language that is maintained as such in relation 
to language precisely insofar as it is excluded from language” (1998: 50). So 
defined, Agamben perceives the absence that potentaility signifies as a sus-
pension of language that takes place in and through language: “only the word 
puts us in contact with mute things” (Agamben, 1975: 113). Indeed, the prin-
ciple method employed by Agamben in his study of potentiality is language. 
The question of potentiality thus becomes a question “concerning the mean-
ing of words, an attempt to understand the meaning of the verb ‘can’ [potere]. 
What do I mean when I say: ‘I can, I cannot’?” (1999b: 177, emphasis add-
ed).  
One way that this paradoxical linguistic suspension of language is exem-
plified by Agamben is through the state of exception (2005a), which he de-
scribes as being “in force without signification” (1998: 51). What character-
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ises the state of exception is the suspension of the law, a state in which the 
law is present in its absence, “appl[ied] in no longer applying” (1998: 28). In 
the state of exception, the law is actualised in its performative absence, in its 
capacity to not-be. The law is “entirely emptied of content” (Humphreys, 
2006: 681), it is in force (hence actual), but without signification (hence 
absent and potential). Elsewhere, Agamben has described this form of sus-
pension as a “destruction of communicable experience” (2007b: 6). To be 
abandoned to the state of exception has thus been likened to being stripped of 
one’s capacity for voice, of one’s “capacity to give meaning” (de Koning, 
2015), unable to bear witness to the violence inflicted upon oneself (Agam-
ben, 1999b: 33). This state of being, this “closedness and muteness” (Ibid., 
2004b: 81) is, however, not without relation to language. As argued above, 
Agamben conceives of the outside of language as a product of language. He 
thus emphasises that the power to install the state of exception is a performa-
tive activity that, on the one hand, takes place in language, and, on the other 
hand is constitutive of the sovereign (Ibid., 1998: 7), who comes into being 
by announcing the law’s suspension (Ibid.: 27): “language is the sovereign 
who, in a permanent state of exception, declares that there is nothing outside 
language and that language is always beyond itself” (Ibid.: 21).  
Agamben further describes the state of exception as a temporal suspen-
sion, capable of “maintain[ing] itself indefinitely, without ever passing over 
into actuality” (1998: 47). In The Idea of Prose, Agamben describes the po-
tential state as a temporal “duration” (Ibid.), the “organisation” of which he 
perceives as one of the principle aims of politics (Ibid.). In contrast to for 
instance Derrida, Agamben holds the actualisation of potentiality as potenti-
ality – i.e. an actualisation of the im-potential, of the potential not-to – not to 
signify the future’s rupture into the present, but as one of the principle means 
through which the future is postponed. While the experience of potentiality 
as potentiality may be dislocating – William Robert describes it as a ‘rupture 
of temporality’, a suspension of “normal spatiotemporality” (2006: 41) – 
Agamben takes its effect to be a suspension of time. Agamben thus defines 
time’s relation to the enduring as paradoxical: a temporal experience of 
time’s suspension. According to Sergei Prozorov, to live in this ruptured state 
is to be imprisoned in the present, in a time in which “nothing at all would be 
able to happen” (2010: 1067).  
In other words, what the life of the state of exception is closed off to is 
not only language, but the ability to act in time. According to Agamben, the 
figure of bare life that he claims inhabits the state of exception is formed 
through a “deactivation of single, specific, factical possibilities” (2004b: 67). 
Bare life is defined as unable to “truly act” (Ibid.: 52), as “captivated” in its 
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present form (Ibid). In the state of exception, the potential to act – to become 
actual – is included only through its exclusion, a suspension that Agamben 
previously has referred to as the “very origin of potentiality” (Ibid., emphasis 
in the original). Through this reading, one can thus define the state of excep-
tion not as a “tyranny of actuality” (Prozorov, 2010: 1067) as per traditional 
interpretations of Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state of exception, but 
as an im-potential state. This matters to us, because it means that the tempo-
rality of potentiality – and consequently of hope – is not predefined as an 
experience of the future, but presents itself rather as a means through which 
the present is organised. By defining hope as a biopolitical technology, the 
temporality of hope becomes rather an experience of the present, one that 
takes part in organising the future’s coming into presence.  
In terms of subjectification, hope – and potentiality – is often held, to be 
formative of an inclusive subject, as discussed in the previous section. How-
ever, according to Agamben, every subject constitution is formed through 
exclusion. Agamben describes exclusion as a performative act, one that es-
tablishes the limits of political belonging: In “Western politics”, Agamben 
writes, the exclusion of “bare life has the peculiar privilege of being that 
whose exclusion founds the city of men” (1998: 7). As is well known, 
Agamben finds the historical roots of this exclusion in the Greek distinction 
between zoē and bios, between bare natural life and the good life deemed 
politically qualified. Of course, many have taken this distinction to imply a 
separation between a life caught in actuality, “a life that just is” (Beckman, 
2016: 1) and a potential life capable of voice and agency that is worthy of 
legal protection (Ibid.). However, as Agamben has repeatedly underlined, the 
concept of bare life does not signify a purely actualised life, a natural exist-
ence, but rather a dehumanised or animalised life that continues to be caught 
in relation to political life (1998: 88; 2004b: 77; 2014: 66). If we recall 
Agamben’s definition of potentiality above, in which the opposite of the 
potential to act is not actuality, but im-potentiality, then bare life appears not 
as an actual life but as an im-potential life, a “being-in-potentiality” (1998: 
35). We should thus not be surprised that Agamben quotes Hannah Arendt’s 
description of the Nazi concentration camps, which Agamben holds as the 
paradigmatic spatial site of the state of exception, as a place where “every-
thing is possible” (quoted in Agamben, 1998: 170).  
The im-potential life of the state of exception is not simply without the 
capacity for life, it is suspended from it, kept in relation to it. Geraldine Pratt 
argues that “abandonment is an active, relational process” (2005: 1054), in 
which one remains “in relation with sovereign power, included through ex-
clusion” (Ibid.). The location of that this form of life occupies is not outside 
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the political order, but the threshold to it: it is a figure that represents the 
limit of the body politic. It is this relational character that transforms bare life 
into the figure of the homo sacer: the life that “may be killed but not sacri-
ficed” (1998: 83). According to Agamben, it is not possible to sacrifice the 
life of the homo sacer because it has no value, or rather, its value lies in its 
exclusion, in the denial of its right to live politically, protected by the law. It 
is through this exclusion, which Agamben names the “sovereign ban” (1998: 
28), that political life is able to performatively experience itself as qualified 
and potential.27 In contrast to Foucault, who has argued that biopolitics ren-
der death into a private affair, Agamben thus holds the exposure to death as a 
key activity of biopolitics, one that has to be iterated continuously (1998: 32; 
139; 153). This, according to Agamben, is the central paradox conditioning 
life biopolitically. To produce life, life has to be excluded, even exposed to 
death (at least potentially), thus making biopolitics, the politics of life, into its 
opposite: thanatopolitics, the politics of death (1998: 153).  
This matters to us because Agamben’s attention to the subject’s relational 
status shines light on the exclusions that are a constitutive part of every pro-
cess of subjectification – it directs attention to how life is assigned value, 
how it is differentiated from other forms life (Agamben, 1998: 137). From an 
Agambenian perspective, the embodied capacities of hope – and potentiality 
– thus appears as an effect of biopolitics rather than as an uncontainable ex-
cess. In summation, we can thus argue that an Agambenian framework makes 
it possible to understand potentiality as a performative activity, one that gives 
form to life.  
Given the close proximity often assumed between hope and potentiality, 
Agamben’s insistence on the performative nature of potentiality thus opens 
the possibility to identify hope as a biopolitical technology, a use object, 
rather than simply as being the target of such technologies. It makes it possi-
ble to understand the instrumental use of hope in the Obama administrations’ 
security discourse as performative of hope, not as reductive of it. In short, 
Agamben allows us to see 1) the ontology of hope as constituted through 
language 2) the temporality of hope as an experience of the present that gov-
erns the future and 3) The subject of hope as a historical product, a biopoliti-
cal form of life, whose constitution is achieved through exclusion, by assign-
ing value and non-value to life. The next chapter will seek to provide an 
answer as to how to research the actualisations of these limits in the biopolit-
ical present in which we live.  
 
                                                                  
27 For a similar discussion on the performative role of exclusion, see Agamben, 2004b: 26.  
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Researching the use of hope  
As stipulated in the opening to this kappa, this thesis aims to understand how 
hope is used biopolitically in the official US security discourse under the 
Obama administrations, 2009-2016. Following Sandra Harding’s distinction 
between methodology – “a theory and analysis of how research does or 
should proceed” – and method – “a technique for (or way of proceeding in) 
gathering evidence” (1987, 2-3, quoted in Ackerly, Stern and True, 2006: 
20), this chapter presents the methodological choices and considerations that 
inform this analysis as well as the concrete methods of analysis employed. 
The chapter departs with a discussion on the concept of discourse, as defined 
by Foucault and subsequently by Agamben. This discussion attempts to an-
swer what discourse is, its relationship to materiality, and most importantly 
how to identify a given discourse as a distinct object of study. The key con-
cepts that guide this discussion are the example and the signature, which 
Agamben holds as central to the formation of a particular discourse. I then 
proceed to discuss how these concepts are operationalised in terms of identi-
fying and delimiting the thesis’ study object. This discussion explicates my 
choice of the Obama administrations’ security discourse as a paradigmatic 
study object, the selection of strategic narratives (which in turn is represented 
primarily by high-level speeches) as my primary empirical material, as well 
as the method employed to select and study these speeches. The empirical 
material has been selected by tracing the complex relational network that 
binds a series of statements to one another into a particular discourse. The 
primary method through which these statements have been analysed consist-
ed of mapping the conceptual relations that according to Agamben (2009a: 
40; 2013: 66) give content to a specific concept, such as hope, within that 
discourse. This method was complimented with a narrative analysis, which 
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attempts to make visible the temporal order established by the respective 
strategic narratives. In the final section, these methods are related to the re-
search questions posed in chapter 1.  
 
 
Conceptualising discourse 
In order to query the use of hope as a biopolitical technology, the thesis fo-
cuses on how hope is articulated in US security discourse – a central, if not 
paradigmatic, discourse within the biopolitical apparatus governing and se-
curing contemporary life. According to Foucault, discourse is only one ele-
ment of a larger, more complex and heterogeneous structure of governance 
that Foucault has referred to as a dispositif – or apparatus, as Foucault’s con-
cept is often, yet perhaps wrongly, translated as,.28 In an interview from 
1977, Foucault defines the dispositif as consisting inter alia of social institu-
tions, material forces and of discourses:   
 
“What I am trying to single out with this term is, first and foremost, a thor-
oughly heterogeneous ensemble of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, reg-
ulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophi-
cal, moral and philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the unsaid. 
Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the system of rela-
tions that can be established between these elements” (Foucault, 1980: 194) 
 
From Foucault’s definition we learn that discourse is only one part of bio-
politics of security. While Foucault defines language’s role as central to the 
formation of regimes of knowledge, such regimes are in other words seen as 
only one part of the “much more heterogeneous” (Ibid.: 197) dispositif. Fou-
cault’s definition also details the relational character of the dispositif. A dis-
positif is not reducible to a particular element, be it a given discourse, an 
institution or a material composition, but constitutes rather the network that 
“exist between these heterogeneous elements” (Ibid.).  
To study these relations, Agamben argues that Foucault nonetheless em-
ployed a single case methodology (2009a: 17), examining in great detail one 
example of the more general dispositif: “The great confinement, the confes-
sion, the investigation, the examination, the care of the self: these are all 
singular historical phenomena that Foucault treats as paradigms” (Ibid.). As 
such, Foucault’s method aimed not to showcase the dispositif in its entirety, 
but rather to render visible “its ideal form” (1977: 221), what he also referred 
to as a “diagram” (Ibid.) of its operations. In Agamben’s reading, Foucault 
                                                                  
28 For a discussion and problematisation of this translation, see Raffnsøe, Gudmand-Høyer & 
Thaning, 2014.  
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treats the diagram as an “epistemological figure” (Agamben, 2009a: 17) that 
organises the relations that make up a given dispositif. Agamben observes 
that the diagram is for Foucault not the standard or typical element of the 
dispositif – it is rather a hegemonic model, a paradigmatic example. 
According to Agamben, the function of the paradigmatic example is not 
to represent, but to constitute the general. The example collects together what 
would otherwise be a disperse group of articulations. It allows “statements 
and discursive practices to be gathered into a new intelligible ensemble and 
in a new problematic context” (Ibid.: 18). The example performs this func-
tion by substituting itself for the general, describing the general through its 
own particularity: “it is the exhibition alone of the paradigmatic case that 
constitutes [the general]” (Agamben, 2009b: 21). It is in this way we should 
read the example: not as a single case, nor as a typical case – but as a “mod-
el”, a “canon” (Ibid.), or in Foucault’s words, an “ideal” (1977: 221), that is 
employed both to describe and to form the general. In other words, while one 
cannot, from a strictly methodological perspective, easily generalise from the 
example (it is after all but one case), this generalizability nonetheless appears 
to be the example’s paradigmatic function: to “establish a broader problemat-
ic context that [the example] both constitute and make intelligible” (2009a: 
17).  
Agamben’s conceptualisation of the example informs my choice of a sin-
gle case methodology. As mentioned above, and as will be argued in greater 
detail below, I see US security discourse as a paradigmatic expression of 
biopolitics of hope, a single case whose explicit purpose is to become gen-
eral, to organise the operations of the more general dispositif of which it is a 
part.  
Agamben’s identification of discourse as a privileged site, central to the 
formation of political belonging, and for the constitution of political commu-
nity further informs my choice to study the US security apparatus through 
discourse. According to Agamben, language is “perhaps the most ancient of 
all apparatuses” (Agambem, 2009a: 14). In contrast to the late Foucault, 
Agamben perceives language not simply as one of many other elements with-
in a given dispositif, but as an “onto-logical relation [that] runs between be-
ings and language, between Being and its being said or named” (2015: 271). 
For Agamben, there is no example that is not somehow related to language. 
In The Coming Community, Agamben refers to the example as a “purely 
linguistic being” (2009b: 10). He explains: “Exemplary is what is defined not 
by property, except by being-called. Not being-red, but being-called-red; not 
being-Jakob, but being-called-Jakob defines the example” (Ibid., original 
emphasis). In other words, language is not one example of a dispositif, but 
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central to the very paradigmatic form through which a dispositif is studied – 
even of studies of material elements or techniques.  
According to Agamben, a discourse is not a pre-existing list or group of 
statements. What collects certain statements into a group is not necessarily 
their shared content, but their relation either to a paradigmatic case, as argued 
above, or to what Agamben refers to as a signature: the authorial mark that 
aims to exhibit the creator of a given statement or object. Like the example, 
Agamben claims that the function of the signature is to make a given disposi-
tif or discourse manifest. However, in contrast to conventional social con-
structivism – which has been critiqued for producing a distinction between 
those who are capable of writing discourse and those who are governed by 
discourse (Weber, 2014: 67-90; Shepherd, 2015) – Agamben conceives of the 
signatory not as an author of discourse, but as a product of the apparatus of 
the signature; of the contemporary demand for an author, for an individual 
addressee (Agamben, 2009a: 40). Read as an apparatus, Agamben argues that 
the purpose of the signature is not to change the object it signs, but rather 
how the object is interpreted. According to Agamben, the signature moves 
the object or statement that it signs, it “position[s] it in a new network of 
pragmatic and hermeneutic relations” (Ibid.). As such, the signature changes 
“our relation to the object [or statement] as well as its function in society” 
(Ibid.: 40). It is from this perspective one should understand my dedication to 
Obama. I perceive Obama not as an author of discourse, but as a paradigmat-
ic figure whose signature is and has been employed to organise the relations 
between statements and signifiers belonging to US security discourse.  
In sum, this thesis takes from Agamben two central concepts of method-
ology: the example and the signature. It employs the example in order to 
make visible a discourse or dispositif’s model form and the signature to iden-
tify the connectivity between statements, their belonging to a given discur-
sive formation. In the next section, I will operationalise these concepts, dis-
cussing how I have utilised them to identify my object of study: The Obama 
administration’s strategic narrative. The discussion is organised as follows: I 
first identify Obama as a paradigmatic figure, exemplary of a form of post-
modern and cosmopolitan hope. As paradigmatic, the signature of Obama has 
been used to delimit US security discourse in time as well as to identify 
which particular statements that belongs to it. I then discuss how I have cho-
sen to represent as well as to narrow down the countless number of state-
ments that bears the signature of Obama. As will be detailed below, the 
statements analysed have been selected because they attempt to be exemplary 
moments of hope.  
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Operationalising discourse 
Which case that becomes paradigmatic is of course “never already given” 
(Agamben, 2009a: 23), but an effect of a historical and political contest. In 
this section I will argue that the signature of Obama, being one of the most 
circulated and exhibited figures of modern politics, has become exemplary of 
a cosmopolitan, if not postmodern, form of empathic hope.  
That the signature of Obama is paradigmatic of hope – a signifier that has 
become indistinguishable from his persona (Shaull, 2017; CBS, 2017) – is 
hardly a novel claim. As the Nobel Committee declared in their Peace Prize 
nomination: “Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama 
captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future” 
(Nobel Media AB, 2009). According to Mark Ferrara, Obama represented a 
form of universal hope, freed from it particular content, an “ideal form of 
global citizenship” (2013: 144), a “multicultural world” (Ibid.: 145). As such, 
Obama came to represent an escape from both the imperialist history of US 
exceptionalism (Stephanson, 2009) and from the occupying logic of the War 
on Terror, a label that Obama did not use (Luce and Dombay, 2009). Accord-
ing to Matthew Golbush, Obama’s grand strategy was characterised by what 
he refers to as “moral multilateralism” (2016: 24), defined as a check on 
power, on the idea that might is right. Quoting Obama, Golbush concludes 
that multilateralism “regulates hubris”, serving as a guarantee of a global 
balance of power. Others have described Obama’s grand strategy as a pro-
fessed willingness to listen (Lindsay, 2011: 765), to cooperate (Ibid.) and to 
see the world through the perspective of others (Pedwell, 2012).  
While conservatives critiqued Obama for lacking a grand strategy, for not 
offering a vision of a global future (Henderson, 2010), progressives claimed 
that it was precisely this lack of vision that was Obama’s vision. In Michael 
Hirsh’s words: “the real Obama doctrine is to have no doctrine at all” (2011).  
So conceived, this ‘grand strategy’ to a large extent corresponded to what has 
been perceived as Obama’s general conceptualisation of hope as an empty 
category. According to Hirokazu Miyazaki, Obama’s hope is not particular, 
but general. The “most distinctive component” of Obama’s hope, Miyazaki 
argues, is “its lack of specificity” (2008: 5), an emptiness he claims “invites 
us all to replicate it as our own personal and specific hope” (Ibid.: 8). In a 
similar manner, Daniel E. Rossi Keen has argued that: “there is [...] no singu-
lar or specific telos for Obama’s audacious call for hope. That telos, rather, is 
itself an infinite collection of teloi” (2008: 210, original emphasis). Lauren 
Berlant has succinctly summarised the empathic promise issued by Obama’s 
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hope: an assuring proclamation that “I feel your hope” (quoted in Pedwell, 
2012: 290).29  
It is the emptiness of Obama’s hope – that it seemingly does not refer to 
anything other than itself, that is does not promise anything but hope – that 
informs the choice of the Obama presidency as the object through which the 
biopolitical use of hope is studied and exemplified. To study this use, I have 
analysed the administrations’ security discourse, represented in this thesis by 
its strategic narratives in the respective ‘pillars’ of national security: (public) 
diplomacy, development and military.  
The reason I focus on narrative is that narratives, in contrast to other more 
general forms of discourse, offer a temporal organisation of past, present and 
future (Miskimmon et. al., 2013: 7). Narratives attempt to sequence events in 
time, orchestrating a “rhythmic unfolding of words and representation” 
(Agamben, 2004a: 317). Following Alister Miskimmon, Ben O’Loughlin and 
Laura Roselle, I understand strategic narratives as “a communicative tool 
through which political actors – usually elites – attempt to give determined 
meaning to past, present, and future in order to achieve political objectives” 
(2013: 5). Based on Kenneth Burke, they define narratives as “frameworks 
that allow humans to connect apparently unconnected phenomena around 
some causal transformation” (Ibid.: 5). In other words, narratives are not a 
static description of the present, but an articulation of change, and of the 
available means of change. In visualising the future, narratives give meaning 
to the past and the present. One should however be careful to assume that 
narratives are ordered according to a pre-defined temporal sequence, such as 
linear chronological time. Sofie Hellberg notes that “there are no given rules 
for how people organise their stories temporally” (2015: 77). How a given 
narrative organises time is in other words rather a matter of empirical investi-
gation.  
From an Agambenian perspective, the methodological reasons for study-
ing strategic narratives are plural. Not only do they have a clear signature, 
they also represent the most authoritative level of communication within the 
US security apparatus. As such, they are designed to be exemplary. Strategic 
narratives articulate the words and values that the actions of the larger US 
security apparatus are supposed to be ‘synchronised’ with (White House, 
2010b: 2). Strategic narratives also have an explicit biopolitical agenda, at-
tempting to “shape behaviour [by] chang[ing] the discursive environment” 
(Miskimmon et. al. 2013: 2). According to Agamben, narratives enchant their 
audience (2000: 71), they steer processes of subjectification. In the 2010 US 
                                                                  
29 See Pedwell, 2012, for a critical analysis of the relation between Obama’s empathic hope and 
neoliberalism. 
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National Framework of Strategic Communication this objective is formulated 
as an attempt to influence the perception of the US among foreign publics, to 
“articulate a positive vision”, (White House, 2010b: 6), fostering the belief 
that the US is a “constructive” and “respectful partner” with whom one 
shares “mutual interest[s]” (Ibid.).  
In sum, the paradigmatic methodology that this thesis employs points to 
the study of political speeches at the presidential level as well as to the narra-
tive form of these speeches: the organisation of past, present and future pre-
sented by them. The methodology presented above further leads me to treat 
these speeches as a biopolitical technique, as an attempt to regulate and mod-
ulate processes of subjectification. In the next section, I will detail the meth-
od used to select which speeches to analyse, as well as the discourse analyti-
cal method utilised to analyse these speeches.  
 
 
Sampling US security discourse 
Given that I am interested both in official discourse as well as in how the US 
uses hope, the empirical material has been selected based on how the admin-
istrations have chosen to present its discourse of hope to the general public. 
To that end, the material has been collected based on how a given speech has 
been communicated, ‘sold’ and ‘advertised’. In particular I have used 
www.whitehouse.gov as well as the administrations’ various social media 
channels.30 Aside from providing an indexed database over statements, 
speeches, reports, policies and executive orders, www.whitehouse.gov is in 
many ways organised as a campaign site. It accentuates certain stories, 
speeches or policies in order to raise awareness or influence public opinion 
on different topics. It is, in other words, not a neutral research database, but a 
tool of public diplomacy, one that showcases the administrations’ ideal image 
of a given policy or issue.  
If every discourse consists of a complex network of statements, a “system 
of references to other books, other texts, other sentences”, as per Foucault’s 
definition (1972: 23), then www.whitehouse.gov offers a snapshot of how the 
Obama administrations perceive this network to be ideally assembled. The 
website represents an attempt to place certain speeches and reports in what 
                                                                  
30 There were several social media channels through which official US foreign policy was 
communicated during the Obama period: Barack Obama’s personal Twitter, Instagram and 
Facebook profiles, the official @potus accounts on the same platforms, the State Department’s 
and the White House’s channels, as well as those that were specifically designed with a public 
diplomacy purpose, such as the Global Engaement Center’s twitter account, and other campaign 
specific accounts such as the White House’s campaign Muslim and American. 
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Lene Hansen calls “a prominent intertextual location” (2006: 13), rendering 
them into what Foucault has called a “node within a network” (1972: 23) and 
what Agamben refers to as an example (2009a: 18). As such, the presentation 
of certain issues on whitehouse.gov has provided a possibility to reassemble 
the network that forms US security discourse during the Obama period.  
While the presentation of this network on whitehouse.gov changes over 
time, a certain consistency remains. Some speeches seem to never become 
old, but are referenced time and again either by policy documents and/or by 
new speeches. Some quotes or statements are used as reminders of old prom-
ises kept, others become headings employed to give an emotional and poetic 
aura to particular policies. The National Security Strategy of 2010’s quote 
from Obama’s speech at the UN General Assembly – “what happens to the 
hope of a single child – anywhere – can enrich our world, or impoverish it” 
(White House, 2010a: 7) – is exemplary of this method.  
By observing this presentation, three paradigmatic moments of hope with-
in Obama’s strategic narratives were quickly identified, each corresponding 
to the three separate domains of national security presented above. A narra-
tive of “A New Beginning” between the US and the Muslim world, as told by 
Obama in Cairo (2009d);31 of a “New Moment of Promise” for the global 
poor as communicated by Obama to the Ghanaian parliament (2009c), and a 
vision of “Just and Lasting Peace” as detailed at the Nobel Peace Prize recep-
tion in Norway (2009b).  
These moments were supplemented with a wider reading of each respec-
tive strategic narrative, analysing additional speeches that were listed or re-
ferred to as prominent by the two consecutive administrations. In order to 
anchor the speeches in their larger discursive setting, I also read a series of 
reports such as the National Security Strategy of 2010 and 2015 (White 
House, 2010a; 2015), the Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review 
(US Department of Stare, 2015), the Presidential Policy Directive on Global 
Development (White House, 2010c) and the National Framework for Strate-
gic Communication (Ibid.: 2010b). Not all of the material read is referenced 
in the articles or in this kappa. In these reports I have particularly searched 
                                                                  
31 According to Hallams, Obama’s Cairo speech was “a classic example of how the administra-
tion is using social media technologies to promote its message and construct an alternative 
narrative to that offered by groups like Al-Qaeda. The speech was instantaneously wired around 
the world, via social networking sites, podcasts, and a live Webcast on the White House’s Web 
site. Updates via text message reached 20,000 non-US citizens in over 200 countries around the 
world, with the texts being available in Arabic, Farsi, Urdu, and eight other languages. In addi-
tion, translated versions of the speech were available to download on YouTube, Facebook, and 
MySpace, and the South Asian social networking site Orkut. The White House used Facebook to 
conduct an international discussion on the event, while responses to the speech submitted via 
text messages were compiled and later posted on America.gov” (2011: 13) 
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for articulations of hope (or of adjacent concepts such as belief, faith, pas-
sion, aspiration, but also of opposite concepts such as fear, despair, hate) to 
find evidence of how hope has been used and understood in its wider security 
context. This method was utilised not only to contextualise Obama’s speech-
es, but also to find contrasting articulations of hope than those that appear in 
the strategic narratives. For example, while the strategic narrative on global 
development continuously refers to hope as not a gift to the hopeless, but as 
an inherent capacity in need of recognition, the Policy Directive on Global 
Development defines hope solely as a gift. In part, it was this contrast that 
allowed the act of recognition to be identified as a gift of hope in article 3, 
“Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and the Promise of 
Despair” (Tängh Wrangel, 2017a).  
To analyse the strategic narrative employed in the sphere of (public) di-
plomacy, addressed in article 2 –  “The Unknowing Subject of Radicalisa-
tion: US Counterterrorism Communications and the Biopolitics of Hope” 
(Tängh Wrangel, forthcoming) – Obama’s Cairo speech was supplemented 
by high-level speeches in which hope was articulated as a primary means to 
counter the ideology of violent extremism, in particular Obama’s address at 
the White House initiated Summit on Countering Violent Extremism (2015a) 
and his 2014 speech at the UN General Assembly (2014b). In order to gain 
access to how the strategic narrative was implemented on a daily basis, be-
neath the presidential level, the empirical material analysed in this pillar 
include statements from the administrators of public diplomacy. Although 
situated on another level within the relational network that make up US secu-
rity discourse, this material is equally narrative, strategic and exemplary as 
the presidential addresses.  
The empirical material analysed in article 3 on the strategic narrative in 
the sphere of development, engages the entirety of Obama’s public discourse 
on development and global poverty. Particular focus was paid to three exem-
plary moments of hope: 1) Obama’s 2009 speech in Ghana (2009c), a land-
mark public diplomacy event (Cull, 2013: 133), during which Obama ad-
dressed the promise of global development for the first time. 2) Obama’s 
2010 speech at the UN General Assembly (2010a), during which Obama both 
presented the 2010 US Global Development Policy and urged the internation-
al aid community to cast aside its colonial lens. 3) Obama’s pledge of com-
mitment to the UN Sustainable Development Goals at the UN General As-
sembly in 2015, during which Obama reiterated his promise to recognise the 
global poor as inherently hopeful and potential (2015b).   
The discussion of the use of hope in the practice of war, analysed in arti-
cle 4 – “Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future in Bare 
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Life” (Wrangel, 2014) – is based on a close reading of Obama’s Nobel lec-
ture, in which hope’s relation to human nature, to violence and to fear was 
explicitly conceptualised. To this day, the Nobel lecture remains the primary 
articulation of Obama’s definition of hope within the context of security. To 
support this reading, references were further made to passages from Obama’s 
2006 book The Audacity of Hope, which offers a key conceptualisation of 
hope within Obama’s oeuvre, as well as to statements made by Obama on the 
promise of military intervention in Afghanistan (2009e). The empirical dis-
cussion in this kappa employs a wider selection of empirical material than 
that analysed in article 4, complementing the analysis with a reading of other 
key speeches in which hope is articulated. These include Obama’s address at 
West Point Military Academy (2014a), in which Obama encouraged the US 
military to embody an ethos of hope as well as several speeches held in re-
sponse to terror attacks claimed to be orchestrated or influenced by Islamic 
terror organisations on Western soil. These speeches include Obama’s ad-
dresses on the 2013 attacks in Boston (2013), the 2015 attacks in San Ber-
nardino (2015e), the 2016 attacks in Orlando (2016b) as well as his state-
ments on the 2015 attacks in Paris (2015f) and the 2016 attacks in Brussels 
(2016a).    
 
 
Reading US security discourse 
To analyse Obama’s speeches, the thesis has made use of a discourse analyti-
cal method adopted from Agamben’s methodological vocabulary. While 
Agamben does not offer a systematised analytical method, his brief discus-
sions on method point to his use of what may be called an exercise of map-
ping or tracing the network of conceptual relations that surround a given 
object or concept. In The Highest Poverty, Agamben briefly argues that "it is 
not possible to understand the meaning of [a] term if one ignores its relations 
with its linguistic context as a whole" (2013: 66). His discussions of both the 
signature (which, if we recall, highlight the constitutive role of a “network of 
pragmatic and hermeneutic relations” (2009a: 40)) and of use (which define 
use as being placed in relation, of affecting and being affected by that relation 
(2015: 29)) also directs attention to this exercise.   
In Homo Sacer, Agamben identifies two “correlative” (1998: 22) types of 
relations as central to the formation of any concept, object or subject, namely 
the exception and the example, which he describes as “the two modes by 
which a set tries to found and maintain its own coherence” (Ibid.: 21). Ac-
cording to Agamben, the subject is caught at the threshold between the ex-
ample and the exception. The performative interplay between the two 
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“come[s] into play every time the very sense of belonging and commonality 
of individuals is to be defined” (Ibid.). For Agamben, what is between the 
exception and the example is both nothing and everything. Every time that 
something is defined or addressed, every time that someone is either exclud-
ed from or articulated as a member of a political community, this particular 
subject is made either into an example or an exception. It is moved from its 
original unspecified location and placed at the limit, what Agamben defines 
as the threshold. As such, the threshold is not simply inside or outside the 
political community, it manifests rather “the experience of the limit itself” 
(2009b: 66), what makes a given subject, object or concept identifiable. Be-
cause of this constitutive role, the first step of my analytical method consisted 
of identifying these two types of relations in each subordinate domain of US 
security discourse. Alex Murray defines this method as a dialectical method, 
which is employed to bring “dialectically opposed forces to a standstill” 
(2010: 33). 
Agamben describes the exception as an “inclusive exclusion” (1998: 21), 
original emphasis), as something that is “included in the normal case precise-
ly because it does not belong to it” (Ibid.) In many ways, the exception can 
be likened to the relation of abandonment discussed in this kappa’s theoreti-
cal chapter, which, if we recall, is defined as “an active, relational process” 
(Pratt, 2005: 1054) through which that which is abandoned remains caught in 
relation to that which excludes it. As such, the concept of the exception ap-
pears to hold a similar function as Henry Staten’s “constitutive outside” 
(1984: 24) that has been so central to post structural theory in general, and 
perhaps especially to the discourse analytical method operationalised by 
Laclau and Mouffe (1985).32   
                                                                  
32 Despite these similarities however, I have attempted to avoid Laclau and Mouffe’s terminolo-
gy. The reasons are twofold. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe bases their analytical method on a 
modernist subject of desire, one that is assumed to be driven by the desire for satisfaction. Ac-
cording to Laclau and Mouffe, all political articulations promise to fix meaning, to secure and 
realise a stable identity (1985: 127; see also Zizek, 1990: 252). Laclau calls this logic of articula-
tion a promise to fill the “empty signifier” (1996: 44) – the nodal point in the chain of signifiers, 
that according to Laclau and Mouffe defines a given discursive formation (1985: 105) – with a 
particular content, creating what he calls an “ontological society” (1996: 69). As such, this logic 
of articulation appears to be at odds with Obama’s notion of hope, which if seen as an empty 
signifier would cancel out the desire for both satisfaction, finality and security. Indeed, for 
Obama, hope is to be never satisfied, merely actualised. The ideal society which he depicts is not 
an ‘ontological society’, in which hopes are satisfied, but a society where “aspirations of indi-
vidual human beings matter, where hopes and not just fear governs” (2014a) – this is, according 
to Obama “the world as it should be” (Ibid., emphasis added). Obama further defines hope not as 
the opposite of insecurity or contingency, but as made possible by them. In US security dis-
course, this is articulated, on the one hand, as a call to embrace the “ambiguities of history” 
(Obama, 2009b) as well as an imperative to recognise insecurity as a “permanent condition of 
life” (Homeland Security Council, 2007: 25) 
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The example constitutes for Agamben the exception’s symmetrical oppo-
site. If we recall, Agamben refers to the example as a concept of substitution, 
one that constitutes the general by taking its place. However, this is not the 
only way that Agamben discusses the performative role of the example. In 
The Highest Poverty (2013), Agamben discusses how the example conditions 
becoming, on the one hand, through desire, and, on the other hand, as a form 
of life. As we shall see, the two are deeply interrelated. The monastic orders 
that Agamben in this book analyses governed the conduct of its monks 
through a particular definition of the example as a form of life (Ibid.: 14). 
The monks were called to form themselves not only in the image of Christ, 
but to become themselves a form, to “be a form of living for all, be an exam-
ple” (Ibid.: 95). Through this definition, the concept of ‘form of life’ that 
Agamben so often invokes appears to refer not simply to different ways of 
living, but to an exemplary form of living, a model life. The concept signifies 
an object of aspiration, an ideal. Agamben thus observes that the monks were 
governed not by explicit rules, not by “substance or content” (Ibid.: 53), but 
by “their own desires” (Ibid.: 12) to become exemplary. Agamben explains: 
“The form is not a norm imposed on life, but a living that in following the 
life of Christ gives itself and makes itself a form.” (Ibid.: 105). As an object 
of desire, the example is both absent and present, or rather, it is present in its 
absence, what Agamben refers to as an “exclusive inclusion” (1998: 21, orig-
inal emphasis).  
In order to answer research question 2 – how do particular conceptual re-
lations give meaning to hope? – I sought to identify the conceptual network 
that gives form to hope in US security discourse. To that end, I identified 
which signifiers were articulated as the principal exceptions to hope and 
which signifiers that were held as exemplary of hope. Across the different 
narratives, the signifier that held the position of the exception varied. The 
strategic narrative in the diplomatic domain distinguished hope primarily 
                                                                                                                                               
Secondly, Laclau and Mouffe’s notion of antagonism (1985: 122) assumes that the fixed 
meaning or identity that the subject is assumed to desire is denied realisation by the very exist-
ence of the antagonist. The desiring subject which they presume is in that sense withheld satis-
faction by the presence of the antagonist, which they define as a “symbol of my non-being” 
(1985: 125). In Obama’s discourse of hope, this relationship appears to be reversed, as below 
analyses will attempt to show in greater detail. According to Obama, hope is not withheld by the 
encounter with an antagonistic Other – the terrorist – but actualised by it. If hope is an empty 
signifier that we desire to realise, then what realises this signifier is not the overcoming of the 
antagonist, but its presence. Indeed, as I will argue below, Obama perceives moments of threat 
and fear as moments of hope: it is “the darkest of moments, that gives us hope” (2016b), they 
offer, in Obama’s words, a “test of the sturdiest of souls” (2013), a “chance to see and highlight 
and appreciate that [hopeful] spirit” (Ibid.). It is this ‘spirit’ that Obama previously has called the 
“audacity of hope” (2006).  
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from hate, the strategic narrative in the domain of development distinguished 
hope primarily from despair and the strategic narrative in the military domain 
distinguished hope primarily from fear. Within the different articles analysing 
these respective narratives, I traced the signifiers that were associated with 
these exceptions in each narrative, analysing, on the one hand, how they were 
placed in relation to one another and, on the other hand, how they were 
placed in relation to hope on various levels of intimacy. I also traced which 
concepts were placed in an exemplary relation to hope in each respective 
narrative. These relations changed somewhat in the different narratives. For 
instance, the narrative in the ideological sphere placed a stronger emphasis on 
“pluralism” (Obama, 2015f), and “freedom” (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2016b), 
than the narrative on development, which emphasised ‘entrepreneurial spirit’ 
(2009c) and “opportunity” (Ibid.).  
This method also made visible the temporalities that the respective narra-
tives placed in opposition to hope, hence allowing me to answer part of re-
search question 3 – how is the temporal experience of hope articulated and 
actualised? To analyse how the respective narratives articulated the experi-
ence of hope, I looked at how hope was temporally described. As emphasised 
in the strategic narrative on development, despair was associated both with a 
form of cyclical repetition and with a sense of impossible linear hope towards 
perfection. Examples of this discursive practice includes Obama’s continual 
reference to the cycles of “dependence” (2010a; 2015b), “poverty” (2015b) 
and “resentment” (2015a). In the domain of diplomacy, hate was likewise 
associated with two seemingly contradictory temporalities. Hate was both 
presented as a backwards motion, a force of destruction, but also as made 
possible by the same linear hope that was critiqued in the narrative on devel-
opment. In the military domain, fear was described both as a state of paraly-
sis as well as an attempt to cling to the past, to remain fixed in “particular 
identities” (Obama, 2009b). This paralysis was further associated with a 
‘naïve’ linear hope, which was claimed to make the subject of security un-
prepared to act in the face of insecurity. In contrast to these different tempo-
ralities, hope was presented as a “moment” (2009c), a “break” (2010a; 
2015c), as “move[ment]” (2009c), but also as a “timeless creed” (2008b) that 
will never falter or be extinguished, as expressed by Obama: “while we 
breathe, we hope” (Ibid.).  
In order to address research question 4 – how are different forms of life 
constituted in relation to hope and to one another? – I also traced how these 
concepts were placed in relation to different forms of life, deemed by US 
security discourse to be in lack of hope. Through this method I was also able 
to analyse both which forms of life that were targeted by the use of hope and 
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what the characteristics of these forms of life were perceived to be. As dis-
cussed in this kappa’s introductory chapter, the different narratives were 
directed not only towards different affective states, but also towards different 
populations of risk. Targeted by these narratives were not only the global 
Muslim population and the global poor, but also the Western subject of secu-
rity, whose actions and response to terror were perceived as affecting the 
populations of risk and their disposition for violence.  
A similar procedure was conducted to identify the concepts that surround 
and give form to the exemplary form of hopeful life that Obama referred to in 
each strategic narrative. By tracing which concepts that give content to the 
exemplary form of life, I analysed how this form of life was presented and 
which characteristics it was taken to embody. As a dual concept, the example 
being both a concept of substitution and of desire, I analysed both how US 
security discourse substitutes the hopeful life for the general and how it ren-
ders it an exemplary object of desire. Obama’s articulation of the hopeful life 
as both a universal figure of human nature and as an exemplary form of life 
that is perceived to be absent from the potential subjects of radicalisation is a 
clear testament to this dual role.  
To answer research question 1 – how can we understand the narrative 
means and ends of the instrumental use of hope? – as well as the second part 
of research question 3, on how the temporal experience of hope is actualised, 
a narrative analysis was employed. This analysis allowed me to study the 
temporal sense of movement that is implied both in the narrative style that 
characterises strategic communication as well as in Agamben’s definition of 
the activity of use (2015). As we have seen in the theoretical chapter of this 
kappa, the experience of temporal movement is also often held as a defining 
trait of hope (e.g. Derrida, 2006; Negri, 1999; Hardt and Negri, quoted in 
Brown et. al., 2002; Massumi, 2002a). It is also central to Obama’s concep-
tualisation of hope. Below, I will briefly rehearse the theoretical underpin-
nings of this narrative analysis. 
In a brief analysis of Guy Debord’s cinematic strategies, Agamben ex-
plains what he means by narrative movement. According to Agamben, the 
first act of movement is stoppage, which Agamben defines not as a “chrono-
logical pause, but rather a power of stoppage that works on the image itself, 
that pulls it away from the narrative power to exhibit it as such” (2004a: 
317). In other words, narrative movement requires disruption, to halt the 
network of relations that make up a narrative – discussed in Agamben’s short 
text as a “montage” that organises time (Ibid.: 315) – to “pull it out of the 
flux of meaning, to exhibit it as such” (Ibid.: 317). Agamben asserts that it is 
this stoppage that is the condition of possibility of movement: “at the heart of 
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every creative act there is an act of decreation” (Ibid.: 318). If the example 
and the exception are the relations through which a concept is brought to 
presence, it thus seems that stop and move are the process through which it is 
brought to actuality. Indeed, Agamben presents the process of stop and move 
as a temporal mirror to the relationship of ‘exclusive inclusion’ that is charac-
teristic of the exception, through which that which is stopped is included in a 
given narrative solely to allow the experience of movement.  
To analyse how this process is actualised in the Obama administrations’’ 
security discourse, I studied how the narratives order time: which past the use 
of hope stops and which future it heralds. In other words, the method em-
ployed to study this process is also partly conceptual. Its purpose is, on the 
one hand, to identify which past – and which forms of life, and which rela-
tions between lives – that is explicitly decreated in order to be able to define 
the present as a moment of hope, as a moment when, as Obama explains, 
“history is on the move” (2009c). Its purpose is also to identify through 
which narrative means a given stoppage is achieved, and what sense of 
movement that is associated with it; which future the stoppage heralds. In the 
respective narratives, a series of various narrative means were employed to 
stop time. In the ideological sphere, the practice of truth-telling was readily 
employed, allegedly confronting the “lies” (Obama, 2009d) peddled by vio-
lent extremist ideology. In the sphere of development as well as in the mili-
tary domain, the practice of recognition was used as a means of stoppage, 
purportedly claiming to “break” (Ibid.: 2010a; 2015c) time free from path-
dependency.  
To problematize Obama’s description of hope as a one-time event – a 
new beginning, a moment of historical movement – I was also interested in 
how these attempts were repeated across time. Indeed, Agamben defines 
repetition as central to the formation of life, in itself a never finalised process. 
In his study of the monastic form of life, he argues that the monks were 
moulded through the ceaseless repetition of the ‘holy art’, “without interrup-
tion” (2013: 23). Agamben refers to this form of governance as “a total mobi-
lization of existence through time” (Ibid.). The role of repetition is also cen-
tral both in US security discourse as a whole – which since the attacks of 
9/11 has emphasised that security can never be truly achieved, but must be 
continuously pre-empted (Massumi, 2007; Anderson, 2010) – and in 
Obama’s conceptualisation of hope – which is defined as a living and fragile 
experience in constant need of support (2016a). In his discussion of Debord’s 
narrative style, Agamben further defines repetition as a central component of 
narration. Together with stoppage, he describes repetition as the “two tran-
scendental conditions of montage” (2004a: 315).  
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To ascertain the role of repetition in each strategic narrative, I therefore 
looked at if, and if so, how, the respective narratives changed over time. 
Reading the narratives, I sought to identify both recurrent patterns of stop-
page and movement and changes in the meaning given to the past and to 
future respectively. I was also interested in to what frequency the respective 
narrative was articulated. Through this method I was able to problematize the 
dichotomy between cyclical repetition and instantaneous rupture that the 
Obama administrations’ security discourse articulated. In contrast, the tem-
poral experience actualised in the respective narratives – addressed by the 
second part of research question 2 – appears as a paradoxical union of the 
instant and the eternal, an instant caught in repeat.  
To summarise the above, the method of analysis that I have employed in 
this thesis is twofold. The primary analysis has focussed on studying the 
conceptual network that gives meaning both to the life of hope and to the 
time of hope. This network has been organised based on Agamben’s defini-
tion of the example and the exception as the two primary relations that give 
form to a given discourse. In tandem with this method I have studied how the 
respective narratives organise time and how they are repeated over time.  
By these methods I have been able to study how hope has been used as a 
biopolitical technology, utilized by the US security apparatus to regulate 
processes of subjectification. I have also been able to analyse how hope has 
been used to value and separate between forms of life, another key aspect of 
Agambenian biopolitics (1998: 137). The next chapter will present my analy-
sis of the conceptual network that constitutes US security discourse – the 
conceptualisation of hope, of time, and of life that it is productive of – in 
order to make possible a concluding discussion on its relation to the current 
state of security in which Agamben and others claim that we live (2001). 
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Analysing the use of hope  
Given the form of this thesis – a compilation of articles – the empirical anal-
yses offered in the three empirically focussed articles are presented at times 
without reference to the methodological vocabulary discussed in the previous 
chapter, aligning rather to different literatures and concepts within critical 
security studies and biopolitics. In the interest of clarity, the empirical find-
ings are therefore presented in a terminologically more concentrated form 
below.  
If we recall Agamben’s definition of the subject as caught at the threshold 
between the example and the exception, this analytical chapter is broken 
down into a series of thresholds: between hope and hate; hope and despair as 
well as between hope and fear. These sections rehearse the strategic narra-
tives in each sphere. They also analyse the different conceptual relations 
which give form and content to hope in the Obama administrations’ security 
discourse and which forms of life that the use of hope is productive of. In 
general, these thresholds coincide with the different pillars claimed to support 
US security. The sphere of public diplomacy actualises the threshold between 
hope and hate; the sphere of development actualises the threshold between 
hope and despair; and the threshold between hope and fear is actualised in the 
sphere of military. To a large extent, the different thresholds correspond to 
the respective articles and the empirical discussions performed therein, yet 
not exclusively so. Far from being clear-cut, the distinctions between the 
respective spheres are intimately related, blurring into one another. For in-
stance, despair and hate are in many ways articulated as conditioned upon 
one another. I will attempt to make visible this intimacy below, rectifying to 
some extent a separation made necessary by the choice of writing a compila-
tion thesis.  
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The discussion in this chapter is overarching, unable at times to offer the 
same level of detail, both theoretical and empirical, as the respective articles. 
The narratives are presented as a snapshot in time. What this chapter offers is 
not an historical analysis of the use of hope, but an attempt to understand and 
make visible its paradigmatic use. It should be noted, however, that hope is 
articulated across the strategic narratives with remarkable consistency. But 
this consistency should by no means be taken to imply that hope holds an 
unambiguous meaning in the Obama administrations’ security discourse. As 
we will see below, this is far from the case. In the following concluding chap-
ter, I will discuss these findings in relation to the research questions stipulat-
ed in the introductory chapter as well as to key concepts of Agambenian 
biopolitics, such as bare life and the state of exception. 
 
 
Threshold: hope – hate 
In the domain of public diplomacy, hope is summoned to confront what is 
most commonly described as a “hateful ideology” (Obama, 2009d; 2014b; 
2015a; 2015g; 2016c) that seeks to “divide the world into adherents and 
infidels” (2014b). The ideological sphere constitutes in the Obama admin-
istrations’ security discourse the principal threshold on which ’violent ex-
tremism’ is to be combatted: war’s “most fundamental source”, namely “the 
corruption of young minds by violent ideology” (Ibid.). According to Obama, 
this war is not won on “the battlefield”, but “by better ideas – a more attrac-
tive and compelling vision” (2015a). As we shall see below, hope is of course 
defined as critical, if not synonymous, to this task.  
While Obama is careful not to mention words like “radical Islam” 
(2016d), it remains evident that the target of these practices are the global 
Muslim population at large. As such, the logic that informs the use of hope 
within US counterterrorism communications is far from hopeful, at least if 
hope is conceived as formative of a solidaristic and inclusive subject, as per 
the previously discussed ‘hope narrative’. Quite the contrary, what these 
operations actualise appear strangely similar to what Massumi has defined as 
a politics of fear, in which the object of politics are not situations of danger, 
identifiable and known, but a pre-emption of an always present, yet unknown 
and indeterminate threat, “formless and contentless” (2005: 35).  
Like Massumi’s politics of fear, the use of hope within US counterterror-
ism communications aims to “not only reach those that may be on the fence, 
but to disseminate messaging that will prevent young people from ever get-
ting to the fence” (Hussein, 2015). The place that these ‘young people’ inhab-
it, i.e. social media, is likewise referred to in US security discourse as a prob-
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lem in its own right, an “ungoverned space” (Fernandez, 2013), that is 
claimed to produce “echo chamber effects, accelerating and widening the 
process of radicalization” (Fernandez, 2013).33  
The distinctions that give form to hope in this particular strategic narra-
tive initially appear to be clearly defined. While the US is held to represent 
“pluralism” (Obama, 2015g), “opportunity” (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2015f), 
“freedom” (Ibid., 2009d; 2015a; 2015g), “communication and trust” (Ibid., 
2015g) “truth” (Ibid., 2009d; 2014b; 2015g) and “hope” (Ibid., 2009d; 
2015a; 2016a; 2016c), the ideology of ‘violent extremism’ is described as a 
“nightmarish vision” (Ibid., 2014b), that Obama claims to represent a “twist-
ed interpretation of religion” (2015a). Elsewhere this ideology is described as 
a form of “cancer” (Ibid., 2014b), a “barbarism” (Ibid., 2016c) communicat-
ed by “depraved terrorists” (Ibid., 2016c) who “cannot build or create any-
thing, and therefore peddle only fanaticism and hate” (2014b). According to 
Obama, this ideology offers only “misery and death” (2015a) and its sole aim 
is “to spread panic” (2016c). The Global Engagement Center (GEC), which 
is tasked to counter this ideology (succeeding the Center for Strategic Coun-
terterrorism Communications (CSCC) and the Digital Outreach Team 
(DOT)) describes this ideology as a “nihilistic vision” (US Department of 
State, 2016) that centre on two ideas:  that the West and Islam are essentially 
incompatible and that US imperialism is the cause of the majority of griev-
ances facing the global Muslim population.  
A closer reading however, reveals above distinctions to be less certain. 
Indeed, what makes the ideology of violent extremism so dangerous, accord-
ing to Obama, is not its nihilism, but the ‘inspiration’ it offers, its ‘attractive-
ness’ (2015a). From former CSCC Coordinator Rashad Hussein, we learn 
that what makes this ideology desirable is its promise of “empowerment, 
adventure, and religious obligation and reward” (Hussein, 2015). Such state-
ments take as their condition of possibility a recognition that the battle of 
hearts and minds is not waged between hope and a nihilistic form of hate, but 
between hopes. In other words, the terrorist ideologue is not perceived to be 
devoid of hope, on the contrary, the ‘ideology of violent extremism’ is de-
scribed as even more hopeful than the “positive vision” (White House, 
2010b: 6) allegedly disseminated by the US’ strategic narrative. Accordingly, 
the US need not invert this ideology, but mimic it: “Like extremist messag-
ing, counter-content could draw in youth with emotional images and themes. 
It would foster a sense of purpose, belonging, and obligation” (Hussein, 
2015). In other words, what according to US security discourse separates the 
                                                                  
33 See also von Behr et al, 2013; Elkjer Nissen, 2015 for an analysis of social media as a key 
location of contemporary conflict.   
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respective narratives from one another is not their commitment to hope, but 
what kind of hope they profess commitment to.  
Presented as the perhaps most important distinction separating these 
forms of hope is their respective relationship to the truth. While the hope 
offered by the proponents of ‘violent extremism’ is claimed to be ideological, 
the hope represented by the US is not once referred to in such terms. The 
‘positive vision’ that the strategic narrative is tasked to implement is not an 
ideology but an objective reality. This is a stark contrast to the discourse of 
President Bush, who during the War on Terror repeatedly claimed allegiance 
to an “ideology of hope” (2010: 1576; 1632; 1747; 1890; 1901; 2039; 2154, 
emphasis added).  
Within the Obama administration’s security discourse, the signifier of 
‘truth’ is heavily invested with hope. In this narrative, ‘truth’ functions as the 
narrative means through which hope is supposed to be generated. According 
to Obama, commitment to truth holds the potential to move humanity to-
wards the future – enabling the “new beginning” that is the key theme of this 
particular narrative (2009d). If “terrorists traffic in lies and stereotypes” 
(Ibid.), the ‘truth’ is claimed to represent a foundation upon which humanity 
can ‘build’ and ‘bolster’ “bridges of communication and trust” (Obama, 
2015g). In Cairo, Obama thus defined the practice of truth-telling as the real 
objective of his speech: “That is what I will try to do – to speak the truth as 
best I can” (2009d). If “division” and “hate” is associated with signifiers like 
“fate” and “doom”, the truth of hope – that the future is not fixed – is held to 
free human action from having been “bound to the past” (Obama, 2009d).  
Outside of presidential discourse, reference to the truth remains equally 
common. For instance, one senior official has described the activities of the 
CSCC as “repeatedly and aggressively presenting the reality of what is going 
on the ground” (Fernandez, 2013, emphasis added). The truth is referred to in 
this body of communication not as an end, but as a means to “deconstruct the 
radical frame” (Olidort, 2015). As such, the purpose of this practice appears 
to be the generation of an emotional impact: “What we try to do is not to 
affirm the positive about ourselves but to emphasize the negative about the 
adversary. It is about offense and not defence […] to unnerve the adversary, 
to get in their heads” (Fernandez, 2013, emphasis added). The devotion to 
truth that this discourse makes manifest thus appears to be based not on the 
objective to replace the “lies and stereotypes” (2009d) peddled by ‘violent 
extremism’ with a hopeful and positive truth, but rather to unsettle the cer-
tainty given by the extremist representation of truth. As such, the despairing 
contents of the ideal message – delivered not by the US State Department but 
by “empowered” (US Department of State, 2016) partner messengers with 
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“credibility […] and sway in the Muslim world and the Arab world” (Sten-
gel, 2016)34 – should come as no surprise: “No you’re not going to go to 
heaven, no you’re going to be treated appallingly when you’re there, no 
you’re not likely to fight, but you’re likely to be cleaning toilets, no you’re 
not going to be able to communicate with your family, and by the way, how 
are you even going to tell your family that you’ve done this” (Ibid.). 
Established through such statements is a paradoxical relationship between 
truth and certainty, through which devotion to the truth is meant to unsettle 
certainty rather than to produce it, to give choice – and doubt – to the subject 
of radicalisation. In contrast to the ‘truth’, US security discourse associates 
certainty with a reduction of human potentiality, exemplified through signifi-
ers such as “division”, “fate”, and ‘inevitability’ (2009d). Obama’s descrip-
tion of the ‘propaganda’ of ‘violent extremism’ as having “coerced young 
people to travel abroad to fight their wars and turned students – young people 
full of potential – into suicide bombers” (Obama, 2014b, emphasis added) is 
a clear example of this logic.  
Through this logic, the form of life that the Obama administrations’ secu-
rity discourse excludes appears not to be conceived as the traditional non-
communicative figure of bare life, the speechless barbarian,35 but the all-too 
communicative terrorist ideologue: the one who speaks, and allows, only one 
language. The one whose ‘nightmarish vision’ is but too defined, binding 
aspiration to only one future. So conceived, this figure embodies a curious 
conflation of the traditional dichotomy supporting modernist forms of biopol-
itics: it combines the violence associated with bare life, zoē, and the linear 
hope of perfection associated with politically qualified life, bios.  
What separates this figure from the Western subject of security is hence 
not the use of hope, it is rather how hope is used: either by positive content, 
promising the creation of a specific future as per the alleged workings of the 
terrorist demagogue, or by disrupting hope’s relation to an articulated object 
or future. According to US counterterrorism communications, the disruption 
of linear hopes is not a nihilistic and destructive enterprise, but rather a com-
mitment to the contingency, doubt and uncertainty that this security discourse 
associates with hope. Obama’s popular distinction, his wartime slogan: “the 
future belongs to those that build – not those who destroy” (2014b), is thus 
                                                                  
34 In this sense, the GEC can be seen as a direct implementation of Obama’s proclamation at the 
2015 Counter-terrorism Summit that deradicalization and resistance from recruitment will not be 
performed primarily by the US state, but by “empower[ing] communities”, “former extremists” 
and “families” to speak out against the ideology of violent extremism (2015a). 
35 For observations and critique of the pervasiveness of this figure within the War on Terror, see 
Douzinas (2007) and Zehfuss (2012). 
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paradoxically inverted. The future – experienced as possibility – belongs to 
the moment of destruction, to the decreation of words and meaning.  
If the past which Obama’s truth aims to disrupt belonged to a linear hope 
and to ideas of a clash of civilisations (Obama, 2009d; 2014d; 2015a), the 
future is claimed to belong to a subject presented as the antithesis to such 
collective ideas of perfection: the struggling multi-cultural individual. Not 
only is this exemplary figure of life continuously summoned by Obama 
(2009d; 2015a; 2015g), its constant dissemination constitutes one of the key 
tasks of the CSCC and of the GEC: to collect and distribute “examples of 
young people around the world who are addressing challenges they face 
through productive means” (Hussein, 2015). Other examples of this dissemi-
nation include the White House’s recent Muslim and American campaign 
(White House, 2016). To be sure, the world which this individual – who, 
according to Obama, is universal: “all of us share common aspirations” 
(2009d) – inhabits is a neoliberal world, a world where opportunity may not 
come true but nonetheless always exists – as promise if not as reality, as 
articulated by Obama in Cairo.36 In Cairo, Obama thus accentuated the suc-
cesses of Muslim American businesses, and the Muslim and American cam-
paign all show individuals at work. Obama is of course the embodiment of 
this figure, as he was sure to tell the audience in Cairo: “I am a Christian, but 
my father came from a Kenyan family that includes generations of Muslims. 
As a boy, I spent several years in Indonesia and heard the call of the azaan at 
the break of dawn and the fall of dusk. As a young man, I worked in Chicago 
communities where many found dignity and peace in their Muslim faith” 
(2009d).  
Although presented as the opposite of hate, the hopeful and productive 
individual discussed above is not free of hate. On the contrary, as testified by 
Obama’s frequent use of dehumanizing language referred to in the introduc-
tion to this section, the hate this subject is supposed to hold is directed to-
wards the idea of perfection, towards a linear utopic hope that in this narra-
tive is associated solely with violence and exclusion. According to the 
Obama administrations’ security discourse, it is further held as imperative 
that the global Muslim community continually expresses this hate. They are 
charged with a special responsibility to both “explicitly, forcefully, and con-
sistently” (Obama, 2014b) distance itself from the dehumanized figure of 
terror, and to actively circulate the counter-image defined by US counterter-
rorism communications (Ibid.). As such, the condition of possibility of this 
hate is the continually presupposed link between Islam and terror, an associa-
                                                                  
36 ”The dream of opportunity for all people has not come true for everyone in America, but its 
promise exists for all who come to our shores” (Obama, 2009d).  
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tion that must be continuously summoned only to be banished if the subject 
of radicalisation is to become the hopeful, empowered messenger that US 
security discourse aims to produce. For the global Muslim population, it thus 
seems that one cannot be anything other than a struggling, potentially suc-
cessful individual in a capitalist society or a violent hateful barbarian.  
To summarise the strategic narrative in the sphere of (public) diplomacy, 
this narrative operates through a clear structure of stop-move-repeat. By the 
means of truth-telling, the ideology of ‘violent extremism’ is meant to be 
continuously stopped in order to effectuate a sense of movement. This is 
arguably not actual movement, in which the subject of radicalisation is 
moved to another future – that of pluralism, tolerance and freedom that this 
narrative allegedly promises – but rather an experience of movement 
achieved through the act of stoppage, by the continuously demanded disasso-
ciation from the ‘barbaric’ linear hope offered by ‘violent extremism’. Noth-
ing is offered the subject of radicalisation, except the disruption of its dreams. 
Through this act of stoppage, the subject of radicalisation is placed at the 
threshold between two different forms of life, between what this narrative 
presents as a collective form of violent life and a multicultural individual, 
exemplified through the figure of Obama. At this particular threshold, the 
subject of radicalisation is torn not between hope and hate, but between a 
particular form of hateful hope and a particular form of hopeful hate: between 
a form of hope that hates articulated dreams of utopia and a form of hate that 
hopes to realise its particular version of utopia through violent means; be-
tween a collective hate for an explicit Other and an individualised hate that is 
neither tolerant or pluralistic, but rather urged to constantly fear and exclude 
the global Muslim population.  
 
 
Threshold: hope – despair 
If ideology represents for Obama the principal level of radicalisation, poverty 
is defined as violence’ second root cause. However, what the use of hope 
targets, according to the Obama administrations’ security discourse, is not 
poverty, but a particular relationship between hope and poverty: “when peo-
ple – especially young people – feel entirely trapped in impoverished com-
munities” (Ibid., emphasis added), making them “ripe for extremist recruit-
ment” (2015a). According to Obama, poverty is a necessary but not sufficient 
cause for radicalisation: “poverty alone does not cause a person to become a 
terrorist” (2015a). The Presidential Policy Directive (PPD-6) detailing the 
2010 US Global Development Policy (GDP) echoes this association between 
violence, poverty and hope: “We cannot defeat the ideologies of violent ex-
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tremism when hundreds of millions of young people face a future with no 
jobs, no hope and no meaningful opportunities” (White House, 2010c, em-
phasis added). This is an important distinction in the strategic narrative, as it 
allows the global poor to be addressed as a specific risk community, without 
the explicit use of excluding and deterministic language.  
Just like the Muslim subject of radicalisation, this narrative describes the 
global poor as inherently hopeful and potential, deemed by Obama as capable 
of changing the world from the “bottom up” (2009c). Obama holds this ca-
pacity as a defining characteristic of human life, described elsewhere as a 
“timeless creed” (2008b), an inextinguishable “audacity” (2006). In Ghana, 
the capacity for hope was articulated as the foundation for a “common hu-
manity” (2009c). We here see how hope is held as exemplary in the dual 
sense that Agamben attributes to the term. As an experience, hope is de-
scribed as an object of desire, one that is denied significant parts of the global 
poor. As a capacity, however, hope is described as universal, in form if not in 
content. As we shall see, recognition of this universality plays a central role 
in the strategic narrative, functioning as a narrative means to generate the 
experience of hope that the Obama administrations’ security discourse claims 
that the global poor are lacking.  
The narrative infuses the act of recognition with a promise to release the 
previously contained potentiality that it claims belongs to the global poor. 
The articulation of this promise is based on a description of the history of 
development as being imprisoned by a modernist linear promise of perfec-
tion, addressed by Obama as “the old model in which we are a donor and 
they are simply a recipient” (Obama, 2013b). According to Obama, the moral 
positioning undergirding this division – “a world that sees only tragedy and 
the need for charity” (2009c) – has reduced the inherently potential life of 
poverty to a state that remind us of the traditional figure of bare life; excluded 
from, yet continuously made dependent of the international development 
community. However, Obama repeatedly underlines that this figure is not 
hopeless, without relation to hope (2009c; 2015b), as per traditional depic-
tions of bare life (Agamben, 2000: 31; Negri, quoted in Nielson, 2004: 68; 
Edkins and Pin Fat, 2005; Burke, 2011; Bourke, 2014). On the contrary, 
Obama underlines that the global poor are withheld from hope, forced to live 
in the shadow of hope. While hopeless, they are in other words not defined as 
absent or incapable of hope, but rather as once hopeful – as hopeful subjects 
whose hopes have turned into “cynicism, even despair” (2009c), as Obama 
observed in Ghana, when describing the unrealised promise of African libera-
tion movements.  
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It is this experience of reduced or diminished hope that the act of recogni-
tion promises to remedy, ostensibly “break[ing]” (2010a; 2015b; 2015c) life 
free from “cycle[s] of poverty” (Obama, 2015b), “dependence” (2010a; 
2015b), “conflict and violence” (2010b) and of “fear and resentment” 
(2015a). As I have shown in article 3 – “Recognising Hope: US Global De-
velopment Discourse and the Promise of Despair” – the act of recognition is 
a recurrent theme in the strategic narrative on global development, one that is 
repeated continuously throughout Obama’s presidency, iterated in every 
public appearance made by Obama on the topic of development. In 2010, 
speaking to young African leaders, Obama made clear to the attending indi-
viduals that they “represent the Africa that so often is overlooked – the great 
progress that many Africans have achieved and the unlimited potential that 
you’ve got going forward into the 21st century” (2010b, my emphasis). At 
the UN General Assembly in 2015, Obama reiterated this point: “develop-
ment is threatened if we do not recognize the incredible dynamism and op-
portunity of today’s Africa. [...] I visited Africa recently, and what I saw gave 
me hope and I know should give you hope” (2015b, emphasis added).  
Although presented as a new moment in time, the theme of recognition is 
but the latest expression of a long standing tradition within global develop-
ment discourse to emphasise local capacity and agency. Examples of this 
tradition includes both the paradigm of human development’s focus on capa-
bilities, local ownership and partnerships (Crawford 2003; Abrahamsen, 
2004; Murray Li, 2007; Shani, 2012; Chandler, 2013; Alt, 2015; Hansson, 
2015) as well as the practice of indirect rule as applied by colonial admin-
istration (Cooke, 2003; Duffield, 2005; Murray Li, 2007: 267).  
As such, the promise to abandon the subjectivities and relations that ac-
cording to Obama belongs to traditional practices of development – the re-
spective figures of developed and underdeveloped life, (or in Agamben’s 
terms bios and zoē (1998: 7)) – is not an abandonment in the traditional 
sense, dissolving the constitutive relationship these figures of life have in the 
formation of hopeful life. On the contrary, the continuously iterated exclusion 
of these categories appears to be a performative exercise. As such, it does not 
confine these categories to history, but continually engenders the promise of 
their abandonment – thereby infusing the potentially hopeful yet despairing 
life of underdevelopment with hope. What the act of recognition offers is a 
sense of narrative movement, achieved by the articulated disruption of the 
past: “at this moment, history is on the move” (Obama, 2009c). For the actu-
alisation of this moment, and the hope experienced in it, despair is not an 
enemy, but a condition of possibility. One that has to be constantly sum-
moned if only to be banished time and again. The temporality that is per-
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formative of hope thus appears as a paradoxical union of cyclical time and 
instantaneous time: an experience of rupture caught in repeat. This temporali-
ty offers a striking resemblance to what Agamben has identified as the struc-
ture of narration, which was discussed in the previous chapter: stop, move, 
repeat (2004a).   
Similar to the use of hope by US counterterrorism communications, this 
narrative employs hope to regulate the form of life through which poverty is 
experienced and acted upon. The act of recognition, and the moment of rup-
ture produced by it, is crucial in this regard, establishing a series of temporal 
dichotomies, through which both the past and future are instilled with mean-
ing. Firstly, if the narrative presents dependence to belong to the cyclical 
structure of development, the future belongs to the mutually beneficial struc-
ture of economy (Obama, 2009c). According to Obama, this future has con-
tinuously been withheld the life of underdevelopment: “Africans – especially 
young Africans – tell me they don’t just want aid, they want trade” (2015b).  
Secondly, if the past belonged to collective identities – exemplified by 
Obama by “identities of tribe and ethnicity; of religion and nationality” 
(2009c), the popular “liberation struggles” (Ibid.) of the decolonial move-
ments as well as by the passive figure of underdevelopment – then the future 
is claimed to belong to the potential and responsible individual. Emerging in 
this discourse is a form of hope which can be likened to what Aronson has 
called the “privatisation of hope”, claimed to replace solidarity and collective 
political action with the consumerism and precariousness characteristic of 
neoliberalism (2014). In the strategic narrative, this objective is made explic-
it, articulated as a necessity to “invest in” (2015b), to “encourage” (2010a; 
2014c), to “empower” (2014c) and to “build” (2010a) “the next generation of 
entrepreneurs” (2010a; 2014c). As articulated in the strategic narrative in the 
sphere of (public) diplomacy, the figure of Obama is hailed as exemplary of 
this form of life: a figure born in despair and risen beyond imagination. 
Through the exhibition of this exemplary figure the American dream is effec-
tively transposed into a global fantasy: “And in my country, African Ameri-
cans – including so many recent immigrants – have thrived in every sector of 
society. We've done so despite a difficult past, and we've drawn strength 
from our African heritage” (2009c).  
Echoing the conceptualisation of poverty claimed to emerge within the 
framework of resilience, which highlight the need to cope with poverty rather 
than to strive to eradicate it (Best, 2010: 123; Aradau, 2014: 81; Chandler, 
2015: 13; Pupavac, 2005: 173), this narrative does not promise to end des-
pair, but aims rather to produce an individual able to thrive in despair, that 
accepts “suffering and setbacks” (Obama, 2009c), in order to use such expe-
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riences for the betterment of itself.  This appears to be this narrative’s objec-
tive: to produce a form of life capable of emerging from despair, of succeed-
ing “despite great odds” (Obama, 2015c, emphasis added).  For this form of 
life, despair is supportive of hopeful neoliberal life, rather than its threat. 
Unlike the potentially dangerous hope that Obama identifies as embodying 
both ‘violent extremism’ and the popular decolonial movements of the past 
(2009c), there is no promised telos that this hopeful form of life can be with-
held from, nor any identifiable antagonist that stands in its way. As recog-
nised, the subject of development is already free: “Freedom is your inher-
itance. Now, it is your responsibility to build upon freedom’s foundation” 
(Ibid.) 
In summation, it appears as if the strategic narrative in the sphere of de-
velopment, like the strategic narrative in the (public) diplomatic sphere, oper-
ates through a narrative structure of stop-move-repeat. In this narrative, 
recognition of human potentiality is meant to generate the sense of movement 
that Obama associates with hope, ostensibly removing the life of underdevel-
opment from the categories of linear modernity. Like the ‘hateful’ subject of 
radicalisation, the ‘despairing’ subject of development is placed at the 
threshold, torn not between between hope and despair, but between two 
forms of hope: a linear hope that is claimed to produce despair and a resilient 
non-linear hope that is allegedly capable of using despair. To this non-linear 
hope, despair is not an enemy or opposite, but a condition of possibility, one 
that must be continuously summoned in order to actualise a sense of continu-
ous movement. The subject that is called to embody this hope is likewise 
caught at the threshold between two forms of life: between collective forms 
of political struggle – that Obama describes as capable only of frustration, 
despair and misguided antagonism – or the individual entrepreneur. As such, 
nothing is promised this individual, except the reformulation of poverty as a 
site of opportunity.  
 
 
Threshold: hope – fear 
It would be easy to assume that the military sphere is not engaged in the 
attempt to pre-empt radicalisation, devoted as it is primarily to the traditional 
battlefield. But this is not the case. Not only is the US military tasked with 
implementing hope through the means of strategic communication and de-
velopment – this they do, as both Caroline Holmqvist (2010) and Jan Bach-
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mann (2013) respectively have observed37 – how terrorist attacks are defend-
ed against and responded to are also perceived as a central target for the use 
of hope. As the strategic narrative in the military sphere details, how terror is 
confronted matters in the long run, affecting the exclusions that US security 
discourse defines as central to radicalisation: the spread of “fear and divi-
sion” (2016a) that Obama holds to be the “intent of the terrorists” (Ibid.).  
As in the previous narratives, the distinctions that give meaning to hope 
and fear in this narrative initially appears to be clearly defined. Obama asso-
ciates hope with “possibility” (2009b), “grit” (2013a), “ambiguity” (2009b), 
“love” (2009b; 2016a), “empathy” (Ibid.), “individual choice” (2008; 2009b), 
“moral compass” (2009b), “faith” (2009b; 2016a), “peace” (2009) and “hu-
manity” (2009; 2015f).  Indeed, in his Nobel lecture, Obama defines hope as 
that which is “best about humanity” (2009b).  These signifiers are opposed to 
fear, which in turn is placed in relation to “division” (2009b; 2014a; 2016a), 
“religious dogma” (2009b), the “loss of particular identities” (Ibid.), “vio-
lence” (Ibid.) and “war” (Ibid.). Obama warns that fear can “tempt us to cast 
out the stranger, strike out against those who don’t look like us, or pray ex-
actly as we do” (2016a). Fear can also “lead us to turn our backs on those 
who are most in need of help and refuge” (Ibid.). Importantly, Obama defines 
faith, which is associated with hope, as different from religion, which is asso-
ciated with fear. While faith is described as a belief in the unknown (2009b; 
2016a), religion is referred to as a dogma, a commanding law that turns the 
respect of difference that Obama holds as central to faith into hatred and 
exclusion (Ibid.).  
While Obama describes the Western subject of security, the “we” that this 
particular narrative primarily addresses, as “people of hope not fear” (2016a), 
a closer reading reveals this dichotomy to be anything but certain. The rela-
tionship between hope and fear that is articulated in this narrative is not mu-
tually exclusive, but rather complexly intimate. Despite the differences listed 
above, the narrative does not depict fear and hope to be ontologically juxta-
posed. They are rather mutually placed within what is articulated as a contin-
gent and potential “human nature” (2009b), described by Obama as a con-
stant state of “human imperfection” (Ibid.). According to Obama, hope can 
never truly overcome fear, because everybody is by nature both fearful and 
hopeful – in potentiality, if not in actuality.  
                                                                  
37 According to Caroline Holmqvist, strategic communication has garnered increasing attention 
within the US military at large (2013). The 2010 National Framework for Strategic Communica-
tion lists strategic communication as a core responsibility of the US security apparatus at large, 
including the military. As an effect of the security-development nexus, Jan Bachmann (2010) has 
further noticed that the US military is engaged in a series of operations traditionally deemed to 
be of civilian nature, including development.  
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The battle between violence and peace, that Obama depicts as the 
“choice” between hope and fear (2009f; 2014b), is hence dissociated from its 
modernist history. It is no longer described as a battle over human nature, a 
fight between the violent and fearful figure of bare life, zoē, in the name of 
qualified life, bios, as per traditional modernist accounts of humanitarian war 
referenced in this kappa’s theoretical chapter. On the contrary, the battle 
between hope and fear is articulated as a forever ongoing battle in life, be-
tween the potentialities of life, “the core struggle of human nature” (Obama, 
2009b). Through descriptions like these, the subjectivities undergirding mod-
ernist forms of humanitarian war dissolves, locating the potential for violence 
not only in the generalised figures of the Muslim and the Poor, but in every-
body: “we are fallible. We make mistakes, and fall victim to the temptations 
of pride, and power, and sometimes evil. Even those of us with the best of 
intentions will at times fail to right the wrongs before us” (Ibid.).  
Importantly, Obama maintains that acknowledgement of this ‘fact’ of life 
should not be interpreted as cynicism, but as a matter of urgent security; a 
“recognition of history; the imperfections of man and the limits of reason” 
(Ibid.). Repeating the logic of recognition discussed in the previous section 
on the use of hope in the domain of development, the act of recognition is 
heavily invested with hope. The reason is twofold: firstly, idealistic beliefs in 
the possibility of a peaceful human nature renders human life insecure, un-
prepared for the necessity of security and at odds with the resilience that 
Obama defines as a central capacity of life (2009b; 2013b; 2015e; 2016b). At 
the Nobel reception, Obama thus argued that he “cannot be guided by the 
examples of [advocates of non-violence such as Ghandi and King] alone” 
(Ibid.), because, he emphasised, security needs to be continuously underwrit-
ten if peace is to be promoted.  
Addressing the dangers of “homegrown” (2016b) terrorist attacks after 
the 2013 attacks in San Bernardino and the 2016 Orlando attacks, Obama 
continued this line of reasoning, emphasising that “we will not be able to stop 
every tragedy” and that “We can't anticipate or catch every single deranged 
person that may wish to do harm to his neighbors, or his friends, or his 
coworkers, or strangers. But we can do something about the amount of dam-
age that they do” (2016b). Ultimately, this is why hope is important, accord-
ing to this narrative, not because it is equated with peace, but because it is 
linked with resilience, with an “audacious” (2006) capacity to act “compas-
sion[ately]” (2013b) in the face of uncertainty and fear. In contrast to the 
linear hope manifested in modernist practices and discourses of security, 
Obama describes hope as a “grit” (2013b), a “spirit” (Ibid.), the precondition 
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for which is precisely the recognition that the linear promise of peace is unat-
tainable. 
Secondly, similar to the logic articulated in the previously discussed nar-
ratives, this narrative describes the idea of perfection as separating different 
forms of life from one another. Although the recognition of human imperfec-
tion portrays war and fear as facts of life, the Obama administrations’ securi-
ty discourse is hence not without commitment to universalism nor to a com-
mon humanity. Indeed, Obama’s recognition that “we are all sinners” (2016a) 
is heavily invested with notions of empathy and redemption. Just as the divi-
sion between developed and developing life is claimed to undergird global 
poverty, the idea of perfection – exemplified in the military domain with 
religious dogma – is held to dehumanise the one deemed different, to turn 
conflict into hate, and violence into annihilation. In Obama’s words: “then 
there is no need for restraint – no need to spare the pregnant mother, or the 
medic, or the Red Cross worker, or even a person of one’s own faith” 
(2009b).  
So defined, the common humanity that Obama envisions – the promise of 
just and lasting peace that is the key theme of this particular strategic narra-
tive – appears not to be the liberal notion of perpetual peace. It is not a state 
where hope has won out over fear – such a state is, as we have learned above, 
identified as both impossible and undesirable – it is rather a place where hope 
and fear coexist: “where hopes and not just fears govern” (2014a, emphasis 
added), where “the aspirations of individual human beings really matter” 
(Ibid.). What this recognition stops in order to grant the appearance of 
movement is hence not fear, but the modernist idea of perfection. This idea is 
not associated with peace, but with exclusion and violence, with a desire to 
remain in “particular identities” (2009b). It is also associated with a foreclo-
sure of that which Obama defines as the real condition of possibility of hope, 
and consequently also of “moral progress” (2009b), namely the “ambiguities 
of history” (Ibid.) and the “imperfections of man” (Ibid.).  
We here see how hope takes the place of peace as the object of global de-
sire. In other remarks, Obama has continued this line of reasoning. In 2009, 
when drawing up the contours of a new strategy for Afghanistan and Paki-
stan, Obama promised neither peace nor freedom to the Afghan people. He 
did promise, however, opportunity and hope. He promised not that their 
hopes would be realised, but rather a continuous experience of hope, a “last-
ing opportunity” (2009e). This, we were told, is what the people of Afghani-
stan cherish the most, this is what they seek: not a better future per se, but 
“the promise of a better future” (Ibid., emphasis added). Hope in this schema 
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should not be read in opposition to violence and fear – Afghanistan has of 
course seen the end of neither – but in their indistinction. 
Instead of avoiding fear, or being consumed by fear, Obama thus urges 
humanity to see fear and insecurity as a source of hope, a moment in which 
hope is actualised and experienced in its purest form. Obama describes the 
event of terror as a “test of the sturdiest of souls” (2013a), one that shows the 
“best of humanity” (2016b). Importantly, it is not only that hope is needed in 
such moments, on the contrary, such moments are transposed into hope. For 
Obama, it is “the darkest of moments, that gives us hope” (2016b). They 
offer the “chance to see and highlight and appreciate that [hopeful] spirit” 
(2013a). This logic was repeated in response to the attacks in Boston, San 
Bernardino, Orlando, Paris and Brussels.  
If hope is a choice, as this narrative articulates, it thus appears not to be an 
existential one, through which a life of hope replaces a life of fear, but a 
confirmation of the indistinction between hope and fear. The life of hope 
signifies a subject continuously placed at the threshold – at the moment of 
choice – between hope and fear. With this subject in mind, it is not surprising 
to find that the exemplary figure of life that is presented in this narrative is 
neither the face of non-violence, nor the neoliberal individual, as in the pre-
vious narratives discussed above, but their radical inversion. For the Western 
subject of security, a figure of permanent struggle and suffering is presented 
as exemplary – in Obama’s Nobel lecture this figure is illustrated through the 
impoverished mother, the desperate soldier and a young protestor withheld 
from political rights (2009b). According to Obama, these figures do not rep-
resent destitution or hopelessness, but hope in its purest incarnation: an inex-
tinguishable will to carry on in the face of insurmountable odds. They repre-
sent a life reduced to nothing but hope, a life that is defined not by what it is 
has or what it is, but solely by what is absent from it, by what it is subjected 
to. For this life, hope is reduced to a spirit of self-preservation, a capacity for 
survival, as argued by Obama: “Let us live by their example” (Obama, 
2009b).  
To summarise the strategic narrative in the military sphere, hope appears 
to be generated by recognising that the modernist dream of peace is impossi-
ble and that the potential for violence is an ever present potentiality, an emer-
gent property of human nature. Repeating the logic of the two previously 
discussed narratives, the hopeful subject of imperfection is placed not on the 
threshold between hope and fear, but between what is presented as an exclud-
ing form of modernist hope, which according to the Obama administrations’ 
security discourse renders fear dangerous, and an allegedly inclusive form of 
resilient hope that regulates and pacifies fear. Like in the previous narratives, 
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this hope does not move the subject towards a future free from violence, on 
the contrary, the hope that this subject is called to embody is actualised in 
moments of fear and insecurity, moments that Obama reformulates as mani-
festations of hope, as the condition of possibility of that which Obama holds 
to be the “best of humanity” (2009b).  
In the next section, which concludes this kappa, I will discuss these anal-
yses in light of the research questions posed in the introductory chapter. The 
discussion will both summarise and consolidate above analyses in order to 
make visible the general use of hope in US security discourse under President 
Obama. By doing so, it will place this use in relation to, on the one hand, the 
radical potential that often is placed in hope by critical studies of security, 
and, on the other hand, in relation to what Agamben claims is the primary 
operation of biopolitics, namely the production of bare life. 
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Conclusion  
As explicated in this kappa’s introductory chapter, the analyses performed in 
the four separate research articles were guided by one overarching research 
question, namely:  
 
How is hope designed to be used biopolitically in US security discourse 
under the Obama administrations? 
 
In order to answer this question, this concluding section will discuss the 
analyses performed in the previous section in relation to Agamben’s distinc-
tion between instrumental use – a conscious activity directed at an explicit 
goal (Agamben, 2015: 68) – and biopolitical use – which operates to regulate 
the ontology, temporality and the subjectification of the object and subjects 
engaged by the use of hope in US security discourse. As the introductory 
chapter of this kappa details, these different levels of use provide the ra-
tionale for the four empirically oriented research questions that guides this 
thesis, repeated below in the interest of clarity. The objective of this discus-
sion is to render possible a discussion on the overall biopolitical use of hope 
within US security discourse and beyond. The chapter also discusses how 
this use relates to traditional conceptualisations of contemporary biopolitics 
and to the privilege often afforded to hope as a practice of resistance. The 
ambition is not to provide an answer to how the use of hope can be suspend-
ed or subverted, but rather to engender a discussion about hope’s role in the 
contemporary biopolitical imaginary. The four empirically oriented research 
questions are formulated as follows:  
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In US security discourse under President Obama: 
 
1) how can we understand the narrative means and ends of the in-
strumental use of hope? 
2) how do particular conceptual relations give meaning to hope? 
3) how is the temporal experience of hope articulated and actual-
ised?  
4) how are different forms of life constituted in relation to hope 
and to one another? 
 
The first research question concerns the explicit version of the respective 
strategic narratives analysed in this thesis: How the means of public diploma-
cy is tasked to engage the ideological roots of ‘violent extremism’ by at-
tempting to replace an ideology of hate and exclusion with a positive vision 
of trust and inclusion; how the promise of development is employed to re-
place a state of despairing poverty with economic opportunities; and lastly 
how a narrative of military protection and intervention promises to replace 
insecurity and fear with peace and human possibility. In order to trace 
through what narrative means the Obama administrations’ security discourse 
aims to generate hope in each respective narrative, the discussion below will 
answer the question of instrumental use in tandem with question 2, concern-
ing the conceptual relations which give meaning to hope. The simple reason 
is that in order to retell the respective narrative means, we need to know 
which concepts that the narratives include. In what follows, I will recapitulate 
these conceptual relations within each sphere. Through this recapitulation, I 
will discuss the means through which hope is meant to be generated in each 
narrative as well as the ends hope promises to achieve.  
As the analysis of the threshold between hope and hate made visible, the 
Obama administrations’ security discourse associates hope with a series of 
signifiers in the sphere of (public) diplomacy. In this strategic narrative hope 
is placed in relation not only with ‘trust and communication’, but also with 
‘pluralism’, ‘opportunity’, ‘choice’ and perhaps most notably with ‘truth’. 
Within this narrative, the practice of truth-telling serves as the narrative 
means through which US counterterrorism communications aims to produce 
hope. Through the practice of truth-telling, “a new beginning” (Obama, 
2009d) is ostensibly made possible – the key theme of this strategic narrative. 
The practice of truth-telling is meant to unsettle the certainty and linearity 
that the ‘ideology of violent extremism’ is claimed to express. Curiously, this 
narrative establishes a conceptual dichotomy between certainty and truth. In 
contrast to truth, ‘certainty’ is associated with ‘lies’, ‘stereotypes’ and ‘prop-
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aganda’. In that sense, certainty is depicted as a precondition of ‘hate’, which 
in turn is associated with words like ‘nightmare’, ‘cancer’, ‘barbarism’, ‘de-
struction’ and ‘division’.  
In this narrative, the practice of truth-telling operates on an affective lev-
el, rather than on an epistemological level. The use of ‘truth’ aims to “un-
nerve” the subjects of radicalisation, to “get into their heads” (Fernandez, 
2013), to create a sense of disruption from linear certainty. Two forms of 
truth-telling is practiced in this narrative. On the one hand, the moment of 
truth is articulated as a call to recognise that the US is not the “crude carica-
ture” (Obama, 2009d) that it is so often presented as, that the US is not the 
cause of all the problems suffered in the Muslim world and most importantly, 
that the US and Islam are not inherently at odds with one another. A series of 
positive examples of Muslims thriving in America is disseminated to that 
end. On the other hand, the Obama administrations’ security discourse para-
doxically utilizes the moment of truth to disrupt the hopes disseminated by 
the ‘ideology of violent extremism’: in particular its claim that success is 
near, that adventure and martyrdom awaits the subject of radicalisation. We 
will have cause to return to this paradoxical relation between hopelessness 
and hope in the discussions below.  
As made clear by the analysis of the threshold between hope and despair, 
the strategic narrative on global development associates hope with ‘potential-
ity’, ‘promise’, ‘entrepreneurial spirit’, ‘opportunity’, ‘empowerment’ and 
‘choice’. In contrast, ‘despair’ is associated with ‘poverty’, ‘tragedy’, ‘con-
flict and violence’ and of ‘fear and resentment’, but also with ‘colonialism’, 
‘patronage’, ‘exploitation’, ‘development’, ‘charity’ and ‘dependence’. Al-
ready from this brief list, we can see that the strategic narrative in the devel-
opmental sphere enlists empathy as a means to generate hope. While the 
strategic narrative in the (public) diplomatic sphere directs its primary atten-
tion to the antagonist, the strategic narrative on development ostensibly shifts 
the focus inwards, towards the global development community.  
The narrative is structured around two promises of recognition, which 
functions as the narrative means through which hope is meant to be generat-
ed. Firstly, the narrative promises to recognise the structural conditions that 
have allowed despair to foster and turn violent. Secondly, a promise is issued 
to see the global poor as responsible agents of change, rather than as passive 
objects of aid and suffering (Obama, 2009c; 2010a; 2013b; 2015b). Taken 
together, these two acts of recognition promise to “break” underdeveloped 
life free from the exclusions inherent in what Obama depicts as the “old 
model” (2013b) of development, thereby offering the subject of development 
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a “new moment of promise” (2009c) – the key theme of the strategic narra-
tive in this particular sphere.  
The conceptual network articulated in the military sphere, which gives 
form to the threshold between hope and fear, places hope in relation to signi-
fiers such as ‘possibility’, ‘ambiguity’, ‘faith, ‘love’, ‘empathy’, ‘individual 
choice’, ‘moral compass’ and ‘humanity’. These signifiers are opposed to 
fear, which in turn is placed in relation to ‘religious dogma’, the ‘loss of 
particular identities’, ‘violence”, terror’ and ‘war’. Importantly, both fear and 
hope are associated with a notion of ‘human imperfection’ that is conditioned 
upon what is articulated as a contingent and potential “human nature” 
(Obama, 2009b). Within the strategic narrative in the military sphere, recog-
nition of the ambiguous relation between fear and hope functions as a narra-
tive means to generate hope, finding within it the possibility for a “common 
humanity” and for a “just and lasting peace” (Ibid.) – the key theme of the 
strategic narrative in this sphere. For Obama, to recognise that one is imper-
fect is to recognise one’s humanity, to see that every human is caught in a 
continual process of being made. So described, the act of recognition is artic-
ulated in opposition to ideas that essentialise social difference. It is in this 
sense that the act of recognition is invested with hope, it functions as a prom-
ise to disrupt lines of division previously perceived to be of divine or natural 
design.  
From above discussion, we can now answer research question 1: how can 
we understand the narrative means and ends of the instrumental use of 
hope? In different ways, each narrative paints a picture of a hopeful society 
free from violent and collective conflict and characterised by freedom, plural-
ity, tolerance of difference, universal access to economic opportunities and 
individual choice. This is a hopeful society in which individual hopes are 
supported, not supressed. The means through which this society is created are 
held to be equally hopeful, namely the disruption of ideas and perceptions 
claimed to be deterministic, divisive and excluding. 
In the Obama administrations’ security discourse, this society is made 
synonymous with hope. It would thus be easy to assume that this society 
holds no place for neither hate, despair or fear. Yet a closer reading of the 
conceptual relations that inform the use of hope reveals that this is not the 
case. As the analyses performed in the previous chapter have made clear, US 
security discourse utilises hope not to replace hate, despair and fear, but to 
reorganise their relationship with violence. The potentially dangerous sub-
jects of radicalisation, be it the figure of the Muslim or of the Poor, are per-
ceived not to be in lack of hope, but to possess a dangerous form of linear 
and collective hope. Obama equates this linear hope both to a promise of 
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realisation and to dreams of perfection. As such, it is perceived both to be in 
constant risk of being frustrated and as being violently opposed to the virtues 
of empathy and tolerance. The intervention hope makes necessary is thus not 
the modernist gift of hope – one which projects optimism, that promises a 
better future without fear, hate and despair – but rather a postmodern form of 
non-linear hope. This form of non-linear hope offers not a well-defined tra-
jectory towards a given future, but a momentary experience of rupture – 
presented as a release of human potentiality.  
The particularity that informs this hope is its paradoxical claim that it 
does not have any particular content that can be realised. Allegedly, there is 
no future that this hope can be withheld from, no antagonist that stands in the 
way of perfection. The devotion to a common humanity that is equated with 
this form of hope is not based on a given idea of what humanity is, or what it 
will become. Its condition of possibility is rather the recognition that humani-
ty is not yet, and never will be, perfected. A closer reading of the Obama 
administrations’ security discourse further reveals that the future that this 
hope is made synonymous with is no future at all, but rather an effective re-
description of the present. The future that these narratives promise does not 
have to be realised, it does not have to establish itself as a positive order. Its 
realisation is based neither on the eradication of poverty, nor on the exclu-
sions facing the global Muslim population. It is also not based on the 
achievement of security or peace, it operates rather through the disruption of 
the present.  
Recalling the analysis presented in the previous chapter, the strategic nar-
ratives achieves this through a drastic redirection of desires: the despairing 
subject of underdevelopment is urged to use despair in order to reformulate 
poverty as a state of opportunity. The hateful subject of radicalisation is 
urged to redirect its hate towards ideas of perfection, and the fearful subject 
of insecurity is urged to perceive fear as an opportunity for moral progres-
sion. As such, while the non-linear hope promoted by US security discourse 
may not be indistinguishable from hate, despair or fear (indeed, it is continu-
ously disassociated from particular forms of hate, despair and fear), it re-
mains caught in relation to them, intimately entangled with a form of indi-
vidualised hate, fear and despair. In the Obama administrations’ security 
discourse, hope is thus not simply opposed to hate, despair and fear, but ra-
ther, in Agamben’s terminology, made indistinct from them.  
From this reading, we can now fully answer research question 2: how do 
particular conceptual relations give meaning to hope? In US security dis-
course what structures this network is not the traditional Agambenian relation 
of inclusive exclusion (1998: 21), but rather a network of indistinctions. 
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What is excluded is not simply fear, hate nor despair, but rather the notion 
that these concepts can be excluded, that they can be replaced and overcome 
by hope. What is removed from politics is not only the desire to realise a 
perfect state without indistinctions, excluded in and by the Obama admin-
istrations’ security discourse are also the very idea of a utopic imaginary: the 
idea that hope can be realised, that hope can end, that hope refers to anything 
but itself. 
Based on this reading of the conceptual relations, we can also begin to an-
swer research question 3: how is the temporal experience of hope articulated 
and actualised? If the Obama adminsitrations’ security discourse holds the 
linear dream of perfection to be deterministic, then it presents the temporality 
of hope as a moment of contingency, a non-linear “break” (Obama, 2010a; 
2015b; 2015c) from the past. According to Obama, this break is experienced 
when “history is on the move” (2009c). It is articulated as both eternal and 
instantaneous, as an instant of contingency that is forever present as possibil-
ity.  
However, despite hope’s eternal presence, the experience of hope is per-
ceived to be in need of continuous activation, lest it risk turning violent. To 
that end, the narrative means through which this discourse generates hope are 
continuously repeated in and by each respective narrative. In the narrative on 
(public) diplomacy, we find a constant dissemination of the moment of truth. 
In the sphere of development, we find an endlessly iterated promise of recog-
nition, and in the sphere of military, we find a continuous activation of the 
moment when hope can be chosen. The reason for this repetition is that these 
moments are designed to offer a constant experience of rupture, an extended 
moment of potentiality, a continual experience of hope: an eternal instant. 
Caught in this instant is not a life released, but a disrupted life, one that is 
suspended in the moment of suspense, in anticipation rather than realisation, 
in potentiality rather than actuality.  
The ’break’ hope offers is thus not a new moment in time, constitutive of 
a new future, but a structure of repetition that keeps the future from coming 
into presence. In this repeated moment, life is arrested in relation to a past 
that it is promised to be replaced, a past that must be continuously summoned 
only to be banished time and again.The narrative on development thus re-
peatedly summons the passive recipient of development that it promises to 
abandon, the narrative on diplomacy continuously articulates the idea of a 
violent Islam that it claims to expunge and the military narrative on resilience 
remains dependent on the modernist figure of perfection. If there is hope in 
this repetition, it is arguably a passive and amnesiac hope whose target is not 
the creation of the future but the erasure and revision of the past – of the 
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cycle which it repeats – a stark reminder of Bloch’s conceptualisation of hope 
as the temporal opposite not of “fear, but memory” (1986: 12). This is the 
temporal experience of hope actualised by the Obama administrations’ secu-
rity discourse. Separated from the future, this hope appears curiously similar 
to Agamben’s conceptualisation of potentiality as that which is “never enact-
ed, what never achieves its end. It is, in a word, pain” (1995: 71). In this 
“duration” (1995: 71), hope is achieved through continuously decreating the 
present. As such, the structure that this temporal experience installs reminds 
us of Agamben’s conceptualisation of the state of exception as a ruptured 
state that is able to “maintain itself indefinitely, without ever passing over 
into actuality” (1998: 47).  
The ambition of the use of hope is however not only to govern the future, 
but also to govern life, an ambition captured by research question 4: how are 
different forms of life constituted in relation to hope and to one another? As 
indicated in the previous chapter, the Obama administrations’ security dis-
course does this not only by reorienting the desires of the potential subjects 
of radicalisation towards hope, rather than towards perfection, but also by 
modifying the form of the desiring subject, attempting to create what I have 
referred to in this thesis as hopeful life.  
Despite the focus on choice and capability in this discourse, its concern, 
as will be argued below, is not the governance of action but of life.38 To that 
end, a temporal dichotomy emerges in what the respective narratives articu-
late as moments of hope, through which both the past and future are instilled 
with meaning. If the past, according to Obama, belonged to collective identi-
ties, then the future belongs to the potential and responsible individual. Im-
portantly, this individual does not equal the individual human as such, but 
rather a particular entrepreneurial and opportunistic individual – similar in 
form to what has been described as the neoliberal subject: an individualised 
form of life that embraces and experiences uncertainty, risk and poverty as 
opportunity (Miller and Rose, 1990; Pedwell 2012; O’Malley, 2010; Shamir, 
2008). In the Obama adminstrations’ security discourse, this individual is 
exemplified through Muslim Americans at work and by successful African 
Americans. As the respective narratives underline, the person of Obama is 
exemplary of both these figures.  
This form of life is presented as an imperfect life that embodies life’s in-
distinctions, as this discourse defines them. This form of life is not without 
fear, hate and/or despair, but exemplifies rather the possibility of their pro-
ductive use. While the examples disseminated by the respective narratives 
                                                                  
38 For a historical analysis of the shift in governance from action to life, see Agamben, 2013: 61. 
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may be successful, the crucial point that is articulated is that they are all 
struggling, that they have all known, and will continue to know suffering and 
exclusion. If hope is actualised, given meaning, at the threshold between fear, 
hate and despair respectively, then the hopeful life is not called to overcome 
the threshold, but to inhabit it, to live at the threshold where fear, hate, des-
pair and hope merge into one.  
At the threshold, we find all the traits characteristic of Agambenian bio-
politics. Firstly, we find an excluding separation between different forms of 
lives. Despite the repeated promises to not single out particular risk popula-
tions as well as to abandon the separation of lives on the basis of hope, the 
analyses presented in this thesis shows that the Obama administrations’ secu-
rity discourse identifies the global Muslim population and the global poor as 
particularly vulnerable to radicalisation. According to this discourse, it is not 
simply despair and hate that make these populations vulnerable to radicalisa-
tion, but rather the combination of collective forms of life and utopian linear 
hope that they are perceived to represent. If hope is an individual choice, then 
it is precisely the individuality of this choice that is denied the respective 
subjects of radicalisation. The Muslim Other is thus described as “coerced” 
by violent propaganda (Obama, 2014b) and the Poor Other as made “depend-
ent” by development (Ibid.: 2010a). Identified in US security discourse under 
Obama is not a subject incapable of hope, as per traditional depictions of bare 
life, but a subject denied the choice of hope. In contrast to the neoliberal form 
of hopeful life, these figures have to be continuously brought to the threshold, 
they have to be presented to the moment of choice: either ‘released’ from the 
‘cycles of poverty’ or ‘disrupted’ from an ideology of ‘hate’ and ‘lies’. As 
such, it appears as if the promised abandonment of the biopolitical division 
between lives does not dispense with the hierarchies and exclusions charac-
teristic of Agambenian biopolitics, but remains committed to them.  
According to Rens van Munster, such a politics finds its condition of pos-
sibility in the normalisation of the Agambenian state of exception; a state of 
living in which the global Muslim population and the global poor are exclud-
ed from the body politic simply by reference to being alive. As argued by van 
Munster: “Through the inclusion of risk classes in a system of control, the 
life of legal subjects is not reduced to that of homo sacer. Rather, the reverse 
is happening: the figure of homo sacer dwells in everybody in the sense that 
all life is bare life until class credentials prove otherwise – the elevation from 
homo sacer to an autonomous subject is only a secondary move (2004: 151-
152, original emphasis).  
At the threshold, we also find the suspension of political agency that 
Agamben claims characterises bare life (2004b: 67). In particular, the Obama 
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administrations’ security discourse denies the hopeful life the capacity to 
create another world. Despite the frequent claims within this discourse that 
hope is a performative force operating on an ontological level, capable, as 
Obama assures the respective subjects of radicalisation, to form the world 
according to one’s desire, to make “change from the bottom up” (2009c), the 
neoliberal world remains out of hope’s reach. Neoliberalism is not articulated 
as one possibility out of many that the hopeful life is deemed capable of 
choosing. In this discourse, neoliberalism is not referred to as a choice, but as 
that which gives choice, it is what inserts a particular benevolent uncertainty 
to life. In the strategic narrative on development, Obama refers to this world 
as an “environment in which young people can succeed despite great odds” 
(Obama, 2015c, my emphasis). The object of this hope is thus not to trans-
form the world, but to naturalise it, to produce a subject blind to the exclu-
sions engendered by it. As such, Obama’s hope is not liberating, but depoliti-
cising: the call to change the world effectively transposed into a continuous 
individual struggle to change one’s place in the world.  
In other words, what is denied the hopeful life is the capacity to suspend 
the state or world in which it lives, to transcend the threshold that it is called 
to occupy. Just like Agamben’s definition of bare life as a state of im-
potentiality, we can now conceptualise this hope as formed through the “de-
activation of single, specific, factical possibilities (Agamben, 2004b: 67). 
What this form of life lacks is consequently not hope, but sovereignty – the 
ability to command hope, to step out of and suspend the moment and world 
of hope in which it is hailed. If Agamben defines sovereign life as in com-
mand of its im-potentiality, as being “capable of the act in not realizing it” 
(1998: 45, original emphasis), the hopeful life that Obama addresses appears 
as its inversion. Rather than in command of its im-potentiality, it is subjected 
to and captivated by im-potentiality. For this life, sovereign decision is re-
duced to an experience of individual choice.39  
What the Obama administrations’ security discourse actualises is not the 
capacity to hope and not to hope, but an inherently fragile experience of 
hope, that is perceived to be in demand of continuous reactivation and sup-
port if it is not to turn violent. So conceived, the “principle of potentiality” 
(Agamben, 1998: 47) that is actualised in this discourse could be summarised 
as an infinite repetition of a captivating state of im-potentiality. Characteristic 
of this principle, is an indistinction between actuality and potentiality, ac-
                                                                  
39 For an analysis of how discourses of human development entails a similar reduction of deci-
sion to choice, see Alt, 2015.  
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cording to which that which is potential does not realise itself into actuality, 
but takes the place of actuality – a suspension of the potential to act, in which 
the reference to this capacity is included only to be excluded. 
At the threshold, we also find the denial of voice that characterises 
Agamben’s notion of bare life (1998: 7). As this thesis has shown, US securi-
ty discourse under President Obama continuously distinguishes hope from 
concrete articulations of a utopic future, which this discourse associates only 
with violence, exclusions, frustration, and particularity. Used to exemplify 
this violent and despairing utopia is both the figure of the hateful terrorist 
storyteller and the modern promise of perfection, whose exclusion from hope 
is based on their perceived attempt to bind aspiration to but one future. What 
is articulated as real hope is in contrast actualised by disrupting such utopic 
articulations, ‘breaking’ their hold on our political imaginary. As such, what 
characterises the moment of hope that this discourse actualises is what 
Agamben has called a ‘destruction of communicable experience’ (2007b: 6) – 
a suspension of meaning that paradoxically is produced through language, 
actualised by the strategic narratives analysed in this thesis. Like the state of 
exception, this discourse thus appears to be in “force without significance” 
(1998: 51).  
Similar to Agamben’s figure of bare life, the Obama administrations’ se-
curity discourse denies the hopeful life the capacity to give testament. Not 
only are the people hailed in this extended moment of rupture formed by the 
destruction of language, they are also deemed unable to represent themselves. 
In fact, they are urged and responsibilised to conform to the respective strate-
gic narratives disseminated by the US security apparatus. While the identified 
risk populations that US security discourse identifies are recognised as hav-
ing a voice, they are thus disqualified from speaking its own voice. What is 
denied these people is the possibility of not conforming to the neoliberal form 
of life addressed by US security discourse, not without being perceived as 
complicit in the ideological diffusion of violent extremism. As such, those 
perceived as vulnerable to radicalisation become unable to bear witness to, on 
the one hand, the irreducible multiplicity that undoubtedly characterises the 
actually existing hopes of both the global poor and the global Muslim popu-
lation, and on the other hand, to the global power relations that continue to 
constitute the conditions in which we all live. This is of course a special form 
of exclusion, in form similar to Edward Said’s diagram of orientalism, quoted 
from Marx: “They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented” 
(1979).   
At the threshold, we also find the permanent exposure to death that 
Agamben claims characterises the homo sacer. Like the homo sacer, a life 
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without political value that can be killed, but not sacrificed (1998: 85). The 
hopeful life is called to acknowledge the permanence of war and insecurity. 
According to the Obama administrations’ security discourse, this permanence 
is embedded in a notion of human imperfection, in the idea that violence is an 
internal and inevitable characteristic of human life. While this discourse 
singles out the global poor and the global Muslim population as particular 
risk populations, the potential for becoming violent in effect applies to us all. 
The idealised life of neoliberalism included, deemed by US security dis-
course to be equally imperfect, albeit without the collective form and the 
utopic aspirations that Obama holds so threatening. Throughout his presiden-
cy, Obama has continuously emphasised this fact, finding both hope, empa-
thy and fear in the recognition of human imperfection, in the ‘fact’ that we 
“are all sinners” (2016a), “all fallible” (2009b). Through such statements, 
human nature is transposed into the ultimate site of the state of exception, one 
that must be continuously policed.  
For the formation of this life, an indistinction between bare and hopeful 
life is made into a global exemplar, an effective limit to our political imagina-
tion. What defines the bare and hopeful life in the Obama administrations’ 
security discourse, is a permanent struggle, an “audacious” (2006: 421) will 
to reject what may seem given. Like the life of resilience (Evans and Reid, 
2014), Obama urges this life to draw strength from the perpetual vulnerability 
installed upon it. If we recall Obama’s identification of the event of terror as 
a moment of hope, as a “chance to see and highlight and appreciate that 
[hopeful] spirit” (2013a), US security discourse transposes the insecurities of 
war into a global promise, one that is both infinitely deferred and continuous-
ly actualised. Paradoxically, Obama thus manages to describe the necessity of 
war not as cause for hopelessness, but as a celebration of the possible, a tes-
tament to hope’s inextinguishable force. Formed to perceive war as an oppor-
tunity for moral progression, the hope that this form of life is urged to em-
body is not reduced or sacrificed by exposure to death, but actualised by it. In 
the end, it is insecurity that allows the hopeful life to forever experience its 
indistinctions, it is war that serves as one of hope’s primary conditions of 
possibility. If hope is that which we shall become, it thus seems that death 
truly is the “originary political relation” (Agamben, 1998: 85).  
In sum, it could thus be argued that within the continual experience of 
hope that US security discourse under Obama aims to achieve, we find all the 
traits that Agamben defines as characteristic of the state of exception as well 
as of bare life: a separation between lives, voicelessness, passivity, and an 
indefinite exposure to death. But in contrast to traditional characterisations of 
bare life, the life governed and produced by US security discourse is not 
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without hope, nor is it “tyrannised by actuality” (2010: 1067). Quite the con-
trary, it appears as formed through hope and to be captivated by potentiality. 
As such, the biopolitical ambitions that this discourse expresses appears as a 
radical break from the history of modern liberal biopolitics, which, as shown 
in the theoretical chapter of this kappa, has been claimed to define hope as a 
prerogative of politically qualified life. It is also distinguished from post-
modern forms of biopolitics claimed to “contain” (Duffield, 2005; 2007) 
hope. Obama’s discourse of hope seeks neither to contain or realise peoples 
hopes, but to realise life as hopeful: to regulate life by releasing hope, by 
inserting life in a permanent moment of hope. As such, it appears that US 
security discourse under President Obama exemplifies a form of biopolitics 
that takes as its object the indistinction between bare and hopeful life.  
This is the biopolitical use of hope in US security discourse – as asked by 
this thesis overarching research question: the production of a bare and hope-
ful life. For this life, which appears as a postmodern incarnation of the homo 
sacer, hope is not the prerogative of political life, but signifies rather the 
exclusion from it. For this bare and hopeful life, hope appears not as a “re-
fusal to accept the imposed conditions of bare life” (McSorley, 2016),40 but 
the very thing that produces and sediments its bareness. In contrast to tradi-
tional depictions of hope in critical studies of security and beyond, this form 
of biopoliticised hope appears not as a subversion of the exclusions generated 
by contemporary biopolitics of security, but as productive of them. This bio-
politicised hope acts not to issue forth a new future, or a new human subject , 
but to sediment life and time in its present form. If we could name the state of 
living produced by this hope, it would perhaps not be bare life, but rather a 
bareness-full-of-life – a minimum condition of life, in which the audacious 
force of life – which Obama defines as hope – is experienced in its purest 
form: a state of necessity, a will to survive.  
 
 
Afterword 
Given the prevalent desire for hope in our present society, I choose not to end 
this thesis hopefully. On the contrary, I wish to underline that we cannot take 
hope for granted as a progressive force. As this thesis has shown, there is 
harm being done in the name of hope and by the use of hope everyday. In our 
present lives, hope functions, inter alia, as a tool for political legitimation, as 
a variable through which different lives are valued differently and as a ra-
tionale for constant policing and surveillance. People die for the sake of hope.  
                                                                  
40 For a similar description of the relation between hope and bare life, see Bourke, 2014.  
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Hope also functions as an effective limit to our political imagination. In-
deed, the two should not be assumed to be the same. As this thesis has 
shown, hope cannot be pre-defined as opposite to the apocalyptic imaginary 
in which we currently live, where cinema and headlines daily warn of irre-
trievable climate change, of impeding financial crisis and of the next terror 
attack (Bendle, 2005; Wallis and Newport, 2009; Aradau and van Munster, 
2011; Zizek, 2011; Evans and Reid, 2014). On the contrary, Erdogan Sima 
argues that the "normalization of hope" (forthcoming) coexists with 
the catastrophic imaginary of our present lives. In this imaginary, hope has 
been transposed into a tool for survival, a celebration of that which Obama 
and others claim define us as human: our resilience, our creativity, our imag-
ination, our resolve, our will to be alive.  
Given the current conflation of insecurity, catastrophe and hope, we 
should not be surprised that traditional spaces or conditions of hopelessness 
are today immersed in a language of hope. For instance, UNHCR ceaselessly 
describes the paradigmatic site of today’s camp – the refugee camp – as a site 
of hope (2017a). In their human interest stories and press releases alike, the 
refugee is presented as a forever striving subject, an embodiment of human 
agency and resilience that “never gives up hope” (UNHCR, 2017b). While 
those inhabiting the refugee camp may very well be without future – accord-
ing to UNHCR, approximately two thirds of the global refugee population 
live in or at risk of facing a protracted refugee situation (Refugee Studies 
Center, 2011: 3) – the refugee is, it seems, never without hope.  
The same situation seems to apply to today’s increasingly precarious la-
bour force. While the dominant affect of precarity has been claimed to be 
anxiety (Institute for Precarious Consciousness, 2014), a sense of not having 
a future (Standing, 2011: 12), of being expendable, unable to foster social 
relations (Ibid.: 8), hopefulness is nonetheless continuously demanded of the 
precarious worker. Kathleen Kuehn and Thomas F. Corrigan describe the 
institutionalisation of this practice as “hope labour” (2013), directing atten-
tion to how the neoliberal economy encourages the precarious worker to 
trade security in the present for the hope of employment in the future. In our 
present economy, hope is individualised and responsibilised. According to 
Franco “Bifo” Berardi, “capitalism has swallowed the exchange-value ma-
chine not only for the different forms of life, but also for thought, imagina-
tion, and hope” (2009: 131). We should thus not be surprised that the ulti-
mate space of this form of labour, the factories in the tax-exempted Free 
Trade Zones in the global South are advertised as “zones of hope” (Tornhill, 
2010: 63). In these zones, the modernist promise, “Arbeit macht frei”, work 
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gives freedom, is replaced by the postmodern promise of neoliberalism: work 
gives hope.  
But perhaps we should not be surprised by this conflation of despair, in-
security and hope? To be sure, hope’s conceptual history is a history of vio-
lence and suffering. Although maintaining a desire for hope, Bloch identifies 
the location of hope as “the place of death” (1995: 112), Derrida associates 
hope with “fear and trembling” (1992: 5) and Eagleton claims that there is no 
“authentic hope” without tragedy (2015: 115). Hesiod’s narration of the leg-
end of Pandora (2006), which remains the first historical record of hope that 
has survived to our days, written approximately 700 BC, is another example 
of hope’s ambiguous relation to human suffering. According to the legend, 
hope is placed within the box of miseries that Pandora is ordered by Zeus to 
release onto mankind. In the final instance, however, Pandora closes the box 
and keeps hope, personified in the goddess Elpis, alone left within. The posi-
tioning of hope within the box of miseries – both belonging to the category of 
suffering and, in the final instance, being separated from it – have puzzled 
interpreters of Hesiod’s poem. According to Friedrich Nietzsche, Hesiod’s 
poem is evidence that hope “is in truth the worst of all evils, because it pro-
tracts the torment of men” (1996: 45). Others have taken the fact that hope 
“is caught by the lid [of Pandora’s box] to symbolize that hope always de-
sires to be realized but never is” (Verdenius, 1985: 68). However, such inter-
pretations reduce neither the ambiguity of Hesiod’s poem nor of hope, which 
remains intimately related to human suffering. Indeed, if we are to believe 
Hesiod’s tale, human suffering is hope’s original location. No wonder that 
Agamben has spoken of “the courage of hopelessness” (quoted in Cerf, 
2012).  
 
 
Contribution to the field 
In order to address the primary aim of this thesis – to make visible how hope 
can and has been used as a biopolitical technology in US security discourse – 
this thesis has demonstrated how hope is used by the US security apparatus 
under President Obama as a biopolitical technology to pre-empt processes of 
radicalisation in perceived risk populations. It has shown how the US securi-
ty apparatus employs strategic narratives to work on the desires of particular 
lives, to give form to an individualised and resilient form of hopeful life as 
well as to govern the future, issuing a state of prolonged suspension. 
Theoretically, the thesis has added critical discussion to a series of litera-
tures. The most important contribution, in my mind, has been a problematisa-
tion of the conceptual opposition between hope and bare life – central as this 
Conclusion 
 89 
opposition has been to discussions and applications of Agamben’s theoretical 
framework (Agamben, 2000: 31; Negri, quoted in Nielson, 2004; Bartolini, 
2008; Burke, 2011; Cerf, 2012; Snoek, 2012: 12-15; Bourke, 2014). As such, 
the thesis has also problematized the often presumed relationship between 
hope and contemporary forms of biopolitics of security, according to which 
hope functions as a motor for a radical political imaginary, an act of re-
sistance that politics of security seeks to tame or deny (e.g. Hardt and Negri, 
quoted in Brown et. al. 2002; Burke, 2011). By systematically situating hope 
within biopolitics of security and development, the thesis has contributed to 
critical literatures on development (e.g. Duffield, 2007), pre-emptive counter-
radicalisation and counterterrorism practices (e.g. Massumi, 2007; 
Holmqvist, 2013; Martin, 2014), resilience (e.g. Evans and Reid, 2014) as 
well as to studies on security through the lens affect theory (e.g. Bleiker and 
Hutchinson, 2008). It has shown that hope is complexly related to a series of 
affects or concepts that hope traditionally is taken to oppose, namely fear, 
hate, despair and violence. To critical literatures on hope, optimism and de-
sire (e.g. Laclau and Mouffe, 1985; Ahmed, 2004; 2010; Berlant, 2011), the 
thesis has investigated and theorised the relation between security and hope. 
The thesis has further added a biopolitical dimension, probing into how hope 
can be used to separate between forms of life, as well as to regulate processes 
of subjectification.  
Empirically, the thesis has employed an Agambenian analysis outside of 
its traditional settings, namely the camp and the law. Agamben’s framework 
has also been applied to an atypical discursive case, namely a discourse of 
inclusion and hope, rather than strict discourses of fear and exclusion (Bly, 
2017). If the traditional empirical material within critical security studies are 
discourses or aesthetics of fear, then this thesis has broadened the scope of 
empirical inquiry within this field, analysing the articulations of hope that 
necessarily exists in every security discourse. To studies on Obama’s grand 
narrative, the thesis has questioned common characterisations of Obama’s 
hope as progressive, as general, as empathic and as being without particulari-
ty.  
Methodologically, the thesis has contributed to discussions on how to op-
erationalise Agamben’s dense political philosophy. To that end, the thesis has 
teased out a set of principles through which to select empirical material (i.e. 
the example and the signature). Moreover, and perhaps more importantly 
given Agamben’s silence on the subject, the thesis has operationalised an 
analytical method that allows a discourse and/or narrative to be read in a 
systematic fashion. The key concepts that informs this discourse analytical 
method are, in relation to a conceptual analysis, the example, the exception 
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and the threshold. In terms of a narrative analysis the key concepts have been 
identified as stoppage, movement and repetition.  
Politically, the thesis has contributed to discussions of what limits our 
present political imaginary. By analysing the appropriation of hope by bio-
politics of security, it has questioned one of the most cherished tools of radi-
cal political agency. As such, the thesis has engendered, but not conducted, a 
discussion on how to decreate the hopeful state of exception in which we 
live.  
 
 
Future research 
This thesis has provoked several potential avenues for future research, in 
particular further analysis of hope as a biopolitical technology, within the US 
security apparatus and beyond. Within the US security apparatus, it would be 
pertinent to further analyse several aspects of the use of hope that this thesis 
has been blind to. These include the material, aesthetic and administrative 
implementation of hope briefly discussed in the section on delimitations. To 
be sure, hope is by no means the exclusive object of strategic communication 
or the task of Presidential discourse. On the contrary, within the US security 
apparatus hope is implemented in and through practices as diverse as trade 
policies, development programmes, US military conduct and communication, 
as well as in a range of external activities orchestrated by the US state de-
partment. One should also not forget the use of US media outlets in the Arab 
world, such the Alhurra television channel launched 2004 to counter anti-
Americanism.  
It would also be interesting to study hope as a biopolitical technique out-
side the sphere of security and outside the US context. Of particular interest 
would be to study articulations of hope in respect to the precarious labour as 
well as in neoliberalism at large. The hold on the imaginary that the promise 
of never-ending growth has occupied in our present capitalist societies comes 
to mind, as do hope’s relation to the politics of dis/satisfaction that is embed-
ded in our consumerist behaviour (McGowan, 2004). Of further interest 
would be to problematize the relation between hope and what has been called 
our contemporary “post-political condition” (Mouffe, 2005). While post-
politics is often called a hopeless form of politics devoid of ideology and 
vision, surrendered to technocracy and administration, it is arguably not 
without hope. For instance, the party manifesto of the Swedish Social Demo-
crats – a typical case of post-politics – professes commitment to a society in 
which everyone should have the ability to hope (Socialdemokraterna, 2012: 
1).  
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Another field of interests is of course how the lives that US security dis-
course targets with the use of hope, responds, appropriates, negotiates and/or 
resist this discourse. Such research would be especially valuable, seeing as it 
holds the potential to show exactly how reductive Obama’s use of hope actu-
ally was, denying – despite its promise of empathy and recognition – the 
existence and irreducible plurality of actually existing hopes in both the glob-
al South and North.  
The latter point is of course an empirical question, but it also has a theo-
retical dimension: how to suspend and resist a form of power that is so elu-
sive, formless and unarticulated as hope? How to suspend the state of suspen-
sion actualised by Obama’s version of hope? Crucial for such a line of re-
search would be to probe the relationship between hope and several of 
Agamben’s more ethical and political concepts, namely inoperativity (2014; 
2015), destituent power (Ibid.), profanity (2007a), messianic time (2005b) as 
well as his notion of free use (2014; 2015). Given the urgency of this task, 
this thesis has but scratched the surface of the relationship between hope and 
politics.  
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Svensk sammanfattning  
Denna avhandling undersöker hur Obamaadministrationens säkerhetsdiskurs 
använder och skapar hopp för att motverka radikalisering till våldsbejakande 
extremism. Studiens primära frågeställning är: hur används hopp biopolitiskt 
av amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs?  
Hopp har en lång historia i säkerhetsdiskurs. Sedan attackerna i New 
York 11 september 2001 har amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs varit närmast be-
satt av hopp. George W. Bush definierade tidigt hopplöshet som en grundor-
sak till terror (2006), en praxis som Obama till stora delar följt. Enligt Obama 
lever vi nu i en värld där ”vad som händer med ett enskilt barns hopp – var-
helst på jorden – kan berika vår värld, eller göra den fattigare” (2009a, egen 
översättning). Särskilt är det ”när människor – särskilt unga människor – 
känner sig fängslade i fattiga samhällen” (2015, egen översättning, egen 
betoning) som risker för radikalisering antas uppstå. Hopp fungerar i ameri-
kansk säkerhetsdiskurs som motsatsen till terror. Avsaknaden av hopp är inte 
bara förutsättningen för radikalisering till terror, det är även definierat som 
”terroristernas sanna intention” (Obama, 2016a, egen översättning). Det är 
vidare genom hopp som vi mäter terrorns effekter, en idé som även Donald 
Trump nyligen givit uttryck för: ”den sanna effekten av ISIS, Al Qaeda, 
Hizbollah, Hamas med flera inte bara räknas i antalet döda, det måste också 
räknas i antalet förlorade drömmar” (2017).  
Givet detta påstådda motsatsförhållande har skapandet och givandet av 
hopp definierats som en nyckelstrategi för att motverka radikalisering och 
därmed ’vinna’ kriget mot terrorismen. Enligt Bush är ”hopp ett svar på ter-
ror” (2002), enligt Obama är hopp ” det viktigaste vapnet i vår arsenal” 
(2009a). I efterdyningarna av attackerna i Bryssel 2016 pratade Obama om 
hopp som en social känsla eller kapacitet, med möjlighet att förflytta sig 
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mellan olika människor. Han syftade då ”inte på ett icke-statiskt hopp, utan 
ett levande hopp. Hopp är inte enbart en gåva vi får utan en något som vi 
måste ge till andra, en gåva att sprida vidare” (2016a). I hans hyllade Nobelt-
al talade Obama om att hopp innehade möjligheten att överbrygga tillsynes 
låsta och fasta identiteter, och därmed bereda väg för en gemensam mänsk-
lighet.  
Denna avhandling är inspirerad av sådana utsagor. Den undersöker hur 
hopp används som ett vapen i krig, ett medel för att skapa säkerhet. Utifrån 
det syftet analyserar avhandlingen hur hopp antas verka på terrorns grundor-
saker, på dess påstådda ideologiska och affektiva förutsättningar. I ameri-
kansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs är hopp inte bara en känsla, de är ett verktyg 
som verkar på individer, på deras begär och drömmar, på deras identiteter 
och på deras handlingsutrymme. Avhandlingen betraktar därför hopp som en 
social och politisk företeelse, vad Giorgio Agamben kallar för en biopolitisk 
teknologi (Agamben, 2011).  
Avhandlingens teoretiska ambition är att ifrågasätta och problematisera 
en tendens inom kritiska säkerhetsstudier och inom den akademiska vänstern 
att positionera hopp som diametralt motsatt den rädsla som ofta anses ligga 
bakom begäret efter säkerhet och kontroll. I denna litteratur presenteras hopp 
som byggt på ett öppet förhållningssätt mot det okända, som möjliggörande 
av en annan framtid bortom dagens säkerhetssamhälle och som subversivt av 
de främlingsfientliga och exkluderande praktiker som detta samhälle har 
underbyggt.  
Avhandlingens primära studieobjekt är Obamaadministrationens strate-
giska narrativ i vad amerikansk säkerhetspolitisk diskurs definierar som sä-
kerhetens tre primära domäner: (allmän) diplomati, utveckling och militär. 
Som denna avhandling visar så aktualiserar dessa domäner hopp på olika vis. 
Diplomatiska medel används för att motverka spridande av extremistisk ideo-
logi, genom att, hävdas det, ersätta hat och propaganda med hopp och san-
ning. Utveckling och bistånd påstås förebygga den förtvivlan som denna 
diskurs associerar med fattigdom. Slutligen används militära medel för att 
motverka rädsla – dels genom att ge löfte om beskydd, men även genom att 
verka som en symbol för en bättre framtid. De olika strategiska narrativen i 
dessa domäner aktualiserar med andra ord tre olika centrala distinktioner som 
ger hopp mening och betydelse: mellan hopp och hat, mellan hopp och för-
tvivlan och slutligen mellan hopp och rädsla. Genom att analysera hur dessa 
relationer hanteras inom varje narrativ undersöker denna avhandling den 
övergripande relationen mellan våld och hopp som underbygger amerikansk 
säkerhetspolitisk diskurs under president Obama. 
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Avhandlingen bygger på fyra stycken separata forskningsartiklar. Artikel 
141 – “Att läsa kriget mot terrorn genom hopp och rädsla: Affektiv krigsfö-
ring och frågan om framtiden” – placerar avhandlingen i samtida akademisk 
debatt. I motsats till att se hopp som en analytisk kategori för att studera och 
kritisera säkerhetsdiskurs under kriget mot terrorn, argumenterar artikeln för 
att hopp ska betraktas som en (bio)politisk kategori. Artikeln introducerar 
avhandlingens teoretiska ramverk, ett ramverk som systematiserats i denna 
kappa.  
Artikel 242 – “Det ovetande radikaliseringssubjektet: Amerikansk kontra-
terrorismkommunikation och hoppets biopolitik” – undersöker det strategiska 
narrativet inom den diplomatiska sfären. Artikeln analyserar hur hopp an-
vänds för att motverka spridandet av vad som framställs som en ’hatets ideo-
logi’, vilken inom amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs presenteras som den primära 
grundorsaken till radikalisering. Obama kallar denna process för ”korruption-
en av unga medvetanden” (2014b). Artikeln visar vidare att även om denna 
ideologi presenteras i motsatsförhållande till hopp och framtid, så ses den 
trots allt som fylld av hopp. Det är de facto detta hopp – dess löfte om mar-
tyrskap, om broderskap och om mening – som anses göra den så farlig, så 
attraktiv för den globala muslimska populationen. Särskilt farligt anses den 
framtid som är kopplat till detta hopp vara: dess löfte att hoppet ska infrias, 
att en värld fri från amerikansk ockupation är möjlig.  
Hopp är med andra ord inget entydigt positivt i amerikansk säkerhetsdis-
kurs, det kan tvärtom vara extremt farligt. Givet denna tvetydighet visar arti-
keln hur amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs försöker att reglera hoppets relation till 
våld, detta genom att bryta ner det hopp som anses erbjudas av ’hatets ideo-
logi’. Artikeln (tillsammans med den bredare analysen av detta narrativ som 
erbjuds i denna kappa) visar att målet med denna aktion inte är att skapa 
hopp, utan att skapa ett viss form av hoppfullt liv, vilket anses mindre våld-
sam än det radikaliserade subjektet – potentiellt hela den globala muslimska 
befolkningen. Målet verkar vara att individualisera hoppet, att skapa en män-
niska som inte drömmer om en specifik framtid, som inte kanaliserar sitt 
hopp mot någon annan, utan använder sitt hopp för att hantera sin vardagssi-
tuation – en strävande mångkulturell individ i ett neoliberalt samhälle.  
                                                                  
41 Wrangel, Claes (2013) “Reading the War on Terror through Fear and Hope: Affective War-
fare and the Question of the Future”, in Political Perspectives 7(2): 85-105. Special issue: Un-
folding the Political: Voices of aesthetics and emotions, guest edited by Emmy Eklundh and 
Rachel Massey. 
42 Denna artikel har blivit inbjudan att medverka i ett specialnummer om “Hope as a Technology 
of Development” föreslagen till tidskriften International Political Sociology. Redaktörer: Marjo 
Lindroth and Heidi Sinevaara-Niskanen. 
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Artikel 343 – “Att erkänna och se hopp: Amerikansk utvecklingsdiskurs 
och förtvivlans löfte” – undersöker det strategiska narrativet inom utveckl-
ingspolitikens domän. Artikeln analyserar hoppets relation till förtvivlan, 
såsom det artikuleras i och av detta narrativ. Förtvivlan ses i amerikansk 
säkerhetsdiskurs som starkt relaterat till fattigdom. Det är en kombination av 
förtvivlan och fattigdom som anses utgöra en av de primära grundförutsätt-
ningarna för att hatets ideologi ska kunna få spridning. I likhet med hoppets 
relation till hat diskuterat i artikel 1 är hoppets relation till förtvivlan inte 
entydigt i detta narrativ. Om det som Obama beskriver som traditionell ut-
vecklingsdiskurs säkerhetiserade världens fattiga på grund av deras förtviv-
lan, så betecknas världens fattiga som potentiellt farliga av Obama på grund 
av deras hopp. Artikeln visar att detta hopp kontinuerligt presenteras i ameri-
kanska säkerhetsdiskurs i singularära termer, vad som definierar världens 
fattiga är ett hopp, de ses och bemöts som ett subjekt.  
Vad som gör detta hopp farligt är den politiska och sociala karaktären det 
har tagit: viljan att bryta sig själv fri från omvärldens exploatering och kol-
onialism. Att erkänna och se världens fattiga som hoppfulla, vilket Obama 
vid upprepade tillfällen lovar världens fattiga, är med andra ord inte en enty-
dig handling. Som hoppfulla subjekt krävs att deras hopp noggrant regleras 
och upprätthålls – så att den förtvivlan som enligt Obama är oseparerbar från 
hopp inte ges våldsamma uttryck. Likt artikel 1 visar artikeln att vad som 
kännetecknar Obamas hopp är en omskrivning av hoppets relation till framti-
den. Istället för att beteckna ett begär efter en annan värld, så associeras hopp 
till en strävan att hantera ens nuvarande situation i ett neoliberalt samhälle. 
Världens fattiga uppmuntras med andra ord att inte bli frustrerat av sin fattig-
dom utan att finna hopp i sin fattigdom, att ständigt söka förbättra sin indivi-
duella position i ett i grunden ojämlikt samhälle. Målet att skapa hopp fram-
står därmed som djupt motstridigt löftet om verklig ekonomisk utveckling.  
Artikel 444 – “Hopp i katastrofens tid? Resiliens och framtiden i det ’bara 
livet’” – undersöker det strategiska narrativet i den militära domänen, med 
fokus på hoppets relation till rädsla. Detta narrativ skiljer sig till viss del från 
de övriga två, eftersom det hanterar hur ett direkt hot ska bemötas, snarare än 
hotets grundförutsättningar. Indirekt är dock detta narrativ även det förebyg-
gande: hur vi hanterar terror har, enligt Obama, betydelse för framtiden. Om 
terror möts med rädsla så antas detta skapa diskriminering och främlingsfi-
entlighet vilket påstås gynna terroristerna. Narrativet försöker således skapa 
                                                                  
43 Tängh Wrangel, Claes (2017a) “Recognising Hope: US Global Development Discourse and 
the Promise of Despair”, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 35(5): 875-892. 
44 Wrangel, Claes (2014) “Hope in a Time of Catastrophe? Resilience and the Future in Bare 
Life”, in Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses 2(3): 183-194. 
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både resiliens för framtida terrorattacker samt förebygga sådana attacker från 
att uppstå. Platsen för detta narrativ är den direkta konfrontationen med ter-
ror, antingen på hemmafronten i efterdyningarna av en attack eller i kriget 
mot terrorns traditionella slagfält, i synnerhet Afghanistan, Irak och Syrien.  
Liksom i de tidigare presenterade narrativen artikuleras i detta narrativ en 
ambivalent relation mellan hopp och rädsla. Enligt Obama kan inte hopp 
övervinna rädsla, snarare är hopp starkt beroende av rädsla och osäkerhet. 
Hopp är enligt Obama det som låter mänskligheten hantera osäkerhet, vilket i 
detta narrativ betecknas som ett givet, statiskt tillstånd. Artikeln visar att 
Obamas definition av den mänskliga naturen som hoppfull inkluderar en syn 
på människan som potentiellt farlig, som ett ofärdigt projekt som noggrant 
måste regleras så att den inte får våldsamma uttryck – hela mänskligheten 
förvandlas därmed till ett potentiellt säkerhetshot. Genom att erkänna detta 
”faktum” – att osäkerhet alltid kommer att finnas, att alla människor kan bli 
farliga – menar Obama paradoxalt nog att säkerhet kan uppnås. I detta erkän-
nande finns nyckeln till att låta hopp bli en garant för resiliens, en inneboende 
kraft att hantera osäkerhet, vilken Obama presenterar som ’mänsklighetens 
bästa sida’.  
Sammanfattningsvis har dessa artiklar visat att hopp inte är motstridigt 
osäkerhet, utan starkt förknippat med det. I amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs 
under Obama har hopp bidragit till att naturalisera den permanenta säkerhets-
apparaten och paranoian som kännetecknat västvärlden sedan attackerna i 
New York den 11 september 2001. Om skapandet av hopp är politikens mål, 
så innebär det med andra ord en radikal förskjutning av ideal som fred, sä-
kerhet och välstånd, vilka har organiserat global diskurs historiskt. Denna 
avhandling har snarare visat att hopp som politiskt ideal inom amerikansk 
säkerhetsdiskurs tvärtom bygger på en naturaliseing av osäkerhet, ojämlikhet 
och exkludering. I amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs ses hopp både som lösning 
till osäkerhet och det som gör världen permanent osäker. Detta hopp bygger 
på en identifiering av hela den muslimska populationen och på alla världens 
fattiga som särskilda riskpopulationer, som några vars hopp kräver ständig 
reglering. I förlängningen ses hela mänskligheten som potentiella terrorister. 
Utifrån denna artikulation skapar hopp ingen framtid, utan förstärker de 
maktrelationer och strukturer som kännetecknar vår nutida värld. Det hopp 
som antas agera pacificerande bygger vidare på en radikal separation mellan 
hopp och framtid. Inbyggt i detta hopp är de facto ett erkännande av att det 
inte finns en framtid, att osäkerhet är ständigt närvarande. Utifrån analyserna 
som underbygger denna avhandling framstår detta som den biopolitiska am-
bitionen för användandet av hopp i amerikansk säkerhetsdiskurs under 
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Obama: att reducera hopp till en individuell hanteringsmekanism i ett till-
stånd av permanent osäkerhet.  
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